ACADEMIC SCRIBBLERS

Policy Reports and the Making of American Strategy on Latin America

1948-1980

by

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Introduction

ANOTHER VIEW OF U.S. POLICY ON LATIN AMERICA

Something strange happened on January 20, 1977: Latin America became a stated priority for U.S. foreign policy makers. Of all people, a farmer from Georgia with little exposure to international relations thought the region was important. The newly minted President Jimmy Carter and his advisors went on to set forth a framework for foreign policy that featured Latin America, seen most publicly in the Panama Canal Treaty negotiations, which led to the 1977 agreements that ended a century of U.S. ownership. But this groundbreaking policy agenda did not appear out of thin air. Initiated earlier in the decade, the Linowitz Commission, a private, non-partisan group comprised of diverse academics and professionals, delivered a series of recommendations for policy in Latin America. This report was not without precedent: American presidents and secretaries of state throughout the 20th century had solicited similar documents. Indeed, after World War II, Presidents Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon all called for outside reports on Latin America. However, these reports were traditionally ignored by policy makers and forgotten by historians. The Linowitz Report was different: every one of its recommendations was implemented. In 1969, the editorial board of the *Washington Post* noted:

Periodically, American Presidents dispatch high-level missions to find out what is going on [in Latin America]—Eisenhower dispatched his brother, Milton; Kennedy dispatched Adolph Berle; Johnson dispatched Thomas Mann; and now President Nixon is dispatching Nelson Rockefeller, and all of them are part of the same old-boy network, men who formed their views in the 1930s and 1940s. The missions return full of pessimism, horrified by the poverty, appalled by the politics, anxious at the growth of left-wing nationalism, wary of Castro. Reports are written, and there is a
presidential statement. But nothing is done, because no one knows precisely what to do.¹

Thus, the success of the Linowitz Report really did represent a breakthrough in U.S. foreign policy.

This thesis will seek to trace the creation and implementation of these four policy reports. A chapter will be devoted to each, wherein the context, key actors, content, and influence of the reports will be examined in-depth. Each report will be framed by the general foreign policy from its corresponding era, based on secondary research. The actors, subject matter of the reports, and their impact will be discerned from a combination of archival sources, memoirs, government documents, and newspapers, amongst other primary material. The creation and impact of each report will be examined through old assessments and new analysis. The goal is an enhanced understanding of the development of policy on Latin America after World War II through the lenses of these reports.²

Most discussions about U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America focus on intervention. Guatemala in 1954, the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis in the early 1960s, and Nicaragua and Chile in the 1970s are some of the oft-repeated names and dates. Indeed, the U.S. did intervene in Latin American countries in a variety of ways and multiple times over the course of the 20th century. The literature on the subject is dominated by phrases like “business-interests”—the idea that U.S. government officials

²When discussing U.S. foreign policy in the context of Latin America, the most important trap to avoid is to try to identify an entity within the foreign policy establishment as “Latin America” policy. This does not exist any more than “Asia” or “Europe” policy does. At most, U.S. policy can be seen as directed at the Caribbean Basin or South America, respectively, and in many cases it is best to treat policy on a country-by-country basis. The practice of lumping is unfortunate and unacceptable. That said, in this paper, the focus of which—several policy reports—did seek to address North-South relations as a whole, the review of the literature and analysis of foreign policy will refer to U.S.-Latin American relations or policy toward Latin America.
were responsive to opportunities for financial advantage in the region—and points frequently to North-South colonial impulses. Examples of familiar authors, though not necessarily similar ones, are Walter LaFeber and Noam Chomsky. In terms of public recognition of these patterns of foreign policy, there are other historical reminders like the Church Committee, the 1973 congressional report that focused on covert intervention in the region. Though these literatures are rich, there is still significant room for improvement. There is a complexity to U.S. foreign policy in the region during the second half of the 20th century which overarching theories fail to register. For example, the series of reports noted above, which outline visions for policy in Latin America, go unremarked, or at best, ill-characterized. Four particularly notable reports were compiled and delivered, respectively, by George Kennan in 1949, Milton Eisenhower in 1958, Nelson Rockefeller in 1969, and Sol Linowitz in 1976. Policy reports, like those I am studying here, play only a peripheral role in existing grand narratives, and within these texts they are often simplified to their most basic impulses or entirely ignored. If one delves a little deeper, though, the reports can provide views of the shifting frameworks and intellectual roots of foreign policy and also reveal the political machinations involved in its creation. The marginalization of these reports obscures the historical narrative about U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America.

As noted, post-War policy reports toward Latin America are understudied, both for their intellectual contents and their impact. The economist John Maynard Keynes highlights the importance of studying these reports on an intellectual level in the concluding pages of his famous *General Theory*:

> the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly
understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.\(^3\)

This notion can be applied to more than just economic theory: in each case studied here there is at least some evidence of this “gradual encroachment of ideas.” The concept of an intellectual development external to centralized decision making is an important one to consider when evaluating the importance of these reports, especially when they are used as markers for the ideation and implementation of foreign policy toward Latin America. Though the reports highlighted in this paper have varied intellectual standpoints with multiple influences, they show how some thinkers understood the region at different moments and how these perceptions changed over time. In some cases, like with the Kennan Report, the reports have little perceptible intellectual influence on later thinkers and are only useful as a benchmark. In other cases, like the Eisenhower Report, there is little immediate influence but evidence that its recommendations and ideas were absorbed and reproduced by later policy makers. In the case of the latter two reports studied here, those by Rockefeller and Linowitz, the intellectual contents are at the heart of major shifts in foreign policy and demonstrate wide influence on contemporary thinkers and policy makers.

In terms of the impact of these reports on actual policy, there are also a variety of different responses to be made and factors to be accounted for, all of which change for each report. One key point is that a report does not have to have a direct and measurable impact to be important. A report can be significant for its intellectual content alone. Both

the Kennan Report, and to some extent the Eisenhower Report, serve as benchmarks for thought on policy toward the region because they outline in a significant way the thinking of influential policy figures during a historical period. However, the impact of a report, that is to say the extent to which its recommendations are adopted by the U.S. government, can also demonstrate a variety of different truths about the policy making process. The Rockefeller Report, for example, stands out because of the contrast between the scope of its recommendations and the narrowness of its implementation: a huge amount of rhetoric surrounded its creation and senior officials credited it as a source of policy for Latin America, but in reality policy did not reflect its innovative recommendations. What does this say about the policy making process? Comparatively, the Linowitz Report is important because it did have an impact: it was the first report of its kind to directly and almost completely dictate policy toward Latin America. What were the factors that caused this to occur? How did it differ from prior reports? Understanding the success of the Linowitz Report is key because it reveals something about the making of U.S. strategy on Latin America and how it may correspond with major expressions of and/or shifts in comprehensive thinking on the region over time.

Ultimately, this study operates on two levels. For one, it reveals the full subject matter of the four reports, some of which has been obscured. Clearing up the content of these reports, especially Kennan’s and Rockefeller’s, puts the intellectual heritage of policy in the region in relief. In short, the progression of policy thought is more egalitarian, innovative, and in the case of Eisenhower, lasting, than the literature has allowed. Simultaneously, this thesis investigates the impact, or lack thereof, of these reports, and surveys the processes by which the reports were attempted to be, or actually,
implemented. This sort of analysis is heavier in the latter two cases because they are more complicated and complement each other in informative ways. What they will reveal is that U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America often hinges on the sentiment of centralized leadership—in this context primarily the White House—as opposed to autonomous external thinking (even though the latter may have influenced the former, in some form), solicited or not. Thus, unsurprisingly, the recommendations of external policy thinkers are most effective when the external actors are integrated into the actual decision making apparatus. However, the Linowitz Report’s unprecedented success as a privately commissioned policy document indicates that there are other, less obvious forces at work which may contain significant lessons for aspiring policy makers.

Recent overviews of the literature on U.S.-Latin American relations since World War II agree on three motivations for relations, respectively: economics, national security, and ideology. All three approaches cast the U.S. in a negative light and as imposing its economic interests, security concerns, or ideology on Latin Americans. Here, the first issue for academic disagreement is the question of primacy for these three concerns relative to U.S. policy formulations in the region. Noted historian of Latin America and critic of U.S. foreign policy, Lars Schoultz, agrees with this broad analysis. He writes that these three interests have driven foreign policy in some combination for two centuries. Historian Mark Gilderhus also concurs in his more compact review of the literature, limited to the post-War period. However, he complicates the issue further, highlighting, “interpretive complexities and profound differences over the roles of

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ideology, economics, and security as determinants in the formulation of foreign policy.”

Indeed, as Gilderhus hints, each of these categories is itself subject to interpretation and can be defined with varying degrees of extremism. Political scientist Harrison Wagner agrees, and finds that it may be pointless to try to differentiate forces and identify which is more powerful; the important thing is to distill the unique role of each.

It is imperative to consider, albeit briefly, the range of viewpoints encompassed under these three general categories of thinking about U.S.-Latin American relations, and those that do not fit at all. For example, under the header of economics, there are a range of corporatists—those who cite the primacy of the influence of U.S. business interests in shaping policy toward Latin America—but also dependency theorists and New Left historians, like Walter LaFeber and William Appleman Williams, who represent a more radical group. Essentially, these scholars view the entire international system of development as designed to subordinate Latin American interests to those of the U.S. and to extend America’s imperial interests. Of course, the lines between the three major categories are blurred, and they have disparate adherents. For example, early U.S. historians of Latin America, such as Samuel Flagg Bemis, probably understood the doctrine of exceptionalism as founded on ideological, economic, and strategic grounds.

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9 For an edifying discussion of the inimitable and somewhat misunderstood Bemis, see again Gilderhus, “Founding Father: Samuel Flagg Bemis and the Study of U.S.-Latin American Relations”: 1-13. As Gilderhus writes on page 12: “Bemis showed almost no interest in or comprehension of Latin American
Indeed, in his U.S.-centric but foundational text, *The Latin American Policy of the United States*, Bemis declared: “From the Era of Emancipation to the Second World War, the Latin American policy of the United States has reflected constantly the vital necessities of national security and idealism of the American People.”

Thus, as historian David Painter notes in his review of the literature, it may be tedious to synthesize or examine each of the three areas at once, but failing to do so prevents a complete understanding of the creation and effects of these policies. Even though these three areas of analysis seem to encompass many of the different interpretations of U.S.-Latin American relations, clearly, there are exceptions, overlaps, and a great deal of room for historians and political scientists to maneuver within each category.

There are also those in the literature who recognize these critiques but either conceive of U.S. motivations in different terms or simply do not find the categories useful at all. In the first instance, historian of international relations Ernest May recognized the occasional influence of business on U.S. government decisions and a lack of attention to Latin American issues and interests but concluded that: “On the whole…the American Government has been mindful of these interests [Latin American interests] and has acted in what it thought to be a spirit of benevolence and even, on occasion, of self-sacrifice.”

Though not necessarily uniformly sympathetic to U.S. motivations, international historian Darlene Rivas takes a more complex view of U.S. policy in Latin America. She viewpoints. Instead, he seemed to expect that Latin Americans should defer, line up in support of the United States, and endorse the judgments of their natural betters.”


puts aside dependency and developmental theories and other literature emphasizing economic and security-based motivations. For her, the issue is embodied in the character of Nelson Rockefeller, the “Missionary Capitalist,” and his dealings in Latin America, especially Venezuela, after World War II. She claims that it is futile to try to explain Rockefeller’s work in Venezuela with dependency or modernization theories. In short, the field of historical research on Latin America does fall into three major categories—which are largely critical of U.S. actions—but there are also dissenters and those who disregard such concepts entirely.

Outside of this general debate, however, there are also a collection of interesting theories that seek to complicate matters—proffered by political scientists and historians alike—regarding the elements of U.S.-Latin American relations. Though there are too many to name, a few are particularly useful in the context of this paper. One is political scientist Martha Cottam’s analysis of images in U.S. policy toward Latin America. At the foundation of Cottam’s claim is the idea that policymakers and citizens have worldviews that are largely comprised of, “specific, identifiable images of types of states.” She identifies five major images: the enemy, the ally, the neutral, our dependent, and the enemy’s dependent. She argues that the dependent and neutral images are prevalent in the development of policy toward Latin America. One of Cottam’s central claims is that neutral countries are not associated with opportunity for America. Rather, such countries

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16 Cottam, *Images and Intervention*, 18. Of course, Cottam’s position is clearly drawn from a legacy of ideas about Cold War relations, including, particularly relevant here, the similarities between her “threatening dependent image” and Cole Blasier’s “rival great power linkage” conceptualization. For more on Blasier’s ideas, see: Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1976).
pursue their own interests, which may result in conflict with the United States.\textsuperscript{17} Dependent countries are defined by their economic and/or strategic reliance on the U.S. Another important claim Cottam makes concerns the inner workings of the foreign policy establishment. She writes: “Those who do not share the prevailing view (the one held by top-level policy makers) may argue against policies emanating from it, but due to role requirements and career interests, they will not prevent a policy choice unless a number of them act in concert.”\textsuperscript{18} Her conception has important parallels with the ideas of May, who noted before Cottam did the perverse incentives involved in bureaucratic decision-making.\textsuperscript{19} May might also have engaged—though perhaps limited to a more sophisticated, more contingent formulation—with Cottam’s proposed images. According to May, the inherited attitudes and flawed understanding of history amongst decision makers often leads to specific mental images of countries and actors and their likely interests or decisions in given situations.\textsuperscript{20} That said, May might have argued that this sort of behavior would be more likely to yield poor results than Rivas would concede due to other factors, like the stress experienced by actors in high pressure decision making scenarios.\textsuperscript{21}

Another powerful angle from which to approach the production of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America—and one with obvious relevance for policy reports—is Eldon Kenworthy’s idea about myths in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Kenworthy

\textsuperscript{17} Cottam, \textit{Images and Intervention}, 26.
\textsuperscript{18} Cottam, \textit{Images and Interventions} 30.
\textsuperscript{19} May, “Lessons” of the Past, 177.
\textsuperscript{21} May, “Lessons” of the Past, 31, for example.
puts together an interdisciplinary theory to discuss the idea of political myths. He is interested in how the government uses inherent misconceptions about policy to encourage or discourage certain actions or opinions.\textsuperscript{22} The implications are wide-ranging and encompass activities such as political advertising, lobbying, and selling policy packages to public audiences.\textsuperscript{23} Most relevant here is Kenworthy’s contention that: “It is when we invest political myths with multihistorical authority—forgetting authorship, losing sight of alternatives, letting fantasy fly unchecked—that we invite trouble.”\textsuperscript{24} Indeed, Kenworthy’s thoughts about the manipulation of policy and audiences map onto Cottam’s theory of images and May’s argument about the misuse of historical analogy in the sense that people obey certain characterizations, accurate or not. Kenworthy offers important insights into how U.S. policy is made and viewed retroactively. He also highlights the unfortunate reality that policy often contains and reproduces groundless assumptions about other countries and peoples.\textsuperscript{25} Political Scientist Yale Ferguson also catches the significance of these trends for policy toward Latin America. He helpfully suggests that much can be learned from public statements regarding foreign policy intentions, even if they are designed to mislead or are not heeded.\textsuperscript{26} Historian of American foreign policy, Robert Pastor, a Linowitz Commission member and national security adviser to Latin American under Carter, describes the importance of knowing these different aspects of the literature best when he writes of studying the history of U.S. foreign policy toward the region: “In order to proceed, one needs a healthy skepticism of

\textsuperscript{22} Eldon Kenworthy, \textit{America/Américas: Myth in the Making of U.S. Policy toward Latin America} (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 49.
\textsuperscript{23} Kenworthy, \textit{America/Américas}, 65.
\textsuperscript{24} Kenworthy, \textit{America/Américas}, 161.
\textsuperscript{25} Kenworthy, \textit{America/Américas}, xiv.
the two most prevalent images, a willingness to question myths that have obscured the view of events, and an interest in using an interactive perspective." 

Also relevant to the literature on U.S. policy in Latin America after World War II is another broader academic debate concerning the fundamental orientation and operation of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. Foreign policy experts I.M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake present one notable interpretation of the transition from a policy establishment guided by the “common sense” of professional foreign service officers and the President to one shaped by ideology and the interference of the U.S. Congress. Though the authors trace the gradual infiltration of politics into foreign policy all the way from World War II, they hold that the twin events of Vietnam and Watergate represented the watershed for increased distrust of executive flexibility and free-hand diplomacy both on the part of Congress and vocal American liberals and moderates. Destler, Gelb, and Lake strongly criticize this sea change in American foreign policy. According to them, it results in constantly mutating and inconsistent policy. One bad effect of increasingly

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30 Of course, there is more than one side to this coin. New Left historians see this change as the answer to the long held imperialism of the East Coast foreign policy elite. See Donald White, *The American Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 349, for a brief discussion. Or, to go straight to the source, see Walter Lafeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2008) and Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life*. For a more middle-of-the-road perspective, try Robert Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929-1976* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). An easy example of a manifestation of the shift in foreign policy motivation and source is the Church Committee. Ironically, though, as the audience for foreign policy decisions grew and encouraged
politicized foreign policy processes, as Destler notes in a separate work, is the increasing tendency since World War II for presidents to centralize decision making in the White House rather with State Department personnel. This development was marked in part by the birth of the NSC in 1947. The result, as Ferguson notes and Destler agrees, is a president with an increasing ability to frustrate bureaucratic procedures with top-down decision making. This is especially apparent in the presidencies of Kennedy and Nixon, but it occurred earlier in the century as well, notably under Woodrow Wilson. This has clear implications for the reports discussed here, all of which (with the exception of Kennan’s) were solicited by and/or delivered to Presidents bypassing the State Department.

There is no significant existing literature focused solely on the series of reports studied here. They are mostly mentioned, briefly, in the context of grander narratives about U.S. foreign policy, which is part of what makes them such fertile sources for study. But, there is a precedent in the historiography for this type of investigation. One prominent example is diplomatic historian Lawrence Gelfand’s work, *The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919*. His book investigates the development of the American Preparatory Commission, commonly known as “the Inquiry,” which was a large-scale investigation and planning group for U.S. policy after World War I.

congressional intervention, presidential power in that arena also increased in reaction to these events. However, the important point for this project is simply that the shift did occur, a fact over which there is little apparent disagreement. See Robert Kelley, “Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon,” *American Historical Review* 82: 3 (June 1977): 550-561, for an authoritative voice.


33 For a similar account, and suggestions on how to centralize bureaucracy and decision-making, see Richard A. Johnson, *The Administration of United States Foreign Policy* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971).
Organized by Texan political broker Edward M. House, this early “think tank” produced thousands of reports on a variety of subjects and regions, mostly compiled by academics.\textsuperscript{34} Though little studied before Gelfand, as he points out, research into the Inquiry not only sheds light on Wilson’s foreign policy in general but also the means by which it was crafted and implemented. In this case it reflected Wilson’s academic inclinations, the rise of outside experts, and the relatively weak influence of the State Department.\textsuperscript{35} On a more theoretical level, the importance of studying reports such as these is also expounded upon by historian of U.S. foreign policy, Frank Ninkovich, who argues that the rise of “cultural policy” in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century—which includes the rise of internationalized philanthropy and policy vehicles like non-governmental organizations—deserves further study and elevates the importance of identifying and studying large-scale shifts in intellectual frameworks for foreign policy.\textsuperscript{36} As a whole, it remains important to study all the reports because, as Pastor has noted, reports can demonstrate the similar opportunities and different choices available to decision-makers over time.\textsuperscript{37} Indeed, this sort of study in general can also serve a broader policy purpose. By utilizing the tools of a historian to reveal the full face and extent of prior policy developments, and the roadblocks and runways to implementation, this thesis might become an “inquiry” of its own for policy makers struggling with similar issues that persist to this day.


\textsuperscript{35} Gelfand, \textit{The Inquiry}, xiii, 1-78.


\textsuperscript{37} Pastor, "Explaining U.S. Policy toward the Caribbean Basin”: 496.
This undertaking will be organized into four chapters. The first chapter will include a discussion of George Kennan’s 1949 report from Latin America. The least formal of the reports discussed here, Kennan’s work is useful as a point of entry after World War II in terms of establishment opinion and as a benchmark for intellectual progression. It is especially informative to consider Kennan’s writing through an anti-imperialist framework. Never implemented—nor even considered as a potential framework for real policy—Kennan’s report does not enter into discussions of impact. The second chapter discusses the 1953 and 1958 iterations of Milton Eisenhower’s report to the President. Milton was President Eisenhower’s brother, confidante, and adviser on a broad range of issues. This report is the first post-War report on Latin America delivered by a government outsider that is recognizable by its format and execution as a formal inquiry. Milton assembled a team of experts, solicited briefings, and made several trips to Latin American countries before writing a detailed document with specific recommendations. In the end, the report was delivered through official channels and meant for the President and his highest advisers in the White House and the State Department. Though the Eisenhower Report did not leave an immediate footprint on U.S. policy, it did lay the groundwork for a host of policies that arose in later administrations, particularly the Alliance for Progress.

The third chapter moves into the late 1960s, after Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress (which trumps several insignificant policy reports contributed during the same time period in terms of understanding policy creation). In 1968, Nixon sent his political foe, Rockefeller, on what many considered a fools errand to busy Rockefeller during Nixon’s first months in office. But Rockefeller took his task—to deliver a report
and recommendations on policy toward Latin America—seriously. In the end, he produced an erudite and innovative set of recommendations that were largely ignored by Nixon and his adviser, Henry Kissinger. The richness of the Rockefeller Report was lost in the controversy surrounding its military recommendations. But more importantly, the Rockefeller Report’s failure casts the success of the Linowitz Report in even greater relief, and thus plays an important role in understanding post-War policy development as a whole.

The fourth and final chapter tackles the Linowitz Commission and its two iterations in 1974 and 1976. The Linowitz Report, delivered by a non-partisan, private commission—the first of its kind—made a strong break from previous reports on several levels. For one, it advocated an entirely new approach to Latin America that was more global in its perspective and intentionally abandoned traditional U.S. policy formulations for the region, such as the Good Neighbor policy and its offshoots. For another, Carter and his administration implemented the Linowitz Report’s 28 recommendations in their entirety. A host of factors were linked to this, including the report’s more neutral source, Carter’s particularly favorable disposition toward Latin America, and the crossover between members of the Linowitz Commission and staff roles in the Ford and Carter White House. The Linowitz Report deserves special attention both for its groundbreaking approach to foreign policy and as a model for the creation and implementation of a non-internal policy report. As a whole, this thesis seeks to change prevailing understandings of U.S. policy through the lenses of these reports, which both enliven the narrative and contain important lessons about the policy making process.
Chapter 1
LATIN AMERICAN POLICY AFTER WORLD WAR II

The Kennan Report

As World War II concluded the Truman Administration turned to a new set of foreign policy priorities. The Cold War was emerging and containment of communism in Asia and Europe became the most important task. While some attention was paid to Latin America in the years immediately following the war, especially with regard to military aid, a comprehensive policy was never developed. It is not a surprise, then, that no major policy report was ever solicited. However, though less formal and less planned than its successors, George Kennan’s report on Latin America does provide an important intellectual benchmark when studying foreign policy toward the region. During his final year with the State Department, after he had already acquired a reputation with “The Long Telegram” and “Article X,” Kennan made a month-long journey to study America’s neighbors to the South. The report was highly subjective and not comprehensive. But, a comparison of the report’s text with historical and contemporaneous criticism thereof reveals that these prior opinions of the report are based on shallow analysis and on only one aspect of Kennan’s writings. While some of what he wrote was racist and unconsidered, Kennan also displayed his foreign policy acumen and anti-imperialist attitude in suggesting policy formulations.

U.S. foreign policy makers in the late 1940s were primarily concerned with containing the communist threat, as they perceived it, based largely on an image inspired by Kennan himself. For this time period that meant the regional focus was mostly on Asia
and Europe.\(^\text{38}\) While this ordering did undercut plans for Latin America once proposed by the incoming Truman Administration, the region still received the attention of policymakers. According to LaFeber, the region was disregarded completely, which would explain the lack of allegiance shown by Latin American countries when the U.S. tried to corral allies at the onset of the Korean War.\(^\text{39}\) Unfortunately, LaFeber ignores crucial components of relations from the time. For one, in 1947 a group of Western Hemisphere nations signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in Rio de Janeiro (the Rio Treaty). The pact bound the signees to mutual hemispheric assistance.\(^\text{40}\) In other words, if one member nation was attacked, it was considered an attack on every other member. This was a major development in U.S. policy in the region, albeit an attempt to strengthen North-South ties against communism.\(^\text{41}\) Although some proposed policies were not implemented, Latin America remained an intellectual focus of the administration on other fronts as well. As historian Chester Pach has explained, War Department officials strived to implement pre-sanctioned plans by Truman for the U.S. to become an exclusive arms supplier to Latin American countries.\(^\text{42}\) This policy development surfaced as the Inter-American Military Cooperation bill in the winter of 1947. It ultimately failed as a result of domestic politics and increasing concerns about communism in the hemisphere, the very force the arms were meant to combat.\(^\text{43}\) Policy makers were convinced that communism was the greatest global threat since the Nazis,


\(^{40}\) Though it is not the point I am trying to make, this also explains why the U.S. might have been looking for regional support against Korea. But that is a question—and a history (the U.S. has tried to use the Rio Treaty for similar purposes as recently as in connection to 9/11)—for another day.


\(^{43}\) Pach, “The Containment of U.S. Military Aid”; 238.
and, therefore, worried that U.S. arms would fall into the wrong hands in Latin America.\textsuperscript{44}

Indeed, though it is true, as Pach argues, that the growing specter of the Soviet Union distracted from arms deals—and gave rise to conflict between the State Department and the War Department—the deals that did go through represented U.S. policy in the region for the time period. As historian of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, Stephen Rabe, notes, even though the grand multilateral plans for arms trading never came to pass, the bilateral assistance that was approved did reflect Truman’s original intentions.\textsuperscript{45} One distinguishing characteristic of this bilateral aid policy was that although U.S. policy makers wanted to protect certain states from communism, they were unwilling to depend on their allies for military support to the U.S. in the case of war.\textsuperscript{46} This policy also pitted the State Department, which opposed bilateral military assistance against the War and Navy departments, which were encouraging it. The latter wanted to maintain Latin American military dependence on the U.S., and hence, encourage containment, while the former clung to post-War ideals about multilateral and non-military aid, embodied in policies like the Marshall Plan.\textsuperscript{47} Ultimately, the fact that there

\textsuperscript{44} Pach, “The Containment of U.S. Military Aid”: 238-243. As Pach points out, it is also ironic that the same Cold War thinking which would inspire extensive intervention in the region over the next decades actually prevented the development of the Western Hemisphere Defense Program at this juncture. According to journalist Tad Szulc, Latin America should have come to the fore in the 1940s and 1950s, but “As it was, the Truman administration became overwhelmingly absorbed with the problems of Europe and Asia—constructing the Marshall Plan and fighting the war in Korea. It was then that a Latin America which desperately wanted to join the West, and the 20th century, began to be lost to us.” “Continents on a Collision Course,” \textit{New York Times Book Review}, July 21, 1963.


\textsuperscript{46} Rabe, “Inter-American Military Cooperation”: 143-144

\textsuperscript{47} Rabe, “Inter-American Military Cooperation”: 145-147. The fact that what military assistance did transpire coincided with the destabilization of some Latin American countries should not to be confused as a causal relationship. Rabe points to the coincidence of these, but as multiple scholars point out, many Latin American states were undergoing autonomous populist and democratic change after World War II. Rabe, “Inter-American Military Cooperation”: 135; Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, “The Postwar Conjuncture in Latin America: Democracy, Labor, and the Left,” in \textit{Latin America Between the Second}
was no equivalent to the Marshall plan in Latin America, and that bilateral arms aid was unpopular and apparently ineffective, harmed the reputation of U.S. policy on the region. Though the late 1940s was certainly not a period of innovation or highly successful execution, Latin America did receive attention from American foreign policy makers, signified primarily by bilateral aid.

By 1950 Kennan had already made a permanent impact on the U.S. foreign policy establishment, and he had done so in just a few short years. But as containment fever spread Kennan was removed from his post as director of the Policy Planning Staff and named a counselor to the State Department. According to Kennan, by 1950 he was disillusioned with his government, “a middle aged man, a bit weary from three hectic years in the Washington bureaucracy, somewhat dépaysé…” Kennan was preparing to leave the government for the safe haven of academia at Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study. In his final months, Kennan requested he take a trip to Latin America. According to Kennan, “In February and March I made, with the permission of the Secretary of State, a journey to Latin America. I had never been there. I wanted to see something of it, before I left government.” Kennan saw himself as engaged in a serious undertaking. In a memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, which amounted to the delivery of his report on March 29, 1950, Kennan noted his journey was like a

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49 Kennan had meant to leave the government earlier but the outbreak of war in Korea had caused Secretary Acheson to request that he stay as a counselor to help develop policy in response to North Korean aggression, which he did. See Wilson D. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 314.
“Cook’s Tour.” He also took pains to establish the validity of his findings, despite the informal—and individual—nature of his inquiry. He declared in his report that his opinions, “are presumably not less valuable by virtue of the fact that the trip enabled me to devote more time and thought to these matters than would ever have been possible in Washington, and to try out ideas on a large number of knowledgeable people.” Though Kennan may have been a novice in the region, especially compared to Milton Eisenhower and later report writers, he did not see his report as a throwaway assignment.

Kennan’s diaries from the time of his trip, which echo some of the more criticized sentiments of his report, provide a springboard for investigating the report itself. As Kennan left Washington, D.C.’s Union Station for Mexico City by train, his writing already betrayed the emotions that would accompany him throughout his travels and perhaps color the cynicism of his reports. Often critical and sometimes poetic, Kennan had a heavy heart when he left. He felt pessimistic about what he could accomplish and embarrassed at what he perceived to be the frivolousness of his trip and his leaving his family behind for almost a month. Anecdotes from his diary give an idea of his mood and ideas. In Mexico, Kennan was focused on the ostentation of the nouveau riche who “have lost the virtues of their Indian villages.” And he verged on verse when he commented of Mexico City: “The city sleeps the uneasy sleep of the threatened animal; and its dreams are troubled.” In Caracas, Kennan openly admitted that he never left his hotel room except for a visit to the embassy and a golf club lunch arranged by the

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51 Kennan to Secretary, March 29, 1950, MC076, Box 299, Folder 1.
52 Kennan to Secretary.
53 February 20 Entry, MC076, Box 232, Folder 1, Diaries 1950, Diary Notes of Trip to South America.
54 February 25 Entry, MC076, Box 232, Folder 1, Diaries 1950, Diary Notes of Trip to South America.
55 February 25 Entry.
Foreign Service.\textsuperscript{56} When he was in Sao Paulo and required an armed guard, Kennan was introspective and “began to feel like a hunted beast, and to ask myself whether it was really possible that I was as sinister as all this.”\textsuperscript{57} Other observations included how uncomfortable he felt staying with wildly wealthy expats on their estate and his reflection that in Lima it had not rained for 29 years, which explained all the dirt.\textsuperscript{58} Kennan’s diaries exhibit his generalized attitudes about Latin American cities and their inhabitants but also his sensitivity to the extreme division between the wealthy and the poor and other social issues.\textsuperscript{59} Of course, the contents of Kennan’s diaries cannot be used as a substitute for the text of the report itself, and, as it turns out, that document requires a more sophisticated lens for examination than is typically applied.

The report itself was delivered to Acheson in the form of a secret memorandum, dated March 29, 1950. It was printed on regular nine by 12 inch copy paper and was rather non-descript. It did not contain a special introduction by the author thanking anyone nor was it ever published in a formal manner. Kennan began his report by summarizing his conclusions. Interestingly, he did not immediately betray the generalizations that were spotted throughout his diaries and for which his report was impugned. He started by laying out what he believed to be the two most important roles of policy toward Latin America. Compatible with his reputation as the father of the Cold War, Kennan exclaimed the importance of Latin American independence to U.S. efforts

\textsuperscript{56} February 28 Entry, MC076, Box 232, Folder 1, Diaries 1950, Diary Notes of Trip to South America.
\textsuperscript{57} March 9 Entry, MC076, Box 232, Folder 1, Diaries 1950, Diary Notes of Trip to South America.
\textsuperscript{58} Kennan, \textit{Memoirs}, 479.
\textsuperscript{59} Kennan, \textit{Memoirs}, 478; February 26 and March 9 Diary Entries, MC076, Box 232, Folder 1, Diaries 1950, Diary Notes of Trip to South America.
to rebut “the Russian challenge.” His second headline emphasized the strategic importance of Latin America in terms of geography, raw materials, and international opinion and trends. These first two bullets, both of which fell under the section header: “Relationship of Latin America to our Global Policies,” were concise and reasoned, if bluntly realist. In one paragraph Kennan provided an extended analysis of the result of a confrontation between “Russia and the Atlantic Pact group,” and he made a compelling argument for the psychological and military reasons why such a situation would have constituted a negative strategic development if a majority of Latin American states sided with the Russians. The relatively uncontroversial content of this first section, and the fact that later segments of the report came back to its main themes repeatedly, illustrates how certain aspects of Kennan’s report have come to overshadow its central points.

It was in section two of the report, entitled “General Considerations,” and to a slightly lesser extent, in section three of the report, entitled simply, “Communism,” that Kennan’s generalizations and patronizing tone were most apparent, though few specific recommendations for policy were offered. Kennan started out noting that, “The beginning of wisdom in Latin American affairs is distrust of the generality,” but he proceeded to throw away this favorite adage of Latin Americanists and to record some observations which he claimed applied across “the area as a whole.” These statements spanned geography (the Amazon was “singularly hostile to human activity”), colonialism (“a

61 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 599. He does deemphasize the importance of the region for American military bases. This, of course, missed the real problem: the potential for Soviet bases. A small island off Florida dotted with Soviet missile silos was apparently not at the fore of Kennan’s thoughts.
62 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 598.
63 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 599-600.
64 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 600.
series of events unfortunate and tragic almost beyond anything ever known to human
history”), and the Latin American personality (the “subconscious recognition of the
failure of group effort finds its expression in an exaggerated self-centeredness and
egotism”).65 Objectively, in this section Kennan provided little of value to policy makers
other than a signal for his biases. In the third section, focused on communism, Kennan
continued with subjective analysis based on personal anecdotes. He found that
communism was “our most serious problem in the area.”66 Instead of quantifying that
statement, though, he launched into an historical investigation wherein he used the logic
of the Monroe Doctrine to advocate the fending off of communist encroachment in the
hemisphere.67 Kennan concluded by arguing for a greater effort to prevent communist
infiltration of key Latin American positions, though he strongly disavowed intervention.68
Neither of these sections were exemplars of objective argumentation or evidentiary
surplus, but they also contained few specific recommendations and thus did not constitute
a great weight in terms of potential policy like latter sections of the report might have.69

In sections four and five of the report, “Economic Matters” and “Political
Matters,” respectively, Kennan focused on specific problems and made varied
recommendations of which some were innovative and prescient for later policy—or ideas
for policy—in the region. In the fourth section, Kennan began with a tempered analysis
of then-current U.S. investment activity in Latin America. He suggested that, “what we
want is not just more trade, but such trade as will be a source of stability and

65 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 600-602.
66 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 603.
67 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 604-606.
68 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 608-609. This disavowal of interventionism as a legitimate tactic is particularly
interesting given future developments in the region.
69 For a similar take, see Anders Step
tanson, Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1989), 162.
improvement in international relations, and not just more export of U.S. capital to those countries…”

Kennan thought that the U.S. should slightly favor European markets and that the single-commodity import situation should be carefully studied from the U.S. side to avoid potential shortages. In terms of U.S. corporate holdings and investment properties in Latin America, Kennan disavowed governmental protection for American businesses, even those in areas where U.S. capital was subject to perceived mistreatment. He also found the applicability of Point Four, an American development policy for the Southern Hemisphere, to be limited. In his economic views, Kennan for the most part espoused what might be compared to a classical liberal, free-market mindset, which was more akin to that of 1970s globalists, to be discussed later, than to someone perceived as promoting patriarchal foreign policy.

In the fifth section, Kennan continued a trend of thoughtful policy suggestions, though some of these were quite blunt in their presentation as well. Kennan began with a section which was part history and part political theory and explicated why it was futile for the U.S. to press democratic institutions on Latin American countries. Though this section did contain hints of a belief in the superiority of American institutions, Kennan was strongly laissez-faire. He questioned the idea that the model of American democracy was applicable—or should be applied—to other countries. He concluded that it was acceptable to treat individual Latin American governments differently based on certain characteristics, but he insisted, “our distinctions should be based upon their [the Latin

70 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 610.
71 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 611
72 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 611. Indeed, he in a way foresees the expropriation dilemmas that had occurred on occasion already but which would increase massively later after the fall of Batista in Cuba.
73 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 613-617
74 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 614.
American states] relations with us and as members of the international community."

From there Kennan went on to assert the need for “total diplomacy” in Latin America via the centralization of policy making in the region, and he rejected the need for Pan-Americanism or multilateralism. These latter concepts were two major themes in post-War American foreign policy but ones that, in some ways, were challenged in significant ways over the next decades. In his final paragraphs, labeled “General Tone of our Approach to Latin America,” Kennan struck a balance between overtones of dominance—he insisted that Latin Americans must always remember the power of the U.S. and the priority of its needs and objectives over their own—but also espoused neutrality and classical liberalism—if the U.S. received the respect it deserved in international dealings, it would return the same to Latin American countries, without preference, bias, or undue influence. Though this last section of the report contained some of the types of assertions that typify Kennan’s accompanying diary entries and the first and second sections of the report, there was also evidence of a professional foreign policy analyst offering up rationale and recommendations for a new policy in the region, most of which were inflected with contemporaneous realities like geostrategic realism, Cold War paranoia, and paternalism.

American historian Robert Trask outlines the prevailing historical perspective on the report, which is that it was a patronizing, negative, and ineffective document that revealed many of the author’s unconscious biases against Latin American peoples. Though Trask denies that Kennan’s writing on Latin America could have had any

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75 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 617.
76 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 618-621.
77 “Memorandum,” FRUS, 621-624.
influence on U.S. foreign policy, he argues historians should remember the report for another reason: its “disturbing” views explain why Kennan never had the influence on foreign policy he desired.\textsuperscript{79} Historian of U.S. policy toward Latin America, Lars Schoultz, confirms Trask’s assessment, citing Kennan’s inexperience in the region—he was a “novice”—and the awkward circumstances of the report itself.\textsuperscript{80} Schoultz contends it was largely a task to keep Kennan busy until he officially left Washington.\textsuperscript{81} Furthermore, despite Kennan’s own claims about his intent and process in crafting the report, Schoultz steadfastly maintains that Kennan could not have learned enough during his “whirlwind” visit to justify his conclusions.\textsuperscript{82} Rather, Kennan, “modernized the thinking of John Quincy Adams, adding the Freudian argot popular at the time,” and otherwise relied on preexisting assumptions and images he had derived from secondary sources.\textsuperscript{83} On another tack, Kennan historian Wilson Miscamble is positive that the report never had any impact on U.S. foreign policy—mostly because it was only seen by a few sets of eyes before being locked away to avoid controversy—but he also observes that the report had a strange honesty to it.\textsuperscript{84} According to Miscamble, not only did the report echo many views on Latin America that had been espoused in the past and would resurface in the future, but it also demonstrated that Kennan, “had the courage to articulate his views directly rather than weaving webs of pious rhetoric to disguise and mask policies which in reality differed little from what he had outlined.”\textsuperscript{85} Miscamble also refutes the

\textsuperscript{79} Trask, “George F. Kennan’s Report”: 311.
\textsuperscript{81} Schoultz, \textit{Beneath the United States}, 380.
\textsuperscript{82} Schoultz, \textit{Beneath the United States}, 380-383.
\textsuperscript{83} Schoultz, \textit{Beneath the United States}, 380-383.
\textsuperscript{84} Miscamble, \textit{Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy}, 318.
\textsuperscript{85} Miscamble, \textit{Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy}, 318.
misperception, perpetuated by Acheson himself in his memoirs—that Kennan was “sent away.” In fact, as Miscamble shows, Kennan had planned the trip since 1949.\(^\text{86}\)

Other criticisms of the report abound, but none are sufficient to deflate it of all its value. Kennan expert Anders Stephanson finds that Kennan is too conflicted in the report: he generalizes, he purports to want to be ethical, and he also plays power politics.\(^\text{87}\) Criticisms like this are valid, but with an understanding of its contents in place, it is worthwhile to emphasize again the effort that Kennan put into his work and his frankness about his own limitations in compiling the report. Indeed, to respond to criticism emanating from Schoultz, Kennan cannot be considered just an average observer of foreign policy in Latin America simply because he was not a regional specialist. Rather, he should be seen as a leading foreign policy expert. Even if Kennan operated under a set of presumptions or attitudes about Latin American culture or government, it is highly likely that some if not many of his colleagues would have been similarly influenced.

Given the generally negative view of historians on the report and what it accomplished, it is interesting to know what contemporaneous observers thought about the trip before it began and during Kennan’s time abroad as well. In short, their views were varied, but many were suspicious of the mission and its purveyor. Though a large entourage did not accompany him, nor was his mission hyped, Kennan’s trip did generate a significant amount of attention before the fact. A memo from the Foreign Service to the Department of State discussed the range of media coverage both at home and abroad. It noted in particular one editorial of December 28, 1949, which hoped that Kennan’s visit

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\(^\text{86}\) There are varying reports on this. Though Kennan had planned the trip himself since 1949 (it once included other regions, such as Africa and the Near East) Acheson also claims that he sent Kennan away while NSC 68 was being finalized. For a full discussion on this, see: Miscamble, *Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy*, 314-315.

\(^\text{87}\) Stephanson, *Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy*, 165.
would retool American policy and signal that, “a new policy for this hemisphere might be in the making, which would include mutual help and a closer understanding between the American republics.”

The Washington Post agreed: “On-the-spot surveys of Latin America and Africa by State Department Counselor George Kennan should prove a valuable asset in maintaining a realistic foreign policy toward these areas.”

The paper’s editorial board highlighted the need for a continuing review of U.S. policy in the region. However, other coverage was not as optimistic. In December, before he left, the Indianapolis Times called Kennan’s trip “A Strange Assignment.” Perhaps most bluntly the Daily Worker harangued the trip and the counselor in January 1950. It speculated, “after the terrible mess which Mr. Kennan and his kind have created for our people in Europe and Asia that the gentleman might be permanently removed from public life.” In March, as Kennan was traveling, the Imprensa Popular urged him to abort his trip. One headline in that paper read: “Mobilizados os Intelectuals e Artistas contra Kennan.” Indeed, according to outlets as diverse as the Brazil Herald and the New York Times, Kennan was a communist target, to be singled out on his trip to embarrass the U.S.

While contemporaneous coverage before and during the trip obviously varied, it is clear that most of the criticism was rooted in the preexisting assumptions people held.

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88 Foreign Service to Department of State, January 5, 1950, MC076, Box 187, Folder 1, Scrapbooks, 1950. Normally, this citation could just be indicated with the title of the article and the name and date of the newspaper in which it appeared. In this case, though, and in a few others, articles were intentionally selected and discussed in a Foreign Service briefing. Thus the governing document is cited.


93 “Mobilizados os Intelectuals e Artistas contra Kennan,” Imprensa Popular, March 1950, MC076, Box 187, Folder 1, Scrapbooks, 1950. The Imprensa Popular article does exist extant and was not bundled up in a specific briefing, but the author’s citation is incomplete. Thus, a folder in which it can be found is indicated here.

about Kennan and the American foreign policy establishment in general rather than a specific issue with the idea of such a trip or report. In fact, some of the more mainstream sources, like the *Washington Post*, applauded the idea (if cautiously).

Contrary to the interpretations available in the historical literature and contemporaneous news coverage, the report’s author can be divided into “two Kennans,” and thus his report can been seen, at least in part, as a valuable contribution to U.S. foreign policy. The first Kennan was the curmudgeonly, racially aware, piecemeal observer of several Latin American countries. The second was the foreign policy realist with an emphasis on the Cold War but a vision for international cooperation, or at least tolerance. If the second Kennan is the focus here—and “his” writing occupied a majority of the report’s pages—then the document takes on a different significance. It can become a starting point for an intellectual investigation of policy development on Latin American after World War II. This second Kennan had echoes of classical liberalism but also anti-imperialism, as defined by the historian of American foreign relations, Robert L. Beisner, in his work, *Twelve Against Empire*.\(^95\) Beisner catalogues the wide range of anti-imperialists who spanned professions and political parties but essentially believed that “colonial expansion would propel the United States into the vortex of international power politics, contradict its democratic principles, and reverse the thrust of history….”\(^96\) Indeed, Kennan fit nicely into this definition, especially when considering the extremely historical nature of his rationalizations for American indifference in the Southern Hemisphere. As Beisner notes, it is basically impossible to respond to the anti-imperialist charge that a representative people have no right to rule over others, and it seems that


\(^96\) Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, x.
Kennan was guided by this logic.\textsuperscript{97} Perhaps most interesting for the purposes here, Beisner voices surprise that so many anti-imperialists—who were otherwise open-minded thinkers—could be so racist, but he concludes, “their racism was more realistic than the patronizing policies of uplift offered by the expansionists because it took into account the difficulty Americans would have in dealing with ‘inferior’ races.”\textsuperscript{98} Beisner’s suggestion captures Kennan’s intentions as a writer and thus sheds an illuminating light on the motivations behind the report and its controversial content.

When it comes to implementation and immediate influence, there is little to discuss as none occurred. Almost immediately upon delivery to Acheson, the report was ordered locked away in order to avoid controversy within the department and internationally.\textsuperscript{99} While it is true that State Department bosses like chief of the Latin America division, Edward Miller, moved to quash the report because of its contents, it does not necessarily follow that they did not identify with some of its statements. It is more likely—and as most evidence points out—that they were concerned about the international political ramifications of such strident and blunt rhetoric.\textsuperscript{100} Kennan noted that he was not being diplomatic in a traditional sense several times throughout the course of his report.\textsuperscript{101} Indeed, as Kennan was astute enough to realize later in his life, the sorts of statements and musings contained in the report belonged more with the period of his life which he was about to begin in 1950—the academic one.\textsuperscript{102} Members of the State Department were diplomatic by training and necessity; academics could operate in a

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\textsuperscript{97} Beisner, \textit{Twelve Against Empire}, 234.
\textsuperscript{98} Beisner, \textit{Twelve Against Empire}, 235.
\textsuperscript{99} Miscamble, \textit{Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy}, 317.
\textsuperscript{100} Miscamble, \textit{Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy}, 317.
\textsuperscript{101} “Memorandum,” \textit{FRUS}, 619, for example.
\textsuperscript{102} Kennan, \textit{Memoirs}, 479-480.
\end{flushleft}
much less restrained environment. Unfortunately, despite Kennan’s best attempts to clarify his intentions in the report, the particular forum was simply not receptive to his attempts to discuss Latin America, even though at least one aspect of them, the foreign policy recommendations (as opposed to cultural observations), may have had more value than they have been assigned.

As Kennan wrote in hand on the top corner of his copy of the report, “This report was repressed, never distributed in the Department of State, and, as far as I know, never entered into its files. This was done, I believe, on the orders of the Secretary, on the recommendation of the Chief of the Latin American Division, Mr. Edward Miller.”\(^\text{103}\) In his memoirs, Kennan recounted these events and recalled the “shock” it caused for various members of the State Department.\(^\text{104}\) Indeed, there is no evidence in Kennan’s papers that he shared the report again until 1985 when he received a letter from a colleague whose name is illegible. The writer commented in his friendly note: “Dear George, Thank you so much for letting me see this. While it strikes what I would consider from my Hispanic vantage-point a number of characteristically Anglo-Saxon attitudes, I greatly enjoyed reading it, not least for its style.”\(^\text{105}\) Indeed, the report was, at best, a product of its times, written by only one individual, but it was also thoughtful and carefully executed, and thus it is useful as a comparison point for later policy reports.

Despite its less than glowing reviews from contemporary commentators and historians, a more thorough investigation of the Kennan Report reveals that its racist components overshadowed more reasonable foreign policy prescriptions that might be

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\(^{103}\) Kennan to Secretary of State, March 29, 1950, MC076, Box 299, Folder 1, Report of South American Trip.

\(^{104}\) Kennan, *Memoirs*, 480.

\(^{105}\) Unknown to Kennan, April 18, 1985, MC076, Box 299, Folder 1, Report of South American Trip.
labeled anti-imperialist and, were, in any case, considered and interesting. This new understanding of the report gives it significance as a benchmark for the intellectual development of foreign policy toward Latin America after World War II. Unfortunately, its lack of impact on Truman’s policy is clear, largely due to it not being released by the State Department. Given this, the first report after World War II generally thought of in regards to Latin America is Milton Eisenhower’s, which he delivered in 1953 and rereleased in 1958. His vision for change was different from Kennan’s, and the structure of his report—a team of observers meeting thousands of leaders in 20 republics—was far more professional. Perhaps not surprisingly, Milton’s report had a wider ranging influence, though it was still not fully embraced by the policy establishment.
Chapter 2
A NEW LOOK AT LATIN AMERICA

The Eisenhower Report

In terms of foreign policy experience, Truman’s successor to the White House could not have been more different. Eisenhower, who served from 1953 to 1961, was a five-star general and the former supreme commander of the Allied Forces in Europe. While Truman presided over the end of World War II and the first “shots” of the Cold War, Eisenhower’s two terms were solidly focused on defeating the communist threat as the U.S. foreign policy establishment traced its supposed spread across the globe. Eisenhower referred to the “New Look” when describing his foreign policy agenda. Like Truman before him, Eisenhower intended to make Latin America a focus of foreign policy—indeed, he purportedly nurtured a love for Argentina as a youth—but he was foiled early on by the urgency of Korea and later by systemic factors beyond his control. Still, Eisenhower dutifully retained his scholarly brother, Milton, to embark on a fact-finding tour in 1953 and report back with a full range of suggestions. Milton did as he was asked. Milton released his report twice, first in 1953 and again in 1958. The second issuance was spurred by troubling developments in the region, such as growing dissent in Cuba. It is the second version of the report—which reiterated the bulk of the 1953 report but carried a more urgent tone and some new, specific recommendations—that is the most relevant for study. Indeed, a review of policy toward the region during

Eisenhower’s two terms, signified here by two NSC documents corresponding to major policy pronouncements, and the report itself, along with historical and contemporaneous analysis thereof, show the report did not have a large immediate impact. But, especially from 1958 forward, it served as a basis for a subsequent policy, namely the Alliance for Progress.

There are several schools of thinking about Eisenhower’s foreign policy, though the proper way to view him is a balance of the two extreme views. Eisenhower is traditionally seen as having been bowled over by his anti-communist Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Revisionists, however, believe that an investigation of Eisenhower’s policies in the Third World illuminates strong leadership and a desire for peace.\(^{107}\) In an essay investigating various Eisenhower revisionists, Rabe finds that some common accolades of the president are (though he concedes they may be exaggerated): Eisenhower’s restraint with executive power, controlled military spending, and ability to balance a budget.\(^ {108}\) Rabe also investigates the historiographical phenomenon of Eisenhower’s changing reputation, especially on issues such as the 1954 intervention in Guatemala. Rabe argues that while Eisenhower was an adept foreign policy maker, his policies were largely reactive and anti-communist. Eisenhower, like Truman, wanted an inter-American military agreement, and the ultimate difference in his policies from Truman was his willingness to intervene militarily when necessary, especially after the rise of Castro.\(^{109}\) Thus, the relevant context for consideration of Eisenhower is neither strictly as an anti-communist puppet nor a steadfast friend to the Third World. Rather, his


policy was activated by global events and colored by an interest in less critical regions, like Latin America, but it was also clearly motivated by a desire to defeat communists, whether that involved cozying up with a dictator or overthrowing a democratic leader.\(^\text{110}\)

Like Truman before him, Eisenhower did show a special interest in Latin America, though it was more theoretical than practical. As Milton notes in his instructive memoirs, Eisenhower was acutely aware of the U.S. reputation in Latin America and “hoped that we could prove by word and deed that this was a new era…”\(^\text{111}\) American diplomat John Moors Cabot recalls something similar. He makes a point to mention that Eisenhower was clearly “very anxious” to improve relations with Latin America.\(^\text{112}\) Cabot goes on, however, to state also Eisenhower’s disinterest in making key decisions with regard to specific policy in the region. This pushed disproportionate influence on actual policy making to Dulles, who had little interest in Latin America.\(^\text{113}\) Still, in 1953, Eisenhower told his brother, “I want you to get a broad view of the conditions which affect the total relations of the United States with the republics of Latin America. Keep an open mind and consider what we can do, what policy changes or programs will be necessary, to unify the republics of this hemisphere.”\(^\text{114}\) This pious request was at least initially buttressed by Eisenhower’s actions—Dulles and he accompanied the mission to the airport for its departure—but, ultimately, follow through and implementation of the


\(^{111}\) M. Eisenhower, *The Wine is Bitter*, 188.


\(^{113}\) Cabot, *First Line of Defense*, 90. Of course Kissinger, unlike Dulles, would make a major about-face on Latin America during the Ford interregnum.

\(^{114}\) M. Eisenhower, *The Wine is Bitter*, 188.
recommendations was spotty and influenced by establishment beliefs and reaction to current events rather than a sincere effort to install new programs.\textsuperscript{115}

Milton, Dwight’s junior, was one of seven sons who grew up in a small farmhouse just off the main road in Abilene, Kansas, a tiny town whose claim to fame, before raising a president, was a large number of saloons and a reputation for wild brawls and shootouts. Incredibly, all these brothers saw some success after such humble, early 20\textsuperscript{th} century roots: one became a banker, another a pharmacist, and one the President of the United States. Milton’s career was mostly in the world of higher education, where he held three different university presidencies. He started at Kansas State University and finished up as president of Johns Hopkins University, where he stayed from 1956 to 1967. Milton was an educational progressive and early proponent of global thinking.\textsuperscript{116} In fact, while a review of Milton’s papers demonstrates that he had a wide range of interests, including agriculture, war food supplies, and veteran education, Latin America was never his main area of expertise or passion. Still, he spoke most presciently, perhaps, in a Pennsylvania Bar Meeting in 1952 where he admitted: “I always feel a little sad when great public issues are discussed in emotional terms; they do not clarify the issues which the people who possess the basic social power need to understand in order that they may render valid democratic judgments.”\textsuperscript{117} Thus, the opportunity to investigate and present the situation in Latin America would have been an opportunity to address the problem he had identified on his own terms.

\textsuperscript{115} M. Eisenhower, \textit{The Wine is Bitter}, 189.
\textsuperscript{117} “Pennsylvania Bar Association Meeting,” January 25, 1952, MSE, Series I, Box 4, Folder: 1952 [speeches, articles] (1).
As noted earlier, the focus of this investigation will be the 1958 version of the report because it was meant to be redundant to the 1953 one with additional sections and its impact was more significant and far easier to register. That said, it is worth briefly discussing the 1953 trip and its results, though they did not dictate policy at the time, NSC 144/1 did. As Milton describes, the 1953 trip was extensive. It covered most countries in South and Central America and more than 2000 people were interviewed across the entire spectrum of society.\textsuperscript{118} The focus of these conversations, as of the report, was development and related economic issues.\textsuperscript{119} Overall, the report contained nine recommendations and stressed understanding among governments and people, mutual respect, sovereign equality and maintenance of the inter-American system, mutual security (support of the Rio Treaty), and mutual goals, including economic development and the advancement of democratic processes.\textsuperscript{120} The report was delivered on November 23, 1953, and the NSC approved it before it was presented off the record to Congress.\textsuperscript{121} Milton speaks highly of the report—and its impact—in his memoirs.\textsuperscript{122} This does not match the contentions of LaFeber and Schoultz. Both authors extend little credit to the 1953 report as an effective policy tool.\textsuperscript{123} LaFeber goes as far as to contend that Milton returned from his first trip with no policy changes to suggest at all.\textsuperscript{124} Even the editors of\textit{Time} could see that the report “called for adopting stable and consistent trade policies,
buying commodities for the strategic stockpile to support prices, making substantial public and private capital loans, expanding Point Four help, considering the revision of tax laws to encourage U.S. investment overseas and making grants of surplus foods in times of emergency.”

More accurately, it might be said that the 1953 effort was delivered to an establishment that had no interest in launching a new Latin American policy, a fact confirmed by the existence of NSC 144/1, a classified policy document that was delivered before Milton’s report and forms the basis for policy at the time.

NSC 144/1, subtitled “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America,” was a classified memorandum delivered on March 18, 1953 (prior to the release of Milton’s 1953 report). It outlined what amounted to a continuation of policies established by Truman. As such, its main objectives were hemisphere solidarity, economic and political development, safeguarding of the hemisphere, reduction of internal communist presence, protection of raw materials, Latin American backing of collective action, and American military aid to the region with the goal of complete standardization.

The true role and impact of NSC 144/1 as compared to Milton’s 1953 report was best illustrated in two top-secret progress reports issued by the NSC later in 1953 meant to evaluate policy goals and implementation in Latin America. The first, issued on July 23, 1953, and authored by James Lay, Jr., then executive secretary of the NSC, focused on the policies of NSC 144/1 and covered a range of topics not touched upon in Milton’s report, including control of subversive forces in Brazil and

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128 NSC 144/1.
Venezuela and covert aid to Guatemala. The second was even more revealing. In the first section, entitled “High Level Consideration of Latin American Problems,” Lay reduced Milton’s trip to an “expression of good will.” It seems that, at best, Milton’s policy report was seen by the establishment (defined here as the inner policy-making body of the NSC, rather than the State Department) as a function of a broader series of policies toward Latin America. Cabot confirms this in his memoir when he complains about the difficulty of convincing Dulles to allocate funding for Latin American initiatives and surmises that new solutions for Latin America were not welcome because the region was not seen as vital to security. While Milton’s 1953 report did not initiate immediate change, and NSC 144/1 was seen as the policy of record by the establishment, events in the mid 1950s caused the Eisenhower Administration to reconsider its policy, which gave rise to the 1958 version of the report.

By the mid-1950s some argue that administration officials had been subdued by what they perceived to be a harmonious period of relations with Latin America. A series of events, however, perhaps best symbolized by a jarring trip to Caracas by then-Vice President Nixon where he was almost killed by an angry mob, spurred Eisenhower and his policy makers to action. The first major signal for a shift in policy was in 1956 when the Soviets began to make commercial overtures to Latin America, and, thus, in the

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130 Memo to the President from James S. Lay, Jr. Lay also mentions that the report will serve as evidence for new policy making, but to that end all he does is make hay about Argentina. The rest of the report goes through NSC 144/1 part by part and outlines what has been done, demonstrating the clear attention to these recommendations and, by extension, the lesser importance he attached to Milton’s trip.

131 Cabot, First Line of Defense, 89-90.

132 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 84, 100; Rabe, “The Johnson (Eisenhower) Doctrine for Latin America”: 99.
eyes of the foreign policy establishment, become a real threat to hemisphere solidarity.\textsuperscript{133} This new attitude was represented in the influential Bemis article, “A Way to Stop the Reds in Latin America,” which portrayed the forces of communism spreading across the globe, including to Latin America.\textsuperscript{134} It was in this atmosphere that Milton took another trip to the region and reissued his 1953 report, with a new and far more urgent tone, in 1958. But the rise of Fidel Castro in Cuba at the end of the decade also led to NSC 5902/1, a new classified policy document on Latin America adopted on February 12, 1959. An evaluation of Eisenhower’s second report, which reveals an interesting set of recommendations and ramped up rhetoric corresponding to the time, still fails to demonstrate the sort of implementation patterns that the more dominant NSC 5902/1 did, though the Eisenhower Report did achieve some traction. In addition, a comparison of Milton’s recommendations, especially the economic ones, with some of the tenets of the Alliance for Progress, proves a clear intellectual link between the second report and this later policy formulation for Latin America.

The second version of Milton’s report, compiled mid-decade and released before the major events of 1959 and 1960, conveyed similar ideas but adopted a new tone and outlined more specific recommendations. Starting in mid-1956 and into 1957, Milton served as his brother’s personal representative on a presidential committee to the Organization of American States (OAS). In this context, he once again came into contact with a variety of leaders from the 20 Latin American republics and began collecting

information and thoughts for a second report.\textsuperscript{135} He also went on a five state fact-finding trip with “several associates,” including a banker and a physician, in 1958, though he focused on Central America instead of South America, as in 1953. The report was first officially submitted on December 27, 1958, after President Eisenhower had already seen it. The report is 39 pages long and was printed in English by the State Department and in Spanish in early 1959. In the opening salvo of this second edition, which looked similar to and was delivered in the same way as the first, Milton reaffirmed the contents of his 1953 report but urged that the U.S. and Latin America “re-examine their attitudes and policy toward one another and constantly seek to strengthen their economic, political, and cultural relations, to their mutual benefit.”\textsuperscript{136} In the introduction to the second report, Milton emphasized what he perceived to be greatly increased misunderstanding over U.S. aid—Latin Americans saw it as unlimited but targeted to other areas of the world—and controversy over price-fixing of agricultural materials and minerals.\textsuperscript{137} In the report, Milton denied both these practices and blamed “communist agitators” for spreading rumors, which also included the theory that the U.S. was propping up dictators.\textsuperscript{138} Milton noted that the nine recommendations of his previous report had garnered attention from various governmental agencies but “the problem grows. New, heroic efforts are required.”\textsuperscript{139} What followed was an interesting set of prescriptions: some recycled, some new, and some, particularly the economic ones, strikingly familiar to a student of 1960s U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America.

\textsuperscript{135} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” December 27, 1958, MSE, Series I, Box 7, Folder: Report to the President 12-77-58, 89.

\textsuperscript{136} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 90.

\textsuperscript{137} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 90.

\textsuperscript{138} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 91.

\textsuperscript{139} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 91.
In the second report, Milton focused on economic recommendations, especially the development of an Inter-American development institution, though he began with a set of suggestions meant to combat the U.S. image problem in Latin America. For example, he asked that the OAS prioritize efforts to promote understanding and cooperation among governments in order to combat misunderstandings.\textsuperscript{140} The report went further, ascribing this responsibility to individual countries as well, including U.S. information services and exchange programs.\textsuperscript{141} It encouraged bilingual training for students and teachers, repeating a recommendation from the first report.\textsuperscript{142} After these recommendations, which required less than three of the report’s 15 pages, Milton turned to economic issues. He began by outlining the need for increased public and private credit to aid Latin Americans in order to exploit incredible agricultural opportunities in terms of production and efficiency.\textsuperscript{143} Milton was quick to compliment the loans that had already been deployed by the United States and other institutions, such as the Export-Import Bank, and by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.\textsuperscript{144} He also made it clear that Latin American countries that wanted loans had to improve their economic analysis and development planning and coordination. At this juncture, Milton proposed an Inter-American development institution to address these concerns, to be created with funding from U.S. technical cooperation funds.\textsuperscript{145} Milton’s vision for this institution was grand. He wrote: “I am convinced that the time has arrived for us to take a more positive approach in using credit as an effective means of forwarding American

\textsuperscript{140} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 91.
\textsuperscript{141} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 91.
\textsuperscript{142} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 92.
\textsuperscript{143} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 92.
\textsuperscript{144} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 92.
\textsuperscript{145} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 93.
foreign policy; this clearly involves helping Latin America achieve its sound economic goals and thus serving the best interest of the United States.”\textsuperscript{146} His inter-American bank would be based on the Export-Import Bank’s management structure and work with the World Bank.\textsuperscript{147} There is no doubt that this recommendation formed the core of the 1958 report.

Attached to his formulations—and vision—for a loaning institution for Latin America, the report outlined byproducts, including but not limited to the sorts of social development that these loans might best aid and other structures increased credit would necessitate. Under social development, there was sanitation and housing, which Milton considered the basic staples of a healthy and functional citizenry, which in turn were necessary to a sound economy.\textsuperscript{148} The report also advocated regional common markets and price stabilization. It defined a limited role for the U.S. in aiding price regulation for raw commodities by looking to establish and enforce market quotas and allow for participation in single commodity study groups when necessary, though without any major commitment to subsequent plans for said commodities.\textsuperscript{149} The report also urged strengthened technical cooperation programs and suggested they be under the control of the ambassadors in each country. In general, it sought to upgrade U.S. activity in Latin America to recognize the importance of the region and its “unique relationship” with the U.S.\textsuperscript{150} The primary recommendation under this was the establishment of a Council on Inter-American Affairs to handle ideas concerning improved relations and to reinforce

\textsuperscript{146} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 93.
\textsuperscript{147} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 95.
\textsuperscript{148} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 97.
\textsuperscript{149} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 98-100.
\textsuperscript{150} “Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,”100-101.
the importance of the relationship with the hemisphere.\footnote{“Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,” 101.} Other 1953 recommendations were reiterated, like the stabilization of trade relations, and new ones were proposed, like the recommendation that dictators not be granted special relationship status and the proposal for a dichotomy between leaders who deserved an “abrazo” and those that only warranted a “handshake.”\footnote{“Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations,”102-104. An abrazo is an affectionate greeting. This coded for different levels of diplomatic engagement.} Indeed, in a 1956 speech to the OAS, Milton argued that the most important recommendation he made in 1953 was for more stable trade and minimal tariffs or quotas, which he linked to an important transition: the shift in relationship from “Good Neighbor” to “Good Partner,” a sentiment which he reemphasized in the second report.\footnote{“Remarks by Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, Personal Representative of the President of the United States at the Pan American Union, Pan American Day,” April 14, 1956, MSE, Series I, Box 6, Folder: 1956 [speeches, articles] (1).} Though the development recommendations were clearly the focus of Milton’s report—and of his 1958 trip to Panama, Central America, and Puerto Rico—this range of other suggestions, largely byproducts of the proposed development structure, comprised a large part of the report’s message and tenor.

Though Milton’s second report is not normally considered a major event in late 1950s foreign policy toward Latin America, a comparison to NSC formulations from the time and the event of the chartering of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) prove otherwise. On November 26, 1958, Milton received a letter from his brother, who wrote that he saw nothing wrong with the report, and that Milton was free to speak publicly on the matter, but he hoped he would not deviate from the party line.\footnote{Eisenhower to Milton, November 26, 1958, MSE, Series I, Box 7, Folder: Report to the President 12-27-58.} This was a tepid response, at best, with no promises of implementation, but it did signal the report’s presence in Eisenhower’s thinking. Observers like Latin American expert and
journalist, Tad Szulc, were unwilling to recognize the impact of this second report. Szulc contends that although the foreign policy establishment was awoken to the region in the late 1950s, it was too late for Milton’s work:

The note of tragedy in Dr. Eisenhower’s account is provided by the fact that the entrenched Establishment—not the well-meaning General Eisenhower and his frustrated Latin American policy aids but the bureaucratic machine and largely bored political opinion—finally woke up to the urgent realities of Latin America only after the stoning of former Vice President Nixon in South American and the emergence of Castro in Cuba a year later.155

The problem, as Szulc continued, was that these crises did not necessarily shape Eisenhower’s policy in the way Milton would have liked. According to Szulc, in 1958, the Eisenhower Administration was still ignoring policy measures, like “Operation Pan America,” that would have launched something very similar to the Alliance for Progress and Milton’s own recommendations years before Kennedy.156 Retrospective analysis, however, of the report and surrounding policy devices and developments show that some of Milton’s recommendations were eventually implemented.

Milton spent much of the mid-1950s reiterating his messages about Latin America in speeches to groups across the country. Changes in the international scene had spurred a new version of his report and, apparently, some traction with the NSC.157 Another classified document, NSC 5902/1, signified policy toward Latin America for most of Eisenhower’s second term, much like NSC 144/1 was the controlling document for his first term. Unlike NSC 144/1, though, which came before Milton’s first report, NSC 5902/1 was submitted after Milton’s second report. The policy was adopted by the NSC in February of 1959 and approved by the President on the 16th of the same month and

155 “Continents on a Collision Course.”
156 “Continents on a Collision Course”; Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 18.
157 Various Speeches, MSE, Boxes 4-6, Folders 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956 [speeches, articles].
year.\textsuperscript{158} Although this internal document did have a more aggressive anti-communist tone and was more worried about certain strategic questions, such as access to raw materials, its language was surprisingly resonant in other ways with goals associated with Milton’s reports.\textsuperscript{159} For example, on one page of the report there was a discussion of growing anti-American sentiment that mirrored that in Milton’s second report.\textsuperscript{160} NSC 5902/1 also had an emphasis on the potential for economic and political development and advocated for hemispheric solidarity via a closer relationship with the OAS.\textsuperscript{161} What differentiated the NSC policy from the second report were passages that advocated “more direct anti-Communist measures,” and ones that made exceptions for unilateral intervention when necessary.\textsuperscript{162} Despite the mixed tenor of NSC 5902/1, the strikingly familiar passages indicated that the intellectual content of Milton’s reports had at least begun to seep into the establishment and achieve some measure of integration.\textsuperscript{163}

Though the NSC policy vehicle did show signs of being influenced by Milton’s work, there is unfortunately still little hard evidence of broad implementation of the Eisenhower Report during the late 1950s, with one major exception. That exception was the creation of the IADB, which was established in 1959.\textsuperscript{164} The idea of the bank had been circulating before Milton—it was proposed as early as 1889—and the OAS initiative was written by President Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil, the same leader who


\textsuperscript{159} “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America (NSC 5902/1),” 1-4, for example.

\textsuperscript{160} “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America (NSC 5902/1),” 2.

\textsuperscript{161} “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America (NSC 5902/1),” 2.

\textsuperscript{162} “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America (NSC 5902/1),” 4.

\textsuperscript{163} “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America (NSC 5902/1),” 4.

advocated for “Operation Pan America.” But the bank was also a clear focus of Milton’s report.\textsuperscript{165} Indeed, as political scientist and Latin American expert, Jorge Domínguez, posits, U.S. cooperation on the matter was largely due to Milton’s direct advocacy to his brother.\textsuperscript{166} Some contemporary accounts of the IADB fail to include Milton in the narrative of its creation, instead focusing on the “late breaking” Eisenhower policy for development captured in “The President’s New Positive Program for Latin America” and the Social Progress Trust Fund, the latter being passed into law in September of 1960.\textsuperscript{167} But Eisenhower, in his memoirs, recognizes his brother, along with government officials like Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, as the main engines behind changes like the IADB and agreements over regional common markets.\textsuperscript{168} As Eisenhower concludes, “Some of these significant advances were a direct result of the appointment in 1953 of my brother Milton as my personal representative and special ambassador on matters affecting Latin America.”\textsuperscript{169} Indeed, all these events, and the IADB itself, are centered on policy principles enumerated by Milton since 1953. Given his status as most-trusted adviser to his brother, it is difficult exclude him from the causation side of these policy items.\textsuperscript{170} As Eisenhower writes in his memoirs, “Throughout my presidency, I was to lean heavily on [Milton’s] counsel and upon his detailed and sympathetic knowledge of the problems of the other nations of this hemisphere.”\textsuperscript{171} Thus, the IADB was a significant development based in Milton’s second report, even if there were other policies in place that seemed to govern more decision-making than Milton’s work.

\textsuperscript{166} Jorge Domínguez, Interview, Harvard University, September 1, 2009.
\textsuperscript{167} Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 19.
\textsuperscript{168} Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 516.
\textsuperscript{169} Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 517.
\textsuperscript{170} Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 28-29.
\textsuperscript{171} Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 241.
Milton’s second report was not key to policy during his brother’s administration, though the adoption of the IADB was significant, but Milton’s work did have a lasting influence. Indeed, as Rabe notes, Eisenhower “built the framework for the economic aid program that would be dubbed the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy administration.”\footnote{Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 3.} This framework refers to the IADB and other development platforms, which were largely the result of the research and observations, formulated into educated advocacy, put forward by Milton both in his reports and in personal overtures to his brother. As Eisenhower writes in his memoirs, the U.S. encouraged the World Bank to set up the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association in 1959, and overall: “we substantially increased our technical assistance to Latin America, sending agricultural, mining, and financial experts to help our neighbors to the south; tripled cultural exchanges,” and so forth.\footnote{Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 515.} Domínguez confirms another aspect of these roots as well when he argues the political connections and networks that dominated the Alliance for Progress—particularly with Puerto Rican players, who ran the system initially—were not random but derived from the legacy of Milton’s policy endeavors in Latin America.\footnote{Domínguez, September 1, 2009.} As economic historian Jeffrey Taffet writes, “The Alliance for Progress was in many ways the ultimate step in a series of changes set in motion by the Eisenhower administration.”\footnote{Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 13.} A brief investigation of the creation and tenets of the Alliance for Progress will demonstrate the connection between Milton’s work and Kennedy’s and Johnson’s.

\footnote{Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 3.}{Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 3.} 
\footnote{Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 515.}{Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 515.} 
\footnote{Domínguez, September 1, 2009.}{Domínguez, September 1, 2009.} 
\footnote{Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 13.}{Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 13.}
The Alliance for Progress was comprised largely of bilateral foreign aid agreements meant to improve the lives of Latin Americans while fostering a spirit of democracy.\textsuperscript{176} Signed in 1961 at Punta del Este, the program included familiar goals like slowed inflation, economic and social planning, and the establishment of democratic governments, though not an insistence on working with them.\textsuperscript{177} Indeed, even earlier, the Act of Bogotá, signed at the same OAS meeting where “Operation Pan America” was being discussed, outlined concerns very close to those that would be included in the Alliance for Progress, and to those that had been set forth by Milton years earlier: equitable land distribution, credit opportunities for industry, productivity increases, and housing and health services, to name a few.\textsuperscript{178} These emphases can clearly be linked back to those made by Milton, and there is little doubt that they would not have showed up at the OAS meeting if it had not been for the late change in the Eisenhower Administration’s view of Latin America and Milton’s corresponding influence. For obvious reasons, people were excited by the potential of the Alliance for Progress. In 1963, Ernest May wrote an article noting that the Charter of Punta del Este provided a real opportunity for increased cooperation and interdependence with Latin America, and that it, along with the Alliance for Progress, had great potential.\textsuperscript{179} Indeed, in his June 10, 1963 commencement address at American University, Kennedy urged a nuclear test ban with the Soviet Union and presented a bright outlook for an interlocking future with Third World regions, and he made sure to emphasize his belief that: “We are bound to

\textsuperscript{177} “Address by President Kennedy at a White House Reception for Latin American Diplomats and Members of Congress, March 13, 1961”: 471.
\textsuperscript{178} Taffet, \textit{Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy}, 19.
many nations by alliances. These alliances exist because our concerns and theirs substantially overlap.\textsuperscript{180} Still, in retrospect many see Kennedy as too caught up in Cold War politics and hawkish policy recommendations, despite his rhetoric and the Alliance for Progress’s agenda. Although this sentiment does not link up with that promoted by Milton, but it does coincide with other Eisenhower policies, including NSC 5092/1. This merits brief discussion.

As Rabe maintains, the Kennedy administration often demonstrated a preference for authoritarian regimes that were anti-communist despite rhetoric supporting the spread of democracy.\textsuperscript{181} Rabe describes a Kennedy Doctrine that was primarily anti-communist and anti-Castro, and which advocated military force in the Caribbean, covert when necessary.\textsuperscript{182} This fits with the dichotomy that existed in the Eisenhower Administration, which is especially apparent in NSC 5902/1: while there were humanitarian clauses and support for development, there was also a strong anti-communist sentiment and leeway for intervention. According to LaFeber, “From its inception, the Alliance focused at least as much on antirevolutionary as on developmental activity. Indeed, they were two sides of the same policy.”\textsuperscript{183} Thus, while the roots for the types of partnership and development were apparent in Milton’s writing, the more controversial anti-communist aspects were not, though they were not unprecedented in overall U.S. policy toward the region from the time. Still, even Eisenhower lays a claim for the Alliance for Progress: “The Alliance for Progress carries forward the progressive departure from the traditional American

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\textsuperscript{180} “1963 Commencement,” American University, \url{http://www1.media.american.edu/speeches/Kennedy.htm} (accesssed November 12, 2009).
\textsuperscript{181} Rabe, \textit{The Most Dangerous Area in the World} (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 56.
\textsuperscript{182} Rabe, \textit{The Most Dangerous Area in the World}, 79.
\textsuperscript{183} LaFeber, \textit{Inevitable Revolutions}, 148.
doctrine which we began as early as 1957 and carried on intensively upon my return from Latin America. In my judgment the basic concepts and agreements in the Act of Bogota are right.”

In that vein, it is impossible to understand the potential depth of Milton’s influence in the 1960s without investigating the second half, especially with Johnson at the helm. In short, under Johnson the elements of the Alliance of Progress that might be associated with Milton’s work almost entirely dissolved. Ivan Musicant, a military historian and former Marine, describes Johnson as a poorly informed commander-in-chief with an “obsessive fear of the spread of Castro-style communism.”

He goes on to describe the Johnson Doctrine as permitting unilateral intervention anywhere in Latin America where it was judged there was a sufficient communist threat. Latin American historian Jules Benjamin confirms that Johnson advocated military intervention in the Dominican Republic, surprisingly, even “in the era of hemispheric cooperation,” which is an unwitting tribute to Milton’s policy thinking.

LaFeber blames Johnson and his advisors for dropping the Alliance for Progress’s main goals and focusing on anti-communism. All told, Johnson largely dismantled the Alliance for Progress. He notably distressed OAS members with his intervention in the Dominican Republic, which “hampered long-standing goals of trying to remold the hemisphere’s political structure

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184 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 539.
186 Musicant, The Banana Wars, 364.
188 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 157; LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 255.
into a more effective force in the settlement of disputes between member states without invoking the Rio treaty,” another bit of phrasing that can be easily tied back to Milton’s encouragement of a stronger OAS.\textsuperscript{189} By 1968, U.S.-Latin American relations had adapted a notably different tenor, and U.S. policy and rhetoric were increasingly divergent as the conflict in Vietnam escalated and the military buildup that had been occurring since Kennedy continued at an alarming clip. Milton’s influence carried through the 1960s in recognizable portions of the Alliance for Progress, but it was largely lost as exogenous events warped U.S. policy toward the region beyond recognition.\textsuperscript{190}

Indeed, though the first iteration of Milton’s report had little impact, the second was more influential, both in its immediate affect on policy via NSC 5902/1 and the IADB, but also in its apparent role in the formation of the Alliance for Progress. It may be fair to consider the end of the 1950s and the beginning of 1960s as a time when Milton’s policies toward Latin America were influential, but only as an extension of his brother’s administration’s general about-face on policy toward the region. Unfortunately, as the 1960s progressed, the bipolar nature of the Alliance for Progress—and Kennedy’s foreign policy in general—began to dominate international relations. The full break occurred when Johnson came to office and any nuance for relations with the Southern Hemisphere was lost. Adolf Berle, a one-time U.S. ambassador to Brazil, and Thomas Mann, Kennedy’s ambassador to Mexico, were both commissioned to write reports on Latin America during the 1960s, but it is clear that the Alliance for Progress subsumes both when considering policy (Berle’s report suggested the Alliance for Progress and

\textsuperscript{189} Lester Langley, \textit{America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere} (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1989), 218.

\textsuperscript{190} See, for example, Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, \textit{The Alliance that Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress} (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970).
Mann’s informed it). Thus, it is more useful to skip ahead to Nelson Rockefeller’s report and related analyses as they deal with an entirely new era of policy toward Latin America. It is an era that was both similar and radically different from its predecessors. The Rockefeller Report holds significant lessons about policy development in Latin America that can only be understood in this context and when compared with the success of the Linowitz Report.
Chapter 3

RIGHT IDEA, WRONG ADMINISTRATION

The Rockefeller Report

By the end of the 1960s Asia was considered the most important strategic region and domestic concerns began to trump aid to Latin America, especially as the Alliance for Progress fell to pieces.\textsuperscript{191} This isolationist sentiment was caught on editorial pages across the country, including in the \textit{New York Times}. In an editorial entitled, “…Closed Door on Defense Cuts,” the editors accused The Pentagon of hogging money and noted scathingly that, “protecting the home front is as essential an ingredient in national security as the endless accumulation of arms.”\textsuperscript{192} Senator Frank Church claimed in 1969 that: “The precipitous slide toward militarism in Latin America certainly underscores the failures of the political objectives of the Alliance of promoting democratic governments.” Church went on to call for complete military withdrawal and a halt to bilateral foreign aid.\textsuperscript{193} The \textit{New York Times} editorialized: “It is felt with regard to rethinking basic policy that President Kennedy’s brief guidance marked the sunset of a long and important era rather than the start of innovation.”\textsuperscript{194} And that: “The sad new look assuming shape seems to be that reality is putting period to favorite old liberal theories such as that we have no inherent conflict with any other people or that economic action can by itself

solve political difficulties.”¹⁹⁵ In 1967, in an article widely seen as his first major attempt to lay out his foreign policy agenda in public, then presidential candidate Nixon wrote succinctly, “Weary with war, disheartened with allies, disillusioned with aid, dismayed at domestic crises, many Americans are heeding the call of the new isolationism.”¹⁹⁶ Indeed, once in office, and with the aid of Kissinger, Nixon initiated a new paradigm for foreign policy.

Nixon’s election represented a change in policy, not the least toward Latin America. The region was far less important to Nixon than to previous presidents.¹⁹⁷ Still, Nixon and Kissinger were willing to do what they thought necessary in the region to maintain international stability, including intervening covertly.¹⁹⁸ This was both a break from and a continuation of the policies of the 1960s. While Nixon did not have a real interest in the region, he was willing to implement a strategic attitude toward Latin America that had been developing for a decade. This meant, for example, using economic aid tools from the Alliance for Progress as sanctions against countries seen as disobeying U.S. interests.¹⁹⁹ It also included intervention in places like Chile. If Nixon had any new strategy, it was based on the idea that trade, not aid, was desired by Latin American countries.²⁰⁰ LaFeber argues that no coherent alternative for the Alliance for Progress was developed, rather ad hoc solutions were devised to perceived problems, such as in

¹⁹⁵ “Foreign Affairs: A Sad New Look.”
¹⁹⁸ Berger, Under Northern Eyes, 103.
Chile, and these fixes were often military in nature. Indeed, several historians have sought to explain, or help represent, the shift in U.S. foreign policy at the end of the 1960s using the Rockefeller Report. It is seen by some as the segue to militarism in Latin America, and it is understood as promoting military modernization and regime control as central tenants of U.S. policy rather than economic aid and democratization. Although it is clear that Nixon’s policy had many forces at work behind it, an investigation of the report’s creation, its reception, and its impact disprove any strong link between the report and Nixon’s policy. However, the report does lend itself to an alternative characterization of the development of policy in Latin American in the late 1960s and beyond, and also serves as an important comparative tool.

Nelson Rockefeller, son of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and grandson of the originator of the American oil dynasty, John D. Rockefeller, was undoubtedly born to a life of privilege that helped him gain position and influence at an unusual pace. But he was not merely a prodigal son or petulant playboy, despite some of his well-known habits like riding a helicopter to the Governor’s mansion in Albany in a time when that form of personal transportation was not common, even for the super rich. Rather, as Kissinger remarked of his close friend and patron, perhaps not complimentarily: “Of all the public figures I have known he [Rockefeller] retained the most absolute, almost touching, faith in the power of ideas.” The Rockefeller family historians, who have an obvious bias,

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204 Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 4. Interestingly, the friendship would persist, even after the report’s apparent failure. Rockefeller to Kissinger, November
describe Rockefeller this way: “Charismatic and ebullient, Nelson was the quintessential politician.”

Beginning with his work during World War II, Rockefeller quickly established a reputation as a foreign policy progressive and a liberal Republican. After the war, he set about to transform, “the historically indifferent, extractive, and interventionist U.S. business presence overseas into an ‘enlightened’ capitalism that would show both Uncle Sam and the American system in a favorable light.” Rockefeller accomplished this through a series of important and formational international endeavors.

Rockefeller’s first major appointment occurred in 1940 when the 32 year old was appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to be Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Rockefeller oversaw a major transition in the committee, created on August 16, 1940 by executive order and dubbed at first the “Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics.” Within a year, though, the group was reorganized. Its function shifted from “voluntary economic intelligence activities,” to the facilitation of communication and health-related initiatives in Latin America. As Coordinator, Rockefeller’s real role quickly transitioned from that of intelligence official to being charged with justifying development assistance in the name of national security. Rockefeller accomplished his task by linking the performance of security guards, for example, to their health, which was affected by the presence of

206 Rockefeller’s beliefs spawned a subset in the Republican Party: the Rockefeller Republican.
209 Kramer, “Nelson Rockefeller and British Security Coordination”: 82.
disease, the elimination of which required U.S. funding for public health measures.\textsuperscript{210} Rockefeller truly believed that such programs would improve security for the United States and bolster international relations.\textsuperscript{211} Thus, it is no surprise that Rockefeller’s work from the time, and his private work in the 1950s, has been directly linked to foreign aid programs championed by Kennedy in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{212}

After World War II, Rockefeller continued to work in Latin America on various development projects. Rockefeller was upset by the shift from regionalism to universalism and the emphasis on indirect treatment of Latin America through the United Nations after the war ended.\textsuperscript{213} He dedicated himself to projects meant to build the middle class in Latin American countries, a strategy he was sure would lead to increased economic and political stability. In 1950 Rockefeller started the first mutual fund in Brazil designed specifically to bolster the middle class.\textsuperscript{214} Though Rockefeller experienced successes and failures, run mostly through his nonprofit, the International Basic Economy Corporation, it is significant that his work covered all the basic aspects of technical assistance that would be contemplated by U.S. officials in the 1950s and 1960s.\textsuperscript{215} In a 1955 NSC meeting, when Rockefeller was Special Assistant to Eisenhower, he is remembered as arguing: “It is true, in the short run, that dictators handle Communists effectively. But in the long run, the U.S. must encourage the growth

\textsuperscript{210} Lars Schoultz,\textit{ Beneath the United States} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 308.


\textsuperscript{213} Cobbs, “Entrepreneurship as Diplomacy”: 94.

\textsuperscript{214} Cobbs, “Entrepreneurship as Diplomacy”: 89.

\textsuperscript{215} Harr and Johnson,\textit{ The Rockefeller Century}, 435.
of democracies in Latin America if Communism is to be defeated in the area.”\textsuperscript{216} Rockefeller was leading the pack of American business leaders and government officials in the realization of the advantages of direct aid, and in the knowledge that U.S. resources were limited and policies had variable and complex repercussions.\textsuperscript{217} He was not an anti-communist crusader. Nor was he a pacifist. Rockefeller sought to balance competing interests and forces in order to use the tool he knew best—economic policy—to stabilize Latin American economies and encourage long-run democratization.

By the late 1960s, Rockefeller was primarily engaged in domestic politics. He served as Governor of New York and embarked upon several unsuccessful runs for president throughout the decade. In doing so he developed one of the country’s most heated political rivalries with Nixon, a fellow gubernatorial and presidential hopeful. Nixon saw Rockefeller as a liberal corrupter of the Republican Party, and Rockefeller viewed Nixon as incompetent. In his memoirs, Nixon describes Rockefeller as, “practically a liberal Democrat on many issues.”\textsuperscript{218} Kissinger describes Nixon’s feelings this way: “Nixon thought of Rockefeller as a selfish amateur who would wreck what he could not control, a representative of the Establishment that had treated him with condescension throughout his political life.”\textsuperscript{219} On Rockefeller’s feelings for Nixon, Kissinger recalls that Rockefeller was particularly perturbed by Nixon’s manipulative style of politics.\textsuperscript{220} Nixon suffered major political losses to Rockefeller in the 1950s in New York and was not disappointed when Rockefeller turned down a politically

\textsuperscript{217} Rivas, \textit{Missionary Capitalist}, 7.
\textsuperscript{219} Kissinger, \textit{The White House Years}, 7.
\textsuperscript{220} Kissinger, \textit{The White House Years}, 7.
motivated offer to join the 1960 presidential ticket as his running mate.  

But the two endured their most heated battle in the 1968 Republican presidential primary, which Nixon ultimately won. After 1968, little love was lost between the men, with the exception of Rockefeller’s recommendation of his closest advisor, Kissinger, to Nixon. Though suspicious at first, Nixon met with Kissinger and impulsively offered him the job of National Security Adviser. This may seem to indicate some sort of intellectual connection between Rockefeller and Nixon, but it is a red herring. Kissinger himself notes, “One of my attractions for Nixon, I understood later, was that my appointment would demonstrate his ability to co-opt a Harvard intellectual; that I came from Rockefeller’s entourage made that prospect all the more interesting.”

Thus, Rockefeller’s appointment to lead a fact-finding commission to Latin America and deliver a comprehensive report to Nixon with recommendations for future U.S. policy was not a valued assignment handed off to a trusted advisor. Rather, it was a political move meant to satisfy calls from U.S. leaders and leaders of the OAS for a renewed and established policy on Latin America. It was also a symbolic opportunity for Nixon to show good grace (at least that is how it might appear to the average observer) to a fallen presidential contender who had a special interest in the region.

The Rockefeller Report was the product of four separate trips to Latin America. On each voyage at least 25 advisors accompanied Rockefeller. Combined, these advisors

were able to meet with 100 to 200 leaders in each country they visited.\(^{226}\) The total number of countries visited was reduced to 20 after delegations were greeted with protests during several stops. As a result, Venezuela and Chile asked that the delegation postpone proposed visits.\(^{227}\) Rockefeller was quick to discount these experiences as affecting the tenor of his recommendations. In introducing the report, he relayed an anecdote to make this point. Rockefeller told how one mission member reported being scared only once throughout the process of producing the report, and it was at a protest which greeted some committee members at the airport upon their return from a trip.\(^{228}\) Rockefeller proposed a new, progressive policy toward Latin America. He introduced his report with these words: “it became clear as our trips progressed that, without...new policy, the nations of this hemisphere would steadily and rapidly become less disposed—because of disillusionment and cynicism—to deal candidly and effectively with the United States and with confidence in the mutuality of our interest and good will.”\(^{229}\) His rhetoric soared: “We rediscovered the quality of life for each person in the hemisphere, and finally the world, as the only measure of lasting consequence.”\(^{230}\) These were not the words of a laissez-faire militarist, disenchanted by protests and the failure in Vietnam and proposing a paradigm shift in U.S. foreign policy. Rather, this was an advocate for humanity, concerned with policies of the past but frightened even more of the potential for an isolated, detached future.

\(^{227}\) “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 497.
\(^{228}\) “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 497.
\(^{229}\) “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 497.
\(^{230}\) “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 499.
Rockefeller stated simply that the biggest problem facing U.S.-Latin American relations was that, “we have no clear formulation of United States policy objectives toward the Western Hemisphere.” In that vein, the report offered over 80 separate recommendations, grouped into two chapters with multiple categories in each. Headings included, “Organization of the United States Government,” “International Organizations,” and “Western Hemisphere Security.” The recommendations themselves spanned a wide range of topics. They suggested that: “The United States should give full support to and work through the Organization of American States and its several councils in dealing with Western Hemisphere affairs….” They noted that: “The United States should make use of international facilities, such as the World Bank and the World Health Organization, in developing its regional assistance programs.” They also encapsulated specific actions, like the creation of a number of high-level government positions related to Latin American affairs, including a Secretary of Western Hemisphere Affairs. Economic recommendations, under the heading “Economic and Social Development,” included issues as disparate as foreign aid, debt relief, and trade barriers. These proposals dominated the report, requiring ten of its nearly 40 pages. These recommendations, undoubtedly where Rockefeller’s views were most dominant, were framed as a continuation of the goals of the Alliance for Progress, albeit an improvement thereof. The main theme was to shift, “an increasing portion of our assistance through multilateral institutions,” an instinct that (unlike complimenting the Alliance for Progress) would become a hallmark of Nixon’s foreign aid policy. Most importantly, though, the report

231 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 509.
232 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 513.
233 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 514.
234 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 510.
235 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 518-528.
emphasized that when it came to the Alliance for Progress and the improvement and building on of its goals: “The time has arrived for the United States to move consciously from a paternalistic role to one of partnership.”236 Through its many recommendations, the report outlined a thoughtful evaluation of previous policies and insightful ways to improve relations, through better organization, communication, and aid, both on the part of U.S. officials and leaders in Latin America.

It is, of course, impossible to avoid a discussion of the military recommendations Rockefeller made, which were contained to a comparatively small section of the report. There were only four recommendations of an explicit and direct military nature. Unsurprisingly, these appeared under the heading, “Western Hemisphere Security,” a section that occupied only two of the report’s 40 pages.237 Admittedly, there was a larger tension throughout the report where Rockefeller, progressive though many of his recommendations are, made statements like: “Clearly, the opinion in the United States that Communism is no longer a serious factor in the Western Hemisphere is thoroughly wrong.”238 Rockefeller’s voice was not vehement but it was certainly at odds with other claims, such as for, “a high degree of tolerance for diversity and for nationalistic expression often directed against the United States, and a recognition that our style may often have a more important effect than what we actually do in the hemisphere.”239 And Rockefeller’s antipathetic observations about communist labor unions jibed with the standard period assertion that communism had no place in the liberal vision for

236 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 518.
237 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 515-518.
238 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 506.
239 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 508.
Still, Rockefeller concluded, “Our neighbors need to be reassured of our conviction that people are, indeed, our basic concern, and that we want to continue to work with them, regardless of the form of their government, to help them raise the level of their lives.”

Furthermore, a close reading of Rockefeller’s specific military recommendations reveals a more nuanced justification. As Rockefeller insisted, “United States policy-makers should be ever mindful of the urgent need to avoid any tendency or even an appearance of a tendency toward isolationism inimical to the best interests of the hemisphere.” It is from this sentiment that most of his military recommendations actually arose. For instance, he found that: “Many of our neighbors find it incomprehensible that the United States will not sell them military equipment which they feel is required to deal with internal subversion.” Further, his recommendations, though they urged increased spending on military training, wanted to do so in order that the U.S. would, “no longer maintain the permanent military missions in residence in other nations which too often have constituted too large and too visible a United States presence.” And Rockefeller’s recommendation to increase spending on a military training program was not unprecedented, though it did reverse a downward trend in such spending that came after Johnson arrived in office. Additionally, Rockefeller was probably influenced by one of his trip mates, General Robert Porter, Jr., former...

240 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 530.
241 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 514.
242 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 514. It is interesting to note that he uses the term “United States” instead of “American,” which was likely to avoid offending Latin American leaders who rightly saw themselves as “Americans.”
243 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 516.
244 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 517.
245 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 517. And if that money went anywhere after 1966, it was likely to Johnson’s increased spending in Vietnam.
commander-in-chief of the U.S. Southern Command, and, subconsciously at least, by the violence he witnessed while traveling. Rockefeller concluded, “the spiritual soil in the hemisphere is fertile for change—and the forces that would nourish revolution are ready and in place.” Indeed, some of that revolution might have been militaristic, but it is likely that Rockefeller had other counterrevolutionary solutions in mind as well. Lastly, as Rockefeller mentioned in a conversation with his advisors when preparing the report, Nixon personally asked him to feature a “section of this report on the forces of change,” which Rockefeller went on to note, with understatement, “is a very sensitive point.”

Despite this infamous section of the report, it is difficult to tie it to the development of Nixon’s foreign policy in Latin America, especially when it comes to militaristic spending and intervention.

Descriptions of the report in contemporary news sources initially agreed with this more benevolent interpretation of its goals, though coverage soured over time. Press on the report was initially dominated by the delay in its release, which spanned almost six months. During this period it was under review and labeled classified. The New York Times worried that, “Some of Governor Rockefeller’s specific recommendations are understood to have been considered unsuitable for the Nixon speech. This is believed to

246 Indeed, an interesting argument for the influence of Porter outside the conventional narrative that he was military personnel can be found in the fact that he was a prompt and well-prepared member of the mission. According to various transcripts from the group’s preparations, Porter was one of the first to complete his recommendations and their form served as a model for everyone else’s. “Transcript of Meeting with NAR and Advisors,” June 20, 1969, RG 4, NAR, Personal, Washington, D.C. Files, Box 121, Folder 991, 45-46. It would be interesting to understand more about how Rockefeller was influenced by others that accompanied him, such as newsman George Beebe. Beebe would go on to found the World Press Freedom Committee and was responsible, as will be seen later, for leaking the report before its declassification. New York Times, May 2, 1990.

247 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 539.

248 “Transcript of Meeting with NAR and Advisors,” 59.
be one reason that the report has not been made public.”

This controversy passed though, as the report’s release was timed to follow Nixon’s long awaited address on U.S.-Latin American policy, which occurred in October of 1961. Soon after, the New York Times captured the real danger of the report’s content, noting presciently that: “It will be unfortunate if the excellent Rockefeller recommendations for expanding trade, reserving debt, clearing the underbrush of United States protectionist devices and broadening hemisphere multilateralism are lost sight of in the inevitable controversy about the military-security proposals.”

Of course, this was coming from an editorial board which had opined just a month earlier that: “Above all, it is vital that Mr. Nixon indicate an open mind on the Vina del Mar recommendations and a willingness to negotiate seriously about them.”

But the New York Times had reason for warning against this bias. Just a few days earlier, the news section’s first coverage on the full report—a version of which was leaked before its release by Rockefeller advisory team member and editor of the Miami Herald, George Beebe—was extremely prejudiced. The story in question, entitled “Rockefeller Fear of New ‘Castros’ Voice in Report,” was largely focused on Rockefeller’s calls for more military aid and training of troops. It marginalized the substantive economic policy to a few paragraphs buried well under the lede.

In the Washington Post’s coverage, similar themes emerged. The paper’s editorial board immediately recognized the progressive nature of many of Rockefeller’s recommendations. The board urged that Nixon adhere to them and highlighted the fact

that only four of 83 recommendations in the report were militaristic.\(^{253}\) This balanced statement in an otherwise optimistic editorial summarized the board’s attitude toward the report: “Many of these recommendations are excellent, many are controversial: we hope to deal with them as they become topical in time.”\(^{254}\) As the \textit{Washington Post} reported: “President Nixon singled out two economic proposals yesterday in making public Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller’s recommendations on Latin American policy, but made no reference to the Rockefeller report’s controversial emphasis on stepping up U.S. military aid for internal security.”\(^{255}\) Though there was news that Church and other liberals had stepped out against the report almost immediately, it is far from clear that the report clearly symbolized a militaristic shift from reading the \textit{Washington Post}. There was fleeting reference to the presence of Porter and his probable impact on the recommendations, but overall it was seen as a progressive document and received balanced treatment in the news.\(^{256}\) Perhaps the editors from \textit{Time Magazine} captured the character of the report best when they wrote: “Against a backdrop of danger, the report stresses that the U.S. in its own self-interest must reaffirm its old, and unfortunately unfulfilled, goal of making the hemisphere a better place in which to live for all Americans, both north and south.”\(^{257}\) But when arraigned in the court of public opinion and congressional mood, the report took on new meaning.\(^{258}\)

Indeed, the writers of the report anticipated issues with the military recommendations and implementation issues in general with Congress and in the public


\(^{254}\) “Rockefeller’s Report: Worth Waiting For.”

\(^{255}\) “Rockefeller’s Report: Worth Waiting For.”

\(^{256}\) “Rockefeller Fear of New ‘Castros’ Voiced in Report.”


\(^{258}\) “Rockefeller’s Report: Worth Waiting For.”
eye. In a June meeting with Rockefeller and his advisors on the report, Porter was already warning of possible confusion in the public sphere over his recommendations and offered to take responsibility for countering them.\(^{259}\) Rockefeller, politically savvy as he was, had consulted congressmen before he set off on his trips to seek their approval. Interestingly, Church was one of those who extended his enthusiastically.\(^{260}\) However, upon the report’s delivery, even though some senators conceded that the media had distorted the report, in general they were unable to fight the tide of public opinion, and the military recommendations became the center of attention.\(^{261}\) Even though Rockefeller continued to lobby congress with letters to key figures like Democratic whip Hale Boggs and Latin American sub-committee heads Church and Representative Dante Fascell, which promoted the report’s potential, it was an uphill battle.\(^{262}\) Though initial reactions were favorable, especially from figures like Thomas Mann, the tide quickly turned, perhaps best symbolized by the title and content of Church’s statement, recorded in the 1969 *Congressional Record*, “The Rockefeller Roadshow: A Fatuous Failure,” which sharply criticized the rhetorical role but practical damage caused by the mission.\(^{263}\)

When taken with an objective reading of the report, Nixon’s early foreign policy toward Latin America—as laid out in his speeches, articles, and internal communications with advisers in the foreign policy establishment in the late 1960s—clearly did not hinge

\(^{259}\) “Transcript of Meeting with NAR and Advisors.”

\(^{260}\) Jim Cannon to Frank Church, April 5, 1969, RG 15, NAR, Gubernatorial, James Cannon Files, Latin American Mission, Congressional Relations, Box 12, Folder 102.


\(^{262}\) Jim Cannon to NAR, March 21, 1969 and NAR to Hale Boggs, July 24, 1969, RG 15, NAR, Gubernatorial, James Cannon Files, Latin American Mission, Congressional Relations, Box 12, Folder 102.

\(^{263}\) “Congressional Record—Senate, July 1, 1969, S 7409. ‘The Rockefeller Roadshow: A Fatuous Failure’,” RG 15, NAR, Gubernatorial, James Cannon Files, Latin American Mission, Congressional Relations, Box 12, Folder 102.
upon the report’s recommendations. While there are parallels between Rockefeller’s recommendations and Nixon’s policies, especially in the economic arena, this sort of overlap did not occur in the development of the militaristic policy that now characterizes Nixon’s presidency. This, of course, makes sense given the actual content of the report, as seen through a close reading and an investigation of early news coverage. There are two ways to view this claim. One is in the light of Nixon’s first major speech on Latin America, which did not take into account even a majority of Rockefeller’s recommendations. Another is through a brief look at any sort of gravity the report or its language might have had in other early statements, policy briefs, or internal communications in the administration during the late 1960s. Both perspectives show a report, for the reasons outlined above—ideological, political, and practical—that was not particularly important to actual Latin American policy. This exercise will acquit the report, and its author, from any major role in militaristic and interventionist policies perpetuated by Nixon and Kissinger in Latin America during the early 1970s, and it will also show its connections with past policies and demonstrate different factors that may aid, or impede, such a report’s implementation.

In his letter of introduction to the report, Nixon claimed that, “this report constituted a major contribution to the formulation of our policy for this hemisphere.

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264 It is not the main focus of this thesis, but an interesting extension of this project would be looking at the role of non-governmental foundations and international philanthropies, especially in terms of potential implementation. For one, the report was likely modeled off of an earlier study done by the Rockefeller Brother’s Fund. More importantly, there is talk in meetings concerning possibilities for implementation about channeling recommendations to places like the National Science Foundation and other agencies. “Transcript of Meeting with NAR and Advisors.” Indeed, such an investigation would not be without historiographical precedent, for example, Akira Iriye’s groundbreaking work, Global Community (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). An interesting connection with this idea in regard to the next chapter might be: Frederic S. Pearson, J. Martin Reynolds, and Keith E. Meyer, "The Carter Foreign Policy and the Use of International Organization: The Limits of Policy Innovation," World Affairs 142 (Fall 1979): 75-98.

Both our general conceptual approach and the specific lines of action we intend to follow have been substantially shaped by this report.”

But he also insisted that: “My speech on October 31 was intended as a philosophical foundation for what I envisage as a continuous process of policy formulation over the months ahead.”

Although the public release of the report was not until November of 1969, it was officially submitted by Rockefeller on August 30, and kept secret until it had been reviewed internally and considered for Nixon’s speech on October 31, entitled “Actions for Progress for the Americas.” In a background only briefing on the day of the speech, Kissinger claimed that the report was delayed so that it could be considered along with NSC recommendations and the consensus of Vina del Mar.

This timeline does not match the contention that the report was heavily considered and adhered to in the conjuring of U.S.-Latin American policy by Nixon, as “his [Nixon’s] speech fell considerably short of accepting the full scope of Rockefeller’s report.” Indeed, Kissinger’s numerous references to bureaucratic procedures and pathways for various recommendations in the briefing hints at the administration’s intention to tout the report but not actually oversee real implementation.

To name a few discrepancies between recommendations and policy, as recorded by the New York Times, Nixon notably discarded the idea of a cabinet post and rejected other central proposals like the joint congressional committee on the hemisphere, the hemisphere education institute, and the hemisphere conference to organize and synchronize industry.

Nixon did find himself to be amenable to some of

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266 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 493.
267 “Quality of Life in the Americas”: 493.
270 “Press Conference with President.”
271 “Rockefeller’s Latin Plan Faces Fire in Washington.”
Rockefeller’s economic recommendations, which he said were “imaginative,” including the proposed repeal of the Hickenlooper Amendment, which Nixon ultimately carried out.\textsuperscript{272} When questioned specifically about debate over the military recommendations, Kissinger claimed they were “practically insignificant.”\textsuperscript{273} But reporters from both the \textit{New York Times} and the \textit{Washington Post} recognized through reliable sources that the delay in delivering the speech was due to arguments about how much of the report to accept, which was ultimately very little, because Nixon did not care for most of its recommendations.\textsuperscript{274}

Rather than adopt many of the report’s serious recommendations, Nixon chose a few he liked and focused on them in terms of his preexisting conception of policy. In fact, the most memorable Rockefeller remnant from the October 31 speech, discounting the anti-tariff and other economic language, was the phraseology elevating partnership over patronage.\textsuperscript{275} Indeed, as one historian has noted, “as one looks at the record of the years that followed, it is difficult to argue seriously that this speech really laid out a blueprint of the policy. It was more a talk that set a rather condescending tone: Latin American countries had finally matured enough to be treated as equals.”\textsuperscript{276} Further evidence that Nixon’s policy was already in place comes from the sixth ministerial meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, which took place from June 20 to 23, 1969. Nixon sent Assistant Secretary for Inter-

\textsuperscript{273} “Press Conference with President.”
\textsuperscript{275} This likely existed within Nixon’s conception of a new foreign policy before Rockefeller introduced it. “Actions for Progress for the Americas.”
\textsuperscript{276} Cohn, “A Tale of Two Translation Programs”: 28. It is worth noting that this development, on an intellectual level, has strong implications for the Linowitz Report.
American affairs, Charles Meyer, as the U.S. representative, in part to quell the increasing calls for an articulated Latin American policy from his administration. This meeting occurred before the report was delivered. There Meyer stated, “This estadounidense is proud of President Nixon’s commitment to the hemisphere, recently demonstrated by his request to the Congress for funds to carry on the U.S portion of the Alliance for Progress during the next fiscal year.”277 Though perhaps technically true, this statement could not be further in sentiment from the tenor of the report, which required revising the Alliance for Progress (or from Nixon’s own views, which were disdainful of it).278 Meyer went on to say of the tenants of the Alliance for Progress, “to anyone who asks if we will stick with them, I am here to tell you that our answer is an unequivocal ‘Yes.’”279 Meyer’s statement also enumerated a large number of economic policies, focusing on the lessoning of protectionism, that Nixon would layout in his October 31 speech. Furthermore, personal correspondence between Rockefeller and former mission members in 1970 and further news coverage in the year after the report makes it clear that the report was widely publicized but never implemented.280 This does not mean that the report has no significance when considering the creation of U.S. policy. Rather it is important to establish the actual content—and influence of the report—in order to be able to understand its real value, both for policy making at the time and for larger scale considerations of policy formation over time.

278 Nixon heavily criticized the Alliance for Progress in “Actions for Progress for the Americas.”
279 “Statement by Mr. Meyer.”
A useful way to consider the immediate impact of the report’s recommendations is to evaluate its appearance in foundational documents for Nixon’s policies. In general, the lack of significant governmental documentation concerning the report points to its lesser direct role in the creation of U.S. policy. Indeed, early speeches and articles indicate a foreign policy formed well before 1969. However, the report did have noticeable traction in public rhetoric—that is at contemporaneous speeches and policy luncheons, which one may assume represented the sort of political interests the report was designed to satisfy in the first place. Other internal reports on similar topics also speak to the relative importance of the report. There are few State Department or Central Intelligence Agency documents—though there are some NSC ones—that cite the report, and memoirs from major players in the foreign policy establishment of the time, including Nixon and Kissinger, only mention the report briefly, if at all.

The editorial note prefacing, *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Foundations of Foreign Policy*, states two obvious but highly relevant considerations for investigating the foreign policy decision making of Nixon and Kissinger. It reads: “The intellectual assumptions on which the foreign policy of the Nixon administration was based were established, in large measure, by President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger….Both men came to their new responsibilities with well-developed views on foreign policy.”\(^{281}\) Not only does the statement exclude other advisors, but it also discounts the significance of exogenous events in the policy making process. Indeed, as early as 1967, Nixon was criticizing the Alliance for Progress and signaling the need for a shift in policy toward Latin America, notably at an address to the

famously exclusive Bohemian Club, located in the Redwood Forest outside of San Francisco. There, at an address meant to honor former member President Herbert Hoover, Nixon proclaimed: “Despite the Alliance for Progress, Latin America is barely holding its own in the race between production and population. As it continues to fall further behind the rest of the world, it becomes a tinder box for revolution.”\textsuperscript{282} Consider also his claim from the same speech: “Latin America will become a permanent international depressed area unless revolutionary changes are made in its economic, educational, and governmental institutions.”\textsuperscript{283} As Nixon’s candidacy was accelerated, his positions became even more crystallized. At a campaign speech in Omaha, Nebraska on May 6, 1968, Nixon expressed his policy more fully, months before he solicited the report. He stated, “It is time to develop a new diplomacy for the United States, a diplomacy to deal with future aggression—so that when the freedom of friendly nations is threatened by aggression, we help them with our money and help them with our arms; but let them fight the war and don’t fight the war for them. This should be the goal of a new diplomacy for America.”\textsuperscript{284} In a June 4, 1969 speech in Colorado Springs at the Air Force Academy Commencement, Nixon set forth an aggressive agenda coming out against isolationism but in support of increased military defense expenditures in order to perpetuate the military establishment.\textsuperscript{285} These claims resonate with some of Rockefeller’s military recommendations, yet they come months before the report was completed, and they help

\textsuperscript{283} “Document 2: Address by Richard M. Nixon to the Bohemian Club.”
to demonstrate the difficulty faced by report writers in achieving implementation in the face of preformed beliefs.

Though not a speech, another notable public event, which accredited the report to some extent (but then undermined it), was a press briefing led by Kissinger in December of 1969. There, Kissinger outlined the policy making philosophy of the administration. He informed the reporters that policy makers start with general principles and then find practical ways to implement them. One example was the report: “For example, on Latin American policy, we made the general decision of where we wanted to go in July, and then in October, after Governor Rockefeller came back from his trip, and the Department of State and other agencies had made specific recommendations, we developed the implementing decisions.”

Although this was one of the rare occasions where the report was acknowledged as at least part of the process, it is also apparent that the general principles and other reports were already in play. This points further to the difficulty of implementation given preformed policy positions. It is fitting that in Nixon’s 1970 State of the Union address there is only one line on Latin America, though it does stem, however meaninglessly, from the Rockefeller Report: “We have initiated a new approach to Latin America in which we deal with those nations as partners rather than patrons.”

The adoption of this popular-but-empty political tagline speaks to the greater impact of the report. In a strange bit of symmetry, Rockefeller gave a speech assessing Nixon’s foreign policy in 1972 at the National Press Club and in his 15 page address only dwelled on Latin America for one paragraph. In that paragraph he only mentioned that Nixon was

working to untie loans in the name of long term economic goals that were established long before Rockefeller’s own significant personal and political investment in the creation of an entirely new policy.  

As alluded to, another interesting facet of Nixon’s foreign policy making vis-à-vis Latin America is the existence of several other reports he commissioned, though less publicly in one case, and internally in the other, on the subject of relations with the region. The first is the Peterson Report, which was led by Rudolph Peterson, then President of Bank of America. Peterson first discussed his report with Nixon, to be focused on foreign aid to Latin America, in September 1969, after the Rockefeller Report had been submitted, but prior to the October 31 speech and the official release of the report.  

Ultimately, the conclusions of Peterson’s report focused on foreign aid findings similar to those proposed by Rockefeller and eventually implemented, in part, by Nixon. As political scientist William Binning observed, “The [Peterson] Report is a relatively short document yet it encompasses the acceptable recommendations of the Rockefeller Report and it fits very well into Nixon’s ‘U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: A New Strategy for Peace’ speech of February, 1970, particularly in regard to the low profile concept.” In other words, the Peterson Report included what was good about the report in Nixon’s mind and omitted the rest. Nixon had also been heavily influenced by a report on Latin America solicited from and submitted by the Chairman of the NSC

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Undersecretaries Committee on October 17, 1969, two weeks before the October 31 speech. To complete this trifecta of lesser known but apparently influential reports on Latin American policy, in 1970 Nixon ordered a reappraisal of, “United States policy and programs in Latin America,” asking that: “The study should consider and reappraise the assumptions, analyses, and estimates which underlay the study prepared in response to NSSM 15, the Rockefeller Report, and the President’s October 31, 1969, speech in light of recent developments in the Western Hemisphere.” This seems once again to reinforce that while the Rockefeller Report was considered by top policy makers, it faced difficulties in implementation as it competed for space with other solicited reports and various others policy bodies.

The content of other extraneous internal declassified documents and retrospective analyses of upper level decision-making points to this same difficulty in implementation. For example, some of the first practical evidence of Nixon’s militarism—namely support for covert intervention—seems to spring up unrelated to the report. In a note he wrote in the margin of a memorandum from Kissinger in September of 1969, Nixon underscored the line, “it is not desirable, in the very interest of peace, to let everybody assume, as appears to the case today, that the US will no longer intervene anywhere in Latin America at any time.” This sentiment is confirmed in a February 19, 1970 internal document, where Nixon stated, “I have determined that it is essential to the defense and

293 “NSSM 108: Review of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America.”
security of the United States and its efforts for world peace that the overt foreign activities of the U.S. government continue to be supplemented by covert action operations.”

A complete review of related documents turns up few if any other references to the report, nor is it mentioned with any substance in the memoirs of Nixon or Kissinger.

The Rockefeller Report, and its impact (or lack thereof), is best explained in the context of the political environment of the 1960s, its relationship to preexisting policies under Kennedy and Johnson, Rockefeller’s foundational and deeply held beliefs regarding Latin America, and the circumstances under which Rockefeller was asked to compile the report, particularly Nixon and Kissinger’s preformed policy agendas. A close reading of the report’s actual text shows a far more complex picture of what Rockefeller hoped to convey about the future of American foreign policy than can be found in the documents and speeches outlining Nixon’s policy toward Latin America. Indeed, Rockefeller sought to advance the legacy of report writers like Eisenhower by discarding or revamping old structures and reinvigorating them with new ideas. Of course, it is a bit counterintuitive to argue so strongly for the ineffectiveness of a report after spending time attempting to trace the importance and impact of the Kennan and Eisenhower reports. Unlike the first two reports, the Rockefeller Report was a heavily publicized policy tool. It does not need more recognition, but, rather, more accurate recognition. Thus, it does not seem contradictory to emphasize the importance of Kennan or Eisenhower compared to reputation while deemphasizing the importance of Rockefeller, as both these arguments serve the same cause: the preservation of a factual alternative

295 “NSDM 40: Responsibility for the Conduct, Supervision, and Coordination of Covert Action Operations.”
narrative for the development of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. More importantly, the Rockefeller Report’s shortcomings in implementation demonstrate many of the factors that can prevent a policy report from achieving conversion to actual policy. The last report in this study, the Linowitz Report, is a surprising capstone as it encompasses, more than the other reports, both elements of the alternative narrative. It contains surprisingly innovating and progressive policy suggestions, which both reach back to and break away from previous intellectual heritages, and these suggestions are also implemented and align with actual U.S. foreign policy in the region from the time. Indeed, the Rockefeller Report may, more than anything, serve as an incredibly effective analog to the Linowitz Report. Taken together, these reports can help reveal the factors that allow reports to become real policy.
Chapter 4

AN UNEXPECTED OUTCOME

The Linowitz Report

The 1970s were typified by angst about America’s role in the world after a decade in which Vietnam had ended, Watergate had transpired, and U.S. actions abroad were increasingly cast in a negative light. The idea that the U.S. was in decline was widespread. Andrew Hacker, a political scientist, wrote a tract in 1970 entitled *The End of the American Era*. He described, “a growing suspicion that the American nation has lost its credentials as a teacher of moral lessons; that our presence abroad is evidence only of power, carrying no enlightenment in its wake.” Yale historian Paul Kennedy penned a controversial but popular book, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, in which he argued that it was possible that the United States in the 1970s represented a great power on the verge of decline. In any case, by the 1970s Americans were, according to American historian Donald H. White, dealing with numerous strains on perceptions of America’s role in the world, both foreign and domestic, relating to military issues, economic dislocations, and more. It was into this environment that Jimmy Carter, a foreign policy novice and political outsider, was elected President. Carter’s foreign policy would come under heavy fire from critics on the right, and it was conflicted within his own administration, as advisors like Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew

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Brzezinski fought for influence. But there is little argument that Carter’s policy represented a departure from Nixon’s realist Cold War formulations and led the way to a more interdependent, global, and cooperative model that respected but was not restrained by Cold War strictures.\textsuperscript{301}

The globalist nature of Carter’s foreign policy, along with its emphasis on human rights, fit perfectly with the concerns being raised about policy on Latin America.\textsuperscript{302} According to Latin American expert, Richard Fagen, Latin America was a priority for Carter as soon as he entered office, and analyses and speeches on the region were produced in 1977 at a rate unseen since the Kennedy presidency.\textsuperscript{303} As Pastor noted in an interview, Carter was determined to move quickly on Latin America and as soon as January 8, 1977, Pastor, who served as an advisor on Latin America, was asked by the president to write a Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) on the canal negotiations.\textsuperscript{304} Carter’s second major foreign policy address, delivered on April 16, 1977, focused on Panama and human rights issues. In his memoirs, Carter’s Secretary of State Cyrus Vance writes of his start at the State Department: “One of my specific concerns was that we should forge a sounder, more equal relationship with Latin

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\item \textsuperscript{301} Indeed, not only was his policy a break from the past, but it also contradicted with current policy assessments from more traditional cold warriors, both inside and outside his administration. For a counterview of how foreign policy, especially toward Latin America, in the mid to late 1970s could have unfolded, see, for example: Charles Corbett, “Toward a U.S. Defense Policy: Latin America,” \textit{Military Review} 55 (June 1975): 11-18.
\item \textsuperscript{303} Fagen, “The Carter Administration and Latin America”: 652.
\item \textsuperscript{304} Robert Pastor, Telephone Interview, July 2, 2009.
\end{itemize}
The initial focus was on Panama and Cuba, but over time the administration went on to implement many new policies in the region. While in the past century policy toward Latin America had been dictated by a variety of factors—individual actors, NSC planning documents, external events, and the perpetuation of existing frameworks, such as the special relationship with Latin America (in the guise of Good Neighbor, the Alliance for Progress, or the Mature Partnership)—a section of Carter’s policy in the region can be tied to a single document: the Linowitz Report.

Sol Linowitz was an impressive figure: he was a lawyer, the chairman of Xerox, and a diplomat. The son of Jewish immigrants, Linowitz grew up in New Jersey and worked his way through Hamilton College and Cornell Law. He started practicing at a small law firm in New Jersey and fell into working with Joseph Wilson, an area businessman who had him write up the options for patents on what would become the Xerox machine. In 1966, Linowitz left Xerox to accept a joint diplomatic appointment as ambassador to the OAS and representative to the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress. As Linowitz writes, “I was in the State Department but definitely not of the State Department.” Perhaps indicating his future inclinations, Linowitz recalls in his memoirs that he arrived to his ambassadorship in the late 1960s and:

the United States did not really have a Latin American policy. It was an area of the world that presidents preferred to ignore. Americans thought of the continent as a homogenous blob and did not understand that these were sovereign countries with their own histories, traditions, and economic circumstances.

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308 Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man*, 4-5. Of course, this is a retrospective account, so his thought process may appear a bit more teleological than it was.
His interest in Latin America persisted through his work on the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations and, later, his founding of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington, D.C-based think tank. He also served as a co-negotiator for the Panama Canal Treaties with Ellsworth Bunker, and enjoyed a successful stint as a diplomat to the Middle East. Linowitz was particularly known, perhaps not unsurprisingly, for his incredible skills as a negotiator and a facilitator of compromise.

As Abraham Lowenthal, a staff member and key figure on the commission has noted, Linowitz was “strong and able, shrewd about influence,” and less egotistical than predecessors like Nelson Rockefeller. Linowitz was intrigued when David Rockefeller approached him with the idea of a privately commissioned report. To Linowitz, the fact that Rockefeller, a moderate republican, approached the liberal Linowitz, indicated David Rockefeller’s truly bipartisan intentions for the endeavor. Furthermore, as Linowitz puts it, “For once, the reason to seek added attention to this region of the world was not a failure but success. At the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s Latin America as a whole had actually exceeded the growth targets set in the Alliance for Progress.” Linowitz’s background and diplomatic skills enabled him to create a “great commission” with a balance of political views and an appropriate smattering of important figures. Still, there were some initial doubts about the idea of the commission from people like Lowenthal, especially given the involvement of divisive figures like David Rockefeller, whose family had noted interactions in the region, and Kissinger, who was

310 “Sol Linowitz Dies; Carter-Era Envoy Helped Found Xerox.”
311 Abraham Lowenthal, Telephone Interview, August 4, 2009.
312 Linowitz, The Making of a Public Man, 142.
313 Lowenthal, August 4, 2009.
315 Lowenthal, August 4, 2009.
still under fire for sponsoring intervention under Nixon.\textsuperscript{316} But, Kissinger, then Secretary of State under President Gerald Ford, had also showed signs of beginning to change his thinking on Latin America.\textsuperscript{317} There were, according to Lowenthal, significant questions about whether the report produced would be anything more than a political document and a wasted effort by its sincere contributors.\textsuperscript{318} However, the incredible consensus-building ability of Linowitz, his wide-reaching connections, and his ability to grasp the major issues and control the direction of the report convinced naysayers to take up the commission’s work for the next several years and beyond.\textsuperscript{319}

Versions of the report were put forward in both 1974 and 1976 by the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, known in short as the Linowitz Commission, after its chairman.\textsuperscript{320} Published by the Center for Inter-American Relations, the first report was called, “The Americas in a Changing World,” the second, “The United States and Latin America: Next Steps.” Physically, they are small booklets. The former is approximately five inches by eight, the latter closer to six by twelve inches. Each has a blue cover and a stapled binding. Private, non-partisan commissions published both reports. It is the contents of the second report—which contains far more specific recommendations—that is the focus here, but the first report is worth a brief examination in order to reveal its structure and basic arguments. Though there were certainly other influences on foreign policy in general, and policy in Latin America specifically, it stands

\textsuperscript{316} Lowenthal, August 4, 2009.
\textsuperscript{317} Jorge Domínguez, Interview, Harvard University, September 1, 2009.
\textsuperscript{318} Lowenthal, August 4, 2009.
\textsuperscript{319} Lowenthal, August 4, 2009. As Linowitz himself notes of the first report’s creation, “We worked for five months and came up with a report that made strong recommendations, yet commanded universal assent from a group that did not start off with much agreement.” The Making of a Public Man, 143.
\textsuperscript{320} Throughout this chapter the “Linowitz commission,” “Linowitz report,” “report,” or “commission,” will be used to refer to the contents of the second report and the staff and general perspective of both the first and second reports, which are nearly identical.
out that every one of the second report’s 28 recommendations was eventually implemented, 27 during Carter’s four years in office.\textsuperscript{321} An investigation of this unprecedented development, through a mix of secondary literature and previously unpublished memos, letters, and interviews, and declassified documents, memoirs, speeches, and news coverage, will reveal some of the factors that caused this about-face in the creation of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. Ultimately, a willing president, combined with a foreign policy establishment ready for new policy in the region, a well-organized commission with a capable leader, and heavy crossover between the commission members and presidential advisors, caused the Linowitz Report to see startling success in influencing U.S. foreign policy.

The first report was released in 1974. Its opening pages named the board members, staff, and consultants to the commission. There were more than 50 in all. The list included academics like Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington and Domínguez. There were also businessmen like W. Michael Blumenthal, Chairman of the Bendix Corporation, philanthropists from the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, and newsman like Andrew Heiskell and Lee Hills, leaders of Time, Inc. and Knight Newspapers, Inc., respectively. The staff was led by executive director Arnold Nachmanoff and advised by Abraham Lowenthal. While reports on Latin America historically involved extended organized travel to the region, the Linowitz Report was the product of “five months study, discussion, and some-times heated debate.”\textsuperscript{322} Indeed, the 23 official members of the original commission, excluding staff and consultants, were all

\textsuperscript{321} This paper is focused on the development of the reports, their content, and the factors that led to their widespread implementation. Post-presidency implementation of the 28\textsuperscript{th} recommendation, or a recounting of the implementation of each individual recommendation, are beyond the scope of this paper.

experts on the region already and had traveled there before.\textsuperscript{323} The basic units of preparation were in-depth policy papers and briefings written and presented by members of and consultants to the commission.\textsuperscript{324}

The structure of the report itself was fairly simple. The report was divided into seven sections and filled 54 pages. The first few outlined a new approach to Latin America. This approach to relations included the “The Global Context,” “The Latin American Context,” and “The United States Context.”\textsuperscript{325} The report then moved on to specific recommendations spanning the political, cultural, and economic realms. These recommendations reflected the political climate of the 1970s. They intentionally touched upon general frameworks like global principles, human rights, anti-paternalism, non-interventionism, and tariff preferences. The specific issues addressed also referenced contemporary events: the report highlighted Cuba, the Panama Canal, the IADB, Fisheries, and the OAS, to name a few. Altogether, the report contained 33 recommendations on a wide range of topics. In general, the recommendations were broad, without timetables, and framed as collegial suggestions rather than focused policy prescriptions.\textsuperscript{326} Nonetheless, the first report was meant as a serious document for policy

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323 Another interesting intellectual influence held in common by some of the Linowitz Commission members was the Murphy Commission, named after its chairman, Robert Murphy, established in 1972 as a joint initiative between Congress and the White House. Peter Scanton, Pastor, and Lowenthal all played roles and were influenced by its recommendations on the organization of government and conduct of foreign policy. Indeed, Nelson Rockefeller also sat on the board. Lowenthal, August 4, 2009; Robert Murphy, Chairman, “Report by the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy: Background and Principal Recommendations,” \textit{Congressional Research Service} (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1972).

324 Most were quite in depth and specific to expertise, such as Thomas Skidmore’s lengthy discussion paper, “United States Policy Toward Brazil: Assumptions and Options,” presented June 25, 1974, or Thomas Buergenthal’s “Human Rights in Latin America: Legal Aspects,” from June 19, 1974, all printed under the aegis of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations. Pastor to Linowitz, February 20, 1975, Robert Pastor, Private Papers.


326 Linowitz, \textit{The Americas in a Changing World}, 4, 5, 9, 13, 15, 19, 36, for example.
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makers, and it advocated a major shift in thinking on the region. As Linowitz noted in the preface to the first report, he had initially resisted leading such a commission, knowing:

that over the years, there had been a steady stream of studies setting forth proposals for U.S. relations with the countries of the hemisphere. Too often, these reports merely gathered dust on crowded shelves, disappointing those who hoped their recommendations might be translated into action.\textsuperscript{327}

He resolved that this would not occur. The commission approached its task with the explicit goal of making real policy, and the content it produced encompassed a paradigm shift in U.S.-Latin American relations. Rather than proffering a new title and set of rules for the traditional “good neighbor” relationship, the commission dismissed this concept. Instead, it suggested that the U.S. should repeal any policies “which seek to impose on Latin American countries a U.S. conception of what is good for them.”\textsuperscript{328} The commission’s members sought to bring aid to Latin American countries without “building walls” around the region.\textsuperscript{329} The commission viewed Latin America in terms of a global community in which super power tensions were to be eschewed for fair and cooperative relations between all states, regardless of historical power structures.\textsuperscript{330} As Domínguez describes the commission’s work, members had a strong commitment to classical liberalism—free trade and free politics—and thus sought to keep the language of the report universalistic.\textsuperscript{331} But they also had a “tilt” toward Latin America, given the report’s explicit goals.\textsuperscript{332} This was the logic, for example, behind recommending generalized trade preferences for all developing countries, which would have the effect of

\textsuperscript{327} Linowitz, \textit{The Americas in a Changing World}, preface.
\textsuperscript{329} Domínguez, September 1, 2009.
\textsuperscript{330} Linowitz, \textit{The Americas in a Changing World}, 5.
\textsuperscript{331} Domínguez, September 1, 2009.
\textsuperscript{332} Domínguez, September 1, 2009.
promoting liberal markets while also aiding the many Latin American countries who fit the criteria. Ultimately, despite its original vision for U.S. foreign policy, even Linowitz conceded in his memoirs that despite the first report being translated into a continuing resolution in Congress in 1975, it did not have nearly the impact of the second report, which “reiterated a number of 1974 proposals but also broke new ground.”

The commission that signed on to the second report was reduced to 20 members, the number of consultants was nearly halved—though these still included important advisors like Dominguez—and the staff was rearranged. Pastor, who had just completed his Ph.D. at Harvard, was asked to lead the commission staff, with Lowenthal and Nachmanoff aboard as special consultants. In the preface of the second report, Linowitz reviewed the favorable publicity and reactions to the first report and its excellent “blueprint” for a new relationship with Latin America. But he also explicitly noted that the commission did not want to see the report relegated to filing cabinets and occasional rhetoric. Rather, “the Commission decided to embark on a concentrated follow-up program to bring the Report to attention of the general public and to policy-makers and to meet periodically to review recent developments and suggest new directions for U.S. policy to Latin America.” Indeed, this second report, dedicated to

336 Linowitz, The United States and Latin America: Next Steps, preface.
337 Linowitz, The United States and Latin America: Next Steps, preface. Indeed, this promise was kept even past this second report, in the form of The Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank.
Congress and the President, would have an impact unprecedented in the history of post-War U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America.

The second report, also in seven sections, but far shorter, at 24 pages, was distilled to the most pertinent issues covered in the first report.\textsuperscript{338} It contained only 28 recommendations. The language therein was sharper and its recommendations were lengthened and more specific.\textsuperscript{339} The second report reaffirmed the goals of the first report, particularly replicating its important global and anti-paternal tenor. The introduction to the second report emphasized the notion that Latin American countries needed to be dealt with unilaterally and in a global context. It proclaimed that the motivation for relations with Latin America was “not hidden dangers but…latent opportunities.”\textsuperscript{340} The central issues in the second report were, in this order, Panama, human rights, Cuba, armaments, and economic policy, especially relating to trade expansion and investment issues.\textsuperscript{341} In his personal notes for the press conference introducing the second version of the report, Pastor confirmed that it was meant more explicitly as a policy document and that it outlined key policies for the region in the order of their importance.\textsuperscript{342} It is worth investigating several, though not all, of these

\textsuperscript{338} As Lowenthal recounts in his fascinating interview, the second life, as it were, of the report was very controversial. Lowenthal was the first to suggest it to Linowitz because he thought there was a great opportunity for policy change in the election year. Linowitz was wary of the idea but asked Lowenthal to shop it around. Lowenthal immediately encountered resistance from a commission member, Nathaniel Samuels, a lawyer and businessman, who thought an election-year report would dilute the non-partisan value of the project. In the meantime, however, the idea had grown on Linowitz, and in a meeting of the commission members, according to Lowenthal, Linowitz tactfully talked the initially cautious group into a second publishing. Lowenthal, August 4, 2009.

\textsuperscript{339} Albeit more forceful but also more easily digestible for the hurried policy maker.

\textsuperscript{340} Linowitz, \textit{The United States and Latin America: Next Steps}, 3. This, of course, is a not-so-veiled reference to the Rockefeller report, which is interesting because, as has been shown in Ch.3, the report has an undeserved reputation for militarism, which is in part what perpetuated its ineffectiveness.

\textsuperscript{341} Linowitz, \textit{The United States and Latin America: Next Steps}, 5, 7, 10, 17-19.

\textsuperscript{342} Notes on Press Conference, December 20, 1976, Robert Pastor, Private Papers.
recommendations in depth, not only to underline their innovative character but the high
degree to which they match actual policy implemented by the Carter Administration.

The section of the report on the Panama Canal, entitled: “Panama: The Most
Urgent Issue,” was considered priority number one by commission members, indicated
by its placement at the beginning of the report. The report noted that the tensions between
the U.S. and Panama were long held, politically bothersome, and based on outdated
policy prescriptions and assumptions about the canal’s military and economic value.\(^{343}\)
The report argued that by 1976 the canal had ceased to hold any real strategic value, and
its commercial interests for the U.S. had dwindled below ten percent.\(^{344}\) The report
combined these realities with the ideal of sovereignty: regardless of U.S. interests, which
were no longer threatened in this instance, the U.S. was beholden to recognize the
sovereignty of Panama over its greatest natural resource.\(^{345}\) The final recommendation
read as such: “The new administration should promptly negotiate a new Canal Treaty
with Panama; it should involve members of both parties and both Houses of Congress in
the negotiations; and should make clear to the American public why a new and equitable
treaty with Panama is not only desirable but urgently required.”\(^{346}\) What actually
occurred under the Carter administration was strikingly similar.

\(^{343}\) Linowitz, *The United States and Latin America: Next Steps*, 5.
\(^{344}\) Linowitz, *The United States and Latin America: Next Steps*, 5.
\(^{345}\) Linowitz, *The United States and Latin America: Next Steps*, 5-6. It could be argued, cynically, that these
idealistic recommendations about the canal were only fulfilled due to the reality of the canal’s decreased
value to the U.S. However, this seems an unlikely narrative given that the canal was still an extremely
valuable global resource and that it still had huge political resonance with the American public. This made
new treaties politically unpopular and thus more difficult to implement. That said, there is no doubt that the
commission was looking to make recommendations that were at least feasible: the entire point of this
second report was to maximize the recommendations’s impact. Fagen, “The Carter Administration and
Latin America”: 653. On another note, the Linowitz report also mentioned the importance of the 1974
Kissinger-Tack agreements in setting the stage for Carter’s negotiations, a notion which has later been
confirmed by historians of the canal. See, for example, William J. Jorden, *Panama Odyssey* (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1984), 216.
Carter signed the “Adoption of the Panama Canal Act of 1979” into law on September 27th, 1979, less than two years after taking office. This signaled the successful legal implementation of the final stage of the Panama Canal Treaties of 1977, also known as the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. The negotiations were initiated by the Carter Administration and designed in conjunction with the Panamanian government, led by Torrijos and his close advisors. The primary goal of the treaties, endorsed by leaders from both sides, was to create a canal that was “safe, efficient, and neutral.”

Disaggregated, there are two treaties. The first, the Panama Canal Treaty, abrogates the treaty of 1903 and affirms Panama’s sovereignty. The second treaty, The Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal (the Neutrality Treaty), ensures the international neutrality of the Canal’s waters in times of war and peace but maintains a right of passage for United States military vessels. In addition to these main objectives, the treaties also include many more narrow articles. These detailed specific operational procedures and outlined a system of more equitable returns for Panama on its natural resources.

There is considerable evidence that the Carter administration had in fact created foreign policy based on the general worldview and specific recommendations for Panama outlined in the Linowitz Report. For one, the administration intentionally approached the longstanding treaty negotiations with an open, global, and situation-specific point of

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348 “Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1381.
349 “Panama Canal Treaty,” American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1386.
350 “Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal,” American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1400.
view, and they asked Linowitz himself to be the co-negotiator.\(^{352}\) Carter’s public speeches during and about the negotiations were pregnant with references to foreign policy based on global tenants and situated outside bifurcated Cold War power structures. For example, in an address before the Permanent Council of the OAS on April 14, 1977, entitled “A New Approach to Policy Toward Latin America,” the President proclaimed:

> In the light of these changes [more balanced and equal relationships between states] a single United States policy toward Latin American and the Caribbean makes little sense. What we need is a wider and more flexible approach, worked out in close consultation with you [Latin American and Caribbean states].\(^ {353} \)

The principles in this speech, which were further enumerated and included a focus on increasing economic diversity and cooperation in Latin America, were the same ones applied to the Panama Canal Treaties in 1977. In an excerpt from the Panama Canal Negotiations, as detailed in a public policy report issued by the Department of State in January 1977, the language closely reflected that of the second iteration of the Linowitz Report. The State Department report noted, in part: “In essence, a new treaty should reduce existing sources of friction and help foster the cooperative environment in Panama which is most conducive to protecting U.S. interests in the canal.”\(^ {354} \) Of course, these public documents can be construed as rhetorical and intended to characterize the general policies and Canal negotiating parties in a certain way. But, declassified documents demonstrate that the Carter administration was both publicly and privately sincere about its motivation to employ a new approach, albeit the one outlined by the Linowitz Commission, in fashioning the Torrijos-Carter agreements.

\(^{352}\) “Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents*, 1379.

\(^{353}\) “A New Approach to Policy Toward Latin America,” *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents*, 1271.

\(^{354}\) “Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents*, 1380.
The declassified documentation is varied, but a sampling demonstrates how different Linowitz tenets were incorporated in some policy decisions.\(^{355}\) For example, in a declassified memo sent from Brzezinski to Carter and meant to debrief the President on Senator Robert Byrd’s trip to Panama, Brzezinski supported the administration’s policy not to attach the issue of a democratic government in Panama to the treaties. Brzezinski advocated a “preference for democracy,” but he did not insist on it.\(^{356}\) This indicated a willingness to respect the power and influence of developing countries over that of the United States, as promoted in the Linowitz Report. Furthermore, Brzezinski confirmed the Administration’s commitment to a cooperative, understanding relationship by placing an equal importance on the nature of the Panamanian state. He wrote: “While many in the U.S. believe we are justified in telling other countries how they should organize their governments, this view is not shared by Latin Americans.”\(^{357}\) Indeed, the elements of Brzezinski’s arguments not only reflect the overall recommendation of the Linowitz Report regarding Panama but also many of its specific bullet points and policy prescriptions for the Canal.

Another important section of the Linowitz Report was entitled, “Cuba: A Lingering Anachronism.” Here the report reiterated the 1974 recommendation that Cuba be reintegrated into international relations as a full partner with the U.S. through the

\(^{355}\) Of course, these are not just Linowitz tenants. Globalism and liberal internationalism were larger entities in 1970s politics, but in these cases, where directly applied to issues covered by the Linowitz Commission, it seems fair to link the two.


\(^{357}\) “Torrijos’ Treaty Group.”
normalization of trade and diplomatic relations.\textsuperscript{358} Though some progress was made on this, including the lifting of regional sanctions for OAS member nations, in 1976 relations still plagued U.S. and Cuban policy makers alike.\textsuperscript{359} Normalization would both be in-line with the U.S. emphasis on human rights and economically beneficial to both countries, the report writers argued.\textsuperscript{360} Though relations were never normalized, recommendation ten read: “The new administration should seek ways to reopen a process of normalizing relations….”\textsuperscript{361} The Carter administration did “seek ways” to reopen the process. Indeed, Carter may have been the most willing of any President in recent history to sit down with Fidel Castro, at least in the first half of his administration. Unfortunately, these efforts were blocked by uncooperative Cuban foreign policy, especially its engagement in wars in Angola and Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{362} In any case, the recommendations on Cuba were both innovative and implemented, though, it is fair to say that in this case the recommendation did not have a goal of “hard” execution, and, thus, implementation was much easier to achieve.

One final recommendation to review is number 18, an economic prescription that fell under the trade expansion section of the report. Though this recommendation may appear less significant than the first two mentioned here, it is symbolically equal since it was the 27\textsuperscript{th} out of 28, and final, recommendation to be implemented during Carter’s presidency. The recommendation was a fairly straightforward one and easy to register as having occurred or not. It asked that Congress, “repeal the discriminatory amendment to

\textsuperscript{358} Linowitz, \textit{The United States and Latin America: Next Steps}, 10. \\
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\textsuperscript{362} Domínguez, September 1, 2009; Domínguez, “Cuban Foreign Policy,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 57:1 (Fall 1978): 106. Pastor claims, specifically comparing Cuba to the Panama issue, that: “Torrijos was capable of moving quickly and willing to do so, which was a fortunate circumstance. Indeed, Carter would have moved quickly with Castro for normalization had Castro been willing.” Pastor, July 2, 2009.
the Trade Act of 1974 which excludes those OPEC members which did not participate in the embargo against the U.S. from the generalized system of tariff preferences.”

In a December 20, 1976 letter to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Carter announced his intention to issue an Executive Order that identified Ecuador, Indonesia, Uganda, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe as developing countries in order so that they might benefit from the Generalized System of Preferences. In the letter Carter outlined his reasons, many of which matched those noted in the Linowitz Report. On March 5, 1980, Pastor confirmed the implementation of this recommendation in a letter to Linowitz. Pastor wrote that he was enclosing the aforementioned letter and a copy of the original recommendation. He also celebrated that:

> With this letter, the President has implemented 27 out of 28 recommendations in the Commission’s 1976 report. I would be surprised if there were any other private commission in U.S. history which has been as successful as the Commission on U.S.-Latin America relations.

Abraham Lowenthal, Roger Stone, and Arnold Nachmanoff were carbon copied on the letter. The attached copy of the original full set of recommendations contained a check and the word “done” in Pastor’s hand next to each prescription, some with dates of implementation and other details. Linowitz responded several days later. In his note, he thanked Pastor and noted that he might be in touch with a certain New York Times reporter because: “There is so little understanding of what the President has been doing in Latin America to further relationships between the United States and Latin America, and

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363 Linowitz, The United States and Latin America: Next Steps, 19.
365 Pastor to Linowitz, March 5, 1980, Robert Pastor, Private Papers.
366 The only recommendation without a check mark next to it is number 28. This recommendation, which suggests a council for cultural relations, was indeed implemented, but by an outside organization and after the Carter administration had left office. Pastor, July 2, 2009.
this makes an extraordinarily impressive story.”\textsuperscript{367} The following discussion of contemporary news coverage, compared with secondary accounts and relevant memoirs, letters, interviews, and declassified documents, will illuminate the immediate perception of the report, its impact, and the varied factors that led to the Linowitz Report’s unprecedented success as a tool for policy creation.

Early coverage of the report, notably in the \textit{New York Times}, quickly picked up on the potential for the commission to be influential given the response of the Carter Administration and the number of members being considered for administration posts. Early in the coverage, which was headlined by the Panama recommendations, it was written that the Administration was pointing to the report as an early signal for their Latin America policy and that: “The presence on the commission of seven persons closely associated with Mr. Carter gives the report considerable weight in terms of the direction and priorities of the next administration’s Latin American policy.”\textsuperscript{368} Special note was made of Vance’s indication of support for the document, which was also spotlighted in the commission’s press release.\textsuperscript{369} Coverage also focused on the new framework being proposed, succinctly explaining that the Monroe Doctrine would fall and “[the report] favors treating Latin America in the context of global issues rather than as a region with a special relationship to the United States.”\textsuperscript{370} The \textit{Washington Post} carried similar stories with the same emphasis on the Panama recommendation and the high number of

\textsuperscript{367} Linowitz to Pastor, March 13, 1980, Robert Pastor, Private Papers. Commission member Theodore Hesburgh, then president of the University of Notre Dame, expressed similar sentiments in a letter responding to Pastor’s news, writing that he thought “he had it made” when the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights passed 75% of their recommendations, but “The Linowtiz Commission may beat us, if it hasn’t already done so.” Indeed, it had. Hesburgh to Pastor, April 1, 1980, Robert Pastor, Private Papers.


\textsuperscript{370} “Commission Favors New Panama Treaty.”
commission members eligible for administration positions. The Washington Star took a slightly different tack. It focused on the Cuba recommendations and offered insight into the necessity for reciprocal action on the part of Cuba and the allowances for that made in the report’s recommendations. Clearly, the major theme in contemporaneous news coverage was the Panama recommendation and, to a lesser extent, Cuba, and most coverage noted the “insider” nature of commission members to the incoming Carter Administration.

On the editorial side, the word from the New York Times and others was glowing, while a few sources were more mixed. The New York Times opined that, “President-elect Carter could ask for no better set of recommendations for United States policies and priorities in Latin America than the one issued yesterday by the distinguished private commission headed by former Ambassador Sol N. Linowitz.” The editorial went on to laud the rejection of a special relationship inherent to the second report—“even more than the first report”—and encouraged the abandonment of attempts to resuscitate the long broken Alliance for Progress. The Miami Herald was supportive, and according to the Boston Sunday Globe, “If the recommendations of a private group mean anything, the Carter Administration may turn out to be refreshingly idealistic in terms of its relations with Latin America.” Time Magazine similarly applauded the report, though in a more subdued manner. It registered its approval of the new global approach and abandonment

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373 “Policy for the Americas,” New York Times, December 21, 1976. The error in the middle initial is the Times’s. Linowitz’s middle name was Myron.
of the “special relationship” framework.\textsuperscript{376} The editors at Business Latin America, a weekly report for managers of Latin American companies, took a less enthusiastic stance toward the report. Though the authors appreciated some of the report’s economic prescriptions, they were more suspicious of its “global” framework. The authors wrote, “Unless such a policy is carried out in the context of a creative economic policy for Latin America—something the report does not come up with—the US could get itself into a policy morass that will raise new hackles in the region.”\textsuperscript{377} Indeed, though more veiled, a vitriolic Reagan railed against the report via a discussion of the canal negotiations. He labeled Linowitz a registered communist and called Pastor Linowitz’s protégé, all while walking through what he perceived to be predictable “sales job” of the canal “giveaway.”\textsuperscript{378} Clearly, commentators saw the importance of the report’s content, but few were forwardly optimistic about its chances of becoming real policy.

Those who condemned Carter’s foreign policy as a whole were likely to associate the Linowitz Report with what they perceived to be failed policy in the region, while those who supported Carter might have seen it as the opposite.\textsuperscript{379} The larger debate about Carter’s foreign policy is not important for the purposes here, but it does serve to reinforce the point that the Linowitz report was seen as being directly tied with Carter’s policy in Latin America. For example, Jean Kirpatrick, an anti-communist foreign policy specialist and ambassador to the U.N. under Ronald Regan, penned an article in 1981 in which she noted that, “nothing is as important as understanding the relationship between

\textsuperscript{376} “Good Neighbors Again?,” Time Magazine, January 3, 1976.


the recent failures of American policy—in Latin America and elsewhere—and the
philosophy of foreign affairs that inspired and informed that policy.”380 She went on to
portray the Linowitz Report as a bipartisan sham funded by the liberal Rockefeller and
Ford foundations and called it a utopian policy that endangered the U.S. by ignoring Cold
War security concerns.381 Nonetheless, in her criticisms of the report she outlined many
of the factors that led to the full implementation of the Linowitz Report as real foreign
policy, thus reinforcing its success.

Clearly, contemporaries recognized that not only did the Linowitz report deliver
unique policy solutions, but these solutions were implemented at a level unprecedented
for policy reports on Latin America. Given the importance of this for U.S. foreign policy,
it is useful to conclude with a discussion of why the report had such an impact, drawing
both on patterns in the above narrative and observations from historians, political
scientists, and actors involved in the report’s creation. One of the interesting differences
between the Linowitz Report and those that came before it, especially the Rockefeller
Report, was its historical context. During Nixon’s two terms in office, Nixon and
Kissinger’s actions made it clear that Latin America was not considered a strategic region
compared to places like Asia. Though they claimed otherwise in their public rhetoric, the
reality of failed implementation of general policy ideas, coupled with specific instances
of intervention, such as that in Chile, combined to paint a picture of a reactive policy
subsumed by its main driver’s interest and concern with other issues, above all

Vietnam. However, just several years later, during Ford’s brief tenure as president, Kissinger, who was still serving as Secretary of State, began to undergo a surprising shift in his views toward the region. Vietnam was over, but in Latin America there was a growing storm. Chile was still a trouble spot, as was Peru, where contestations between the U.S. and left-leaning President Juan Velasco mounted over fishing limits and expropriation issues, and there were ongoing rumblings with Panama and Cuba. Just four years earlier Kissinger had completely ignored the Rockefeller Report. But under Ford he brought in William Rogers, a former Alliance for Progress official, and gave him free rein to develop and implement policy in the region. This was part of the context into which the first Linowitz Report was created and released in 1974, and the importance of Latin America had only grown by 1976 with Carter, who was decidedly less anti-communist then Ford. Simultaneously, there was the advent of human rights as an ideological issue in Congress and an increasing stalemate over this and other issues with the State Department, especially with Kissinger, who was vilified for his perceived human rights abuses. Thus, one of the keys to the success of the Linowitz Report was the conducive historical and contemporary context in which it was introduced.

It is hard to underemphasize the importance of the preexisting desire of Carter and his close advisors to engage on Latin America. Besides the evidence already marshaled,
there are a few more examples from letters not yet published on the subject. In a letter from Carter to Linowitz in early 1977, the president reaffirmed the “special consideration” the report would receive from his administration and thanked Linowitz for coming on board as a negotiator for the Panama Canal Treaty, in an of itself an implicit endorsement of the report’s most important recommendation. In an earlier letter addressed to Sol Linowitz from Cyrus Vance on December 20, 1976, typed on “Carter-Mondale Transition Planning Group” letterhead, Vance also made Carter’s intentions clear. He congratulated Linowitz on the report and assured him that not only would the recommendations be reviewed but they would be “very useful” for approaching policy and “the Carter administration will continue to welcome such citizens’ contributions in the formulation of this nation’s foreign policy.”385 This statement reflected not only the intentions of the new Administration for Latin America and the Linowitz Report in general, but it also touched on one of the greater themes encapsulated by the success of the Linowitz Report: the ability of a group of citizens, technically outsiders, though in this case closely linked to government, to have a real impact on policy.386

This leads to the final factors in the implementation of the Linowitz Commission’s 28 recommendations: competence and crossover. The first part of this is straightforward: by several accounts, the private, non-partisan commission was extremely well organized, thanks in large part to the leadership of Linowitz but also to the efficiency and talent of commission staff such as Nachmanoff, Lowenthal, and Pastor. Pastor’s role in the delivery of the second report has been noted by several of his colleagues, who unanimously describe him as incredibly energetic, determined, and able

385 Vance to Linowitz, December 20, 1976, Robert Pastor, Private Papers.
386 One might think of the famous Margaret Mead quote: “Never doubt that a small group of committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”
to understand and connect with policy-making mechanisms in Washington.\textsuperscript{387} Not only were the report staff and members smart and well organized, but their approach was integrated on several levels. For one, they sought to respond to realities on the ground and with alliances and interests on a country to country basis—not only was this a conceptual departure from earlier reports like the Rockefeller Report, but it was also more practical to implement on a policy unit scale.\textsuperscript{388} For another, the commission sought to engage with current thinking on the region—such as the Consensus of Vina del Mar—and by doing so was actually integrated with current foreign policy vehicles and players.\textsuperscript{389} This was in contrast to other reports, especially Rockefeller’s, which often relied on personal resources and networks rather than governmental ones.\textsuperscript{390} Finally, as noted earlier, the Linowitz Commission managed to maintain a continuing presence. Unlike most other reports, not only were there two iterations, but Linowitz founded the still extant Inter-American Dialogue to continue the important work.

The highly functional and well conceived nature of the Linowitz Commission and its members tied directly into the other component of its success on the direct implementation level: crossover. As the \textit{New York Times} noted early on, there were a great deal of connections between commission members and the incoming administration.\textsuperscript{391} Indeed, every former member of the commission interviewed argues the same thing: the incredible number of staff members who ended up in the Carter Administration—or who were closely linked thereto—drastically increased the report’s

\textsuperscript{387} Dominguez, September 1, 2009; Arnold Nachmanoff, Telephone Interview, August 4, 2009; Lowenthal, August 4, 2009.
\textsuperscript{388} Lowenthal, August 4, 2009.
\textsuperscript{389} Lowenthal, August 4, 2009.
\textsuperscript{390} Lowenthal, August 4, 2009.
potential to have a real impact.\textsuperscript{392} Not only did Republicans like William Rogers and Albert Fishlow join the Ford administration after the 1974 version, but, more importantly, under Carter, several members also had significant positions. To name just a few, Blumenthal was Secretary of the Treasury, Theodore Hesburgh was closely connected to Carter and served on several blue ribbon commissions, and Linowitz held several diplomatic roles, notably as a co-negotiator in Panama.\textsuperscript{393} Arnold Nachmanoff was appointed to a position at the treasury and Pastor, most significantly, went on to become Carter’s national security advisor for Latin America. As Lowenthal and Pastor have both noted, the real importance of this was that officials being asked to make policy were already steeped in the general notions—and specific prescriptions—of the report.\textsuperscript{394} In a fast-paced environment where officials do not have time to learn new policies, and staffers, like Pastor, could simply explain the policy they had already absorbed, more often than not, it was automatically accepted.\textsuperscript{395} Furthermore, Pastor describes his access to Carter and his top advisers, once in the White House, as “extraordinary.”\textsuperscript{396} He recounts how Linowitz and he wrote a letter that introduced the 1976 report to Carter and outlined its recommendations. Then, Pastor drafted the response letter for Carter. Pastor was responsible for briefing Brzezinski and Carter, while Linowitz briefed Vance. Furthermore, due to Carter’s longstanding interest in Latin America, Brzezinski allowed Pastor special access to Carter not available to other staffers with the same rank. Indeed, when the First Lady was sent on an envoy to Latin America, it was Pastor who was


\textsuperscript{393} Linowitz, \textit{The Making of a Public Man}, 143.

\textsuperscript{394} Lowenthal, August 4, 2009; Pastor, July 2, 2009.

\textsuperscript{395} Pastor, July 2, 2009.

\textsuperscript{396} Pastor, July 2, 2009.
entrusted with briefing her and accompanying her on her travels. There is little doubt that the combination of crossover to, and in some cases, intense access once inside, the White House for commission members was a major factor in the unprecedented impact the report ultimately had on the shaping of U.S. policy toward Latin America during the Carter Administration.

The late 1970s, marked by the rise of Carter, signified yet another shift in U.S. policy after World War II. Other shifts had been accompanied by policy reports outlining visions for relations with Latin America, and this transition was no exception. This time, however, a new paradigm for foreign policy was applied to thinking on the region. Decades old assumptions and frameworks were rejected in favor of a new, global perspective that discarded the “special relationship” for Latin America and emphasized individual countries and their interests over Cold War concerns. It was also different because the policy report written on Latin America was not only groundbreaking in its content, but it was also fully implemented. This was a landmark in the reception of policy reports from outside sources. Why and how did this happen? The Linowitz report was different from its predecessors. It was a private, non-partisan commission, with great leadership and organization, executed by outsiders but also future insiders, and it was presented to a receptive foreign policy establishment. This is an important phenomenon that deserves study in the history of U.S. foreign policy and by future policy makers. It also stands out as a rare example of a small group of private citizens not only speaking to, but also effecting real change in, the foreign policy of their government.

Pastor, July 2, 2009.
Conclusion:

THE MAKING OF U.S. POLICY ON LATIN AMERICA

These four reports share many similarities, but their importance lies in what they reveal about the making of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America after World War II. Taken together, these reports provide a perspective on the development of policy in the region that has not been previously explored. The unprecedented success of the Linowitz Report contrasts with earlier experiences and presents an opportunity to isolate different factors in the policy making process and analyze their significance. As a group these reports reveal something about how policy is made and who influenced it.

The obvious outlier of these four reports is the one produced by the Linowitz Commission. The overwhelming success of the Linowitz Report is not congruous with what one comes to expect when dealing with these documents. Different factors may have intervened. There were favorable conditions, not available, for example, when Rockefeller wrote his report. These included contemporary realities, Carter’s preexisting beliefs, and a high level of crossover between Linowitz Commission members and the Carter administration. There are two other particularly suggestive conditions associated with the Linowitz Report that are worth expounding upon here. The first is the fact that the Linowitz Commission was a private group. The second is that the Linowitz Report was the only one conceived of and written prior to the election of the Administration that implemented it.

As noted, the Linowitz Commission was private and officially non-partisan. This made it unique among the reports studied here. Each of the four reports was an external
report, but high government officials, either a secretary of state or the president, solicited the first three for government use. The Linowitz Commission was never intended for this purpose, and this likely allowed it more political freedom in its recommendations and also helped it avoid the taint of political sponsorship. This is directly related to the fact that the report was not written while the president it was delivered to held office. While some authors of the first iteration of the Linowitz Report did go to the Ford Administration, the first version was not aimed explicitly at the executive branch. The second iteration of the Linowitz Report was released during an election year, but even then it was not necessarily written with a specific recipient in mind. This meant a number of significant things. The recommendations were not widely associated with a politician, a publicized trip to Latin America, or a specific problem. This undoubtedly smoothed their acceptance. The circumstances of creation of the Linowitz Report eliminate the need to consider whether a report was only requested for political reasons.

In that vein, the Rockefeller Report is a useful point of comparison. For one, the fact that Nixon had, at best, mixed motives for sending Rockefeller on his trip, immediately forces the responsible analyst to at least consider whether Nixon ever meant to heed Rockefeller’s recommendations at all. Even if Nixon implemented a few of them, it is easy to see that the incentive structure for accepting any but the most obvious, popular, or predetermined propositions by Rockefeller might have been skewed. Other factors, like the precedence of Latin America for foreign policy in the late 1960s compared, to say, the early to mid 1970s, were also working against the Rockefeller Report. Although Nixon was under pressure from the OAS and others to release a policy on Latin America, his focus was on Asia. Thus, the Rockefeller Report can be seen as the
answer to a low priority policy problem. Conversely, the Linowitz Report, which certainly responded to a general consensus amongst its members and supporters that a new policy was needed, came at a time when Latin America was becoming important to policy makers above and beyond reacting to crises. This increasing importance of the region was a trend, of course, which reached its pinnacle with the proactive interest shown by Carter. Kennedy was clearly an example of a president who promoted Latin American policy, but it is hard to separate the Alliance for Progress from the two formative crises of Kennedy’s presidency—the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis—both of which provoked reactive policy in the region. The Linowitz Report came on the heels of successes and new pressures, but no major failures. The Eisenhower Report also had two iterations, the second meant to emphasize easily digestible and relevant policy recommendations, but it was requested in the face of growing concerns about Latin America. Unfortunately, there is no compelling reason to think the Eisenhower would react differently the second time he was confronted with similar suggestions, despite their supposed increased relevance—the political and bureaucratic blocks were the same.

Thus, the Linowitz Report, as contrasted with the Rockefeller Report and others, stands out as an example of a successful case of conversion from recommendation to policy formulation. But what do the four reports taken together indicate about the making of U.S. policy on Latin America over time? For one, they show definitively that influence over policy, generally, is strongest within the executive branch, and, particularly with the President. This observation is in agreement with what scholars on the subject generally claim. The Kennan Report, which was delivered to the Secretary of State, provides some
argument for his power: Acheson was able to quash a series of policy recommendations before they made it to the President. But, ultimately it was internal documents presented to Truman or conceived in an executive branch group, like the NSC, that had the greatest influence on policy. This was also true for Eisenhower and Rockefeller. The location of influence also speaks in general to how policy was shaped. The most important factors were preexisting internal governmental resources, especially those situated within the executive branch, and policy priorities typified by reactive measures and preexisting beliefs about the regions of the world with the greatest strategic value for the U.S. Though reports were not always a major part of this formula, the Linowitz Report proves that it is possible for an outside report to find an important—indeed integral—role in these processes, a fact which in part contests the scholarly consensus about policy-making dynamics.

Given the history of policy reports, what is their future? When taken alone, examples like those by Kennan, Eisenhower, and Rockefeller are not necessarily reason for optimism. While they have inherent value for their intellectual content, their motivations, and their place in the democratic process, their lack of immediate success is hard to celebrate. But with the success of the Linowitz Report, a path begins to emerge whereby all that is excellent about policy reports, like those we have seen here—their depth, their originality, and their goodwill—can be merged with a real sense of accomplishment in the policy making sphere. Today, policy reports abound in Washington, D.C. on virtually every topic from every point of view. But it seems that most still go unheeded, or at least are not directly responsible for policy changes. Successes do occur, but the “gradual encroachment of ideas” is still probably the
dominant mode of influence. Many of these reports come out of think thanks, big and small, with varying reputations, ideologies, and degrees of influence. This is good, in that they are established policy outlets. But, amidst the heaps of reports, there may still be a place for a report, sponsored by a think thank or not, that is truly non-partisan, and not simply reactive to an immediate perceived crisis or problem. Created without a political target in mind, but guided by people who know how to maneuver the halls of power, there is value in recommendations that are designed to transition immediately to policy without endless layers of debate, bureaucracy, and politics. In the future, one hopes the academic scribbler, the politico, and the government official will make further efforts to work together to concoct policy that is relevant and appropriate but also inspired by forces from outside of the political arena. Contrary to common wisdom, such efforts would not be without precedent.
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