“Tangibles and Intangibles”
The Search for an Effective and Comprehensive Evaluation of JROTC
[Diamond Scholar Research, Temple Honors Program]

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INTRODUCTION
THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF JROTC RESEARCH

Urban areas throughout the United States have responded to the increasing public concern regarding education standards through empowering their respective school districts to experiment with a variety of educational reforms. Although certainly not new, Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC) programs and JROTC-based programs have featured prominently in these school districts’ experiments. These developments are not without controversy. Critics, such as the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), have contended that JROTC is a recruitment tool that militarizes schools. Nevertheless, JROTC has shown some promising results.

The School District of Philadelphia is typical of this trend, operating seventeen JROTC programs, along with two military academies. However, atypical of this trend is the institutional prominence that JROTC has gained within the hierarchy of education throughout the school district. According to news media, the School District of Philadelphia in 2002, under the direction of Paul Vallas, “hired Lieutenant Colonel Russell Gallagher to direct its JROTC programs district-wide and oversee the military school initiative at $75,000 annual salary.” Gallagher, himself, elaborated “there is only one other position like mine in the U.S. and that is in Chicago.” These facts demonstrate that JROTC will feature prominently in future educational reform projects undertaken by the School District of Philadelphia.¹

In light of this prominence, this paper intends to analyze the issues surrounding the adoption of JROTC and JROTC-based programs. To provide a proper grounding in the national issues involved, the paper will begin with a discussion of the history and the changing purpose of JROTC. To bridge the interaction of local and national issues, the paper will continue by describing and evaluating the critical discourse in which JROTC programs are proposed. Finally, the Philadelphia Military Academy – Elverson will be tentatively evaluated through synthesis of the available methods of evaluation.

The evaluation of JROTC programs must be comprehensive enough to account for the particular strength and weaknesses in those programs. It will not be that every aspect of those programs positively or negatively impacts the students in the programs. Rather it will be that certain aspects of the program are beneficial, whereas others are detrimental. However, in order to understand these programs it would be necessary to first find the standard by which to judge them.

Often supporters (and detractors) of JROTC programs cite the statistical facts regarding the outcomes of students in the program. However, Colonel Arthur T. Coumbe, a prominent historian of ROTC and JROTC, along with Colonel John W. Corbett, contend that JROTC was never designed to be “a vehicle to morally and educationally uplift hard-core delinquents.” Consequently, they do not believe that it should be evaluated merely on its assistance to the problems of urban high schools within the United States. They conclude:

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2 From this point forward this paper will utilize the term JROTC, exclusively. This should be understood to include JROTC and JROTC-based programs. As a matter of clarification, JROTC-based programs include Career Academies and Military Academies. See “Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps: Contributing to America’s Communities,” Final Report of the CSIS Political-Military Studies Project on the JROTC, for a fuller discussion of the distinction.
Most students do not participate in the program to enhance their academic skills or future marketability. They want the sense of belonging and purpose it gives them. This sense of belonging results from working on community-service projects, supporting school events, participating in drill competitions or engaging in various other unit activities. Often done in uniform under military supervision, these team-building activities obviate feelings of alienation that afflict so many adolescents. While drilling, wearing uniforms and adhering to military customs and courtesies might seem irrelevant or counterproductive to some observers, experience shows that they help to create a sense of identity many cadet contemporaries either lack or get from nonproductive groups [gangs].

A strict comparison of data from analysis of academic achievement of participants in JROTC programs with non-participants is not enough to understand the positive, or negative, impact of JROTC. Such an analysis, rarely responds to socio-economic variables. Traditional analysis would be ineffective for it does not find away to analyze the intangible elements of JROTC.3

Such contentions are validated through interviews with those directly involved in implementing JROTC in Philadelphia Public High Schools. When asked about the value of JROTC, Lieutenant Colonel Russell Gallagher responded, “[J]ROTC stands up to them [the participants] and nurtures them.” He further elaborated, “JROTC provides a positive distraction – helps by being a ‘good drug.’” Both of these goals seem to describe what the average parent/guardian would hope is accomplished by the present public school system. To respond to this concern, Gallagher explained that the program’s effectiveness, “[It is] structure in the programs and the things that they do [that] are the two benefits of JROTC.” As will be presented and validated through evidence from actual cadets, Coumbe and Corbett move too far in setting the value of JROTC primarily in the sense of belonging. Cadets, parents, instructors, and administrators equally value

the structure that JROTC instills upon its participants. Gallagher concludes that success must be gauged through both “tangibles and intangibles.”

In light of this, the chosen method of evaluation is a modified version of the criteria presented in the 2001 RAND Corporation study “Implementing High School JROTC Career Academies” augmented by pedagogical standards. The data was collected through a series of observations, resembling a case study, in hopes of grasping the above-mentioned “intangibles.” The author hopes that these tentative findings will assist in the formation of a study that fully conforms to social scientific standards, proposals for which are presented in the paper’s conclusion. The author concludes, in agreement with Coumbe and Corbett, that the most effective, and hardest to evaluate social scientifically, aspect of JROTC is its creation of a “sense of identity.”

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SECTION 1: HISTORY
THE CHANGING PURPOSE OF JROTC

In order to conceptualize the development of Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC) Programs in the School District of Philadelphia, the history of those programs must be understood. This immediately collides with a methodological issue that this paper will be unable to adequately address, namely what history is relevant to the development of JROTC. This paper intends to address the history of federal authorization of JROTC programs and their implementation by the School District of Philadelphia. When this paper is expanded to include additional cases, other histories that will be examined are the impact of military preparedness ideology, the history of the development of ROTC, and the history of race relations in the city of Philadelphia.

The history of federal authorization of JROTC programs comprises several eras, which often saw JROTC as a burden for the United States Army until it came into national prominence and its current trend towards near-universal acclaim. The National Defense Act of 1916 established JROTC and ROTC. Under the terms of the act, JROTC cadets “were given a commission, but only once they reached twenty-one years of age. The commission, upon their graduation, would be ten years.” Although the direct commissioning of JROTC graduates has lapsed, the other major initial terms, such as being “authorized the loan of federal military equipment and the assignment of active or retired military personnel” provided that they “followed a prescribed course of training”

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remained, albeit slightly modified. The National Defense Act of 1916 created JROTC, providing for the perpetual role of the federal government in its implementation.  

Immediately following its federal authorization until the 1970s, support remained limited. Between both World Wars “due to funding restraints and a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the army,” JROTC experienced a gradual increase in the number of High Schools in which it was implemented with 295 JROTC united in operation in 1939. However, the high schools in which it was present became very comfortable with the program and developed impressive alumni bases willing to defend it.7

In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara attempted to eliminate JROTC. His primary arguments were based in the fact that JROTC “produced no officers and made no ‘direct contributions to military requirements.’” In light of this, the price of “4.7 million needed annually to run the program and the 700 active duty personnel needed as instructors” was too great. However, his attempt to eliminate the program was met with a public backlash, prompting President Kennedy to direct McNamara, to conduct a study of the entire ROTC program (ROTC and JROTC) “for viability and cost-effectiveness before implementing the ROTC Vitalization Act.”8

This trend corresponds with experiences within the School District of Philadelphia. When asked about the history of JROTC in Philadelphia, Gallagher explained that there was evidence of a JROTC program at Overbrook High School in 1966. This information, he explained, “came from students” who attended the school. The level of information that Lieutenant Colonel Russell Gallagher, an individual with

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7 Coumbe, 10 Year History, 258. ; James Dohle, JROTC – A Study of Two St. Louis Schools. (Carlisle, PA, 2001), entire.
8 Coumbe, 10 Year History, 259-261.
tremendous institutional authority over JROTC, has about JROTC programs in the 1960s illustrates the general antipathy for them that existed in the United States at the time.⁹

This research, undertaken by McNamara, led to three major alterations of JROTC that impact the present-day implementation of a JROTC program, particularly the Philadelphia Military Academy – Elverson (PMA – Elverson). JROTC programs now included “a two-track academic structure curriculum with a college preparatory academic track and a technical track, which combined military with vocational training.” PMA – Elverson, while in the planning stages for its opening in 2005, took advantage of the planning option that emphasized “college preparatory work.” Further, at this point, JROTC “was to be completely staffed with retired military personnel.” PMA – Elverson makes use of two retired military personnel, in being retired they are potentially insulated from the everyday needs of the standing army and can prioritize their educational mission. The final change of importance, stemming from the study, was that the Army was “authorized [at the time] a maximum of 650 units, twice as many as the other services.”¹⁰

At this point, the United States Army became the dominant sponsor of JROTC units throughout the country, a role that it still continues to perform. Consequently, the entire critical discourse of JROTC is conducted with Army JROTC programs in mind, although programs exist for the other branches. There are Air Force, Navy, and Marine versions of JROTC. Unlike college-level ROTC, the Navy and Marine operate separate programs. The critical discourse regarding JROTC is analyzed in Section 2 of this paper.

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¹⁰ Coumbe, 10 Year History, 261.
In the Post-Vietnam War era, the Army still candidly discussed how to best utilize the recruitment potential of JROTC programs. Coumbe and Harford explain that, “at a time when the public’s esteem for the military profession was low, the Army felt compelled to exploit more fully the junior program’s potential as a recruiting source.” The army provided a variety of options for JROTC graduates to quickly and beneficially integrate into the United States Army, including “special honors categories for nomination to the United States Military Academy.” With this in mind, Public Law 94-361 was passed by Congress and signed by President Gerald R. Ford. It “raised the authorized number of JROTC units from 1,200 to 1,600.” Despite, the Army’s initial motivations, Coumbe and Harford reveal that this wave of “JROTC growth proceeded in a haphazard fashion.” JROTC continued its meteoric expansion, and “did not even have a mission statement.”¹¹

In many ways, the present use of JROTC represents a beneficial reallocation of an ineffectively utilized resource that already existed. As previously noted, there was one JROTC program in Philadelphia during the 1960s, which expanded to five programs in 1978. The expansion between 1960 and 1978 corresponds with the “haphazard” expansion, vaguely undertaken in order to increase recruitment, discussed by Coumbe and Harford. The level remained constant until 1995, when JROTC programs underwent an expansion. In 2005, there are 17 JROTC programs in the City of Philadelphia. Most relevant to this paper is the history of federal authorization that happened in the 1990s that explains why the number of programs in Philadelphia was more than tripled during the decade between 1995 and 2005.¹²

¹¹ Ibid, 261-263.
Again the trends witnessed regarding JROTC in the School District of Philadelphia mirrored the trends across the country. Unprecedented federal authorization of new JROTC units occurred in response to the conclusion of the Cold War. Coumbe and Harford explain the rationale, arguing, “There was a growing recognition that national power rested not upon military strength alone but upon a host of other political, social and economic forces.” The United States Army, while emphasizing its traditional dedication to republican education, realized that an effective defense of the United States required properly educating Americans, whether or not they directly served the nation’s defense establishment. In light of this, Coumbe and Harford point out that “JROTC was one of the few ways the U.S. Army served American society in other than a warfighting capacity.” It would be this choice, that opened the U.S. Army to a variety of criticism.13

The most recent prominent description of the benefits of JROTC, President George H. W. Bush’s speech at the Lincoln Technical Institute in Union, Jersey, will demonstrate the stakes involved in analyzing the effectiveness of these programs. Bush declared, “Today I’m doubling the size of our Junior ROTC program…We’re going to expand it (from 1500) to 2900 schools…(JROTC is) a great program that boosts high school completion rates, reduces drug use, raises self esteem and gets these kids firmly on the right track.” The President of the United States publicly supported the largest expansion of JROTC in history for reasons entirely related to character building. He set off a wave of expansion that has not slowed in many areas across the United States, prominently including the School District of Philadelphia.14

13 Coumbe, 10 Year History, 275-276.
SECTION 2: JROTC
SELF-JUSTIFYING OR SELF-MOTIVATING?

President George H.W. Bush and Lieutenant Colonel Russell Gallagher point out both the “tangible and intangible” benefits of JROTC programs. Neither believes that there are major harms involved either in regards to expansion of the programs in school districts with limited resources or to those who participate in the programs, while cadets or later in life. These positive appraisals of JROTC programs are not shared universally. Others, such as the American Friends Service Committee, would agree with the argument developed by Marvin J. Berlowitz and Nathan A. Long. They argue simply that the “objective of Junior Reserve Reserve [sic] Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC) is to serve as a vehicle of military recruitment.”15

In Nathan Long’s Dissertation, he lists, what he sees as several major problems with JROTC programs. Three of these criticisms are:

1. Federalization and centralization of Junior ROTC operations and management has been critical to its continued success.

2. Nearly ninety years ago, the program unapologetically placed itself in schools with intentions that were seemingly obvious to students, school administrators, and parents. Today, it purports to aid those students who are said to be lacking discipline, motivation, and hope. The program may, in fact, be able to do both, but it should do so candidly.

3. If Junior ROTC claims to reach ‘at-risk’ youth, why are restrictions placed on students with grade point averages lower than a ‘C’, with physical disabilities, or with disciplinary challenges?

The first and the third criticism will be addressed in Section 3 of this paper. However, the second criticism warrants immediate attention.16

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16 Long, Public Schools, 192-194.
Does JROTC serve as a recruitment tool for the branches of the United States Armed Forces? In the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analysis of JROTC programs, it concludes that there is a positive correlation between membership in JROTC and enlistment. The report states:

A summary of these reports for two consecutive school years appears in table 1.2. A sizable proportion of the cadets (approximately 40 percent in both years) indicated that they planned some form of military service. Because these data on the propensity of graduates to serve in the military are collected close to the time of their high school graduation, the data can usefully serve as a proxy for actual enlistment rates.

However, the data collected does not really answer the question. None of the available data on this question, with the CSIS’s study being the best available, constructs a valid social scientific model weighing the impact of JROTC on a student’s decision to enlist. The data supplied by CSIS does not prove that JROTC serves as a recruitment tool, in an analytically useful manner. It would be tautological to say that individuals need a high school diploma to enlist and therefore JROTC facilitated their enlistment. The data could as easily prove that those who already have an interest in the military are interested in the JROTC. The real question is: If JROTC did not exist in an area would there be fewer enlistees in the United States Armed Forces? A further question: Is it a problem if there is a positive correlation, if JROTC improves the futures cadets?17

Another form of criticism is the one undertaken in the AFSC Report, “Making Soldiers in the Public Schools: An Analysis of the Army JROTC Curriculum” and in the present authors first paper on JROTC, “JROTC: A Self-Justifying Narrative.” Both of these papers analyze the JROTC curriculum, finding deficiencies. The AFSC report is dated, as the JROTC curriculum has been updated to include the benefits of pedagogical

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research and accepted teaching standards. “JROTC: A Self-Justifying Narrative” suffers from the author conflating the JROTC’s four student texts with the phrase “curriculum.” The curriculum, itself, contains required lessons, with flexibility for the rest.18

Even if the conclusions of “JROTC: A Self-Justifying Narrative” are too sweeping, valid criticisms exist. An especially valid complaint about LET III, a JROTC text, are those that directly relate to its leadership training. “JROTC: A Self-Justifying Narrative” illustrates the texts deficient treatment of democracy, arguing:

The text quickly criticizes deliberative process, specifically America’s electoral one, without any similar critique of military government or explanation of its “changing” for any variety of “reasons.” The first argument that the text paraphrases from Beedham’s article is the argument that American democracy is changing because of the “Inconsistent Quality of Representatives.” Their quality is inconsistent mainly because, “most representatives have relatively minor differences of opinion on issues such as public spending and economic strategies.” According to the JROTC curriculum, “minor differences” regarding the spending of taxes and the overall health of the economy illustrate the “inconsistent quality of representatives.” Deliberation among elected officials illustrates a deliberately slow process as to prevent dramatic change; such slow change does not seem to reflect the proper form government should take. The text prefers dramatic and decisive change, much like the change the U.S. Army can bring about on the field of battle.

Admittedly, the JROTC Curriculum was substantially improved since the publication of the AFSC report criticizing the last curriculum. However, serious deficiencies remain, such as the curriculum’s disapproval of anything that does not bring quick results or appear to demonstrate firmness. However, an analysis of an educational curriculum, or its texts, is insufficient to evaluate its effectiveness. The “tangible and intangible” benefits or harms of JROTC must be evaluated through actual observations.19

18 See Appendix A
SECTION 3: EVALUATION
PHILADELPHIA MILITARY ACADEMY – ELVERSON

The author conducted a week of observations at the Philadelphia Military Academy – Elverson (PMA – Elverson). Throughout the week, four in depth interviews were conducted along with observations of all classrooms. Admittedly, these results will not produce conclusions that can be generalized. However, if compared to a series of evaluative criteria, this paper can reach tentative and anecdotal conclusions. These conclusions then can be utilized to design a truly social scientific experiment, requiring substantially more time to complete and covering an entire school year (or two).

The first set of criteria used to evaluate PMA – Elverson is derived from the 2001 RAND Corporation study “Implementing High School JROTC Career Academies.” This study was chosen because it deals specifically with newly instituted programs, and has extensive interview analysis and implementation standards. It should be noted that a key reason why the criteria in the study were modified is that PMA – Elverson is not a JROTC Career Academy, but instead a Military Academy. As previously established, PMA – Elverson chose to emphasize “college preparatory work.” PMA – Elverson will soon change its name to Frederick C. Branch Military Academy (BMA).

Below are listed, the relevant implementation standards from “Implementing High School JROTC Career Academies.” Along with the implementation standards, is the evaluation found by observing PMA – Elverson. Such ratings could change at any time.

1. School Within a School – Total Success
2. Common Planning Time – Partial Success
3. Reduced-Student Teacher Ratios – Total Success
4. Integration of JROTC – Partial Success
The first standard of “School Within a School” is met by definition. PMA – Elverson took over the now defunct Elverson Middle School, and all students who take classes on that campus are one of the 107 members of the first class of the academy. Aside from that, the standard is met by the fact that as the Principal, Dr. Manning explained, “all teachers are site-selected.” Likewise, “all but two of the personnel [were sight-selected], which will change.” PMA – Elverson is given a large degree of independence from the School District of Philadelphia, in regards to staffing concerns. The hope is that this can provide for a more integrative experience for the cadets at PMA – Elverson.²⁰

The second standard of “Common Planning Time” was apparent. All of the instructors were familiar with each other and relatively familiar with the relevant aspects of JROTC. The Algebra I instructor explained that he had even used a suggestion he gained from a colleague at PMA – Elverson during my observation of his classroom. The students were working in groups to solve algebra problems. He explained that they are thus able to learn from each other, as some are not as willing to ask questions of the instructor if they believe that the majority of his or her classmates already understand the material. The emphasis on group work was apparent throughout PMA – Elverson.

The third standard of “Reduced Student-Teacher Ratios” was a resounding success. Classes had approximately 20 cadets. As Battalion Commander Shawn Torres, a cadet, explained, the small class size allows for “individual learning.” Which he explained, means that the “teacher can get to everyone in a day.” The Command Sergeant Major Asia Hyman, attributed her observation, “that teachers stay behind” at the end of the school day to help students to the small-class size. Teachers are able to

develop academic and social relationships with the cadets. Hyman explained that the instructors were “like friends” and “cool.”\footnote{Shawn Torres, interview by author, transcript, Philadelphia, Penna., 30 Nov. 2005.; Asia Hyman, interview by author, transcript, Philadelphia, Penna., 30 Nov. 2005.}

The fourth standard of “Integration of JROTC” was a partial success. Impressively, because PMA – Elverson is a JROTC Academy, several aspects of JROTC do not end when the JROTC class ends. Students march to and from classes in platoons of 13 cadets, each. Each platoon has its own officers, which members are obligated to listen too. The platoon leaders keep the members marching appropriately and when the time is appropriate give the order for the students to sit. Often however, instructors of classes other than JROTC will interject themselves into the process, if they think it is lasting too long. There is an apparent detachment of the instructors from JROTC.

In order to understand the “intangibles” that Lieutenant Colonel Russell Gallagher referred to in his interview, on my first day at PMA – Elverson I was given the chance to interview two cadets, Shawn Torres and Asia Hyman, and be led on a tour of the campus by them. Regrettably, they were PMA – Elverson’s two highest ranking and therefore inevitably skewed the results, as they were obviously both successful.

I asked them both a series of questions in order to understand the “intangibles” at PMA – Elverson, and in JROTC generally. I asked them both why they chose PMA – Elverson. Shawn Torres responded that he had chose the academy because of “discipline.” He further explained that he was “not as disciplined at his last school.” This seems to qualify Coumbe and Corbett’s conclusion that individuals do not become involved in JROTC for tangible benefits, but instead for the “sense of belonging.” Without a doubt, Torres valued the sense of belonging, but “discipline” mattered.
Asia Hyman answered the question saying “that she wanted to test herself” and that “ever since she was little [she] heard about [the] Air Force.” Again, Hyman illustrate the cadets themselves have an appreciation of the tangible benefits involved in their choice of attending PMA – Elverson.\(^\text{22}\) Her candor that her interest in PMA – Elverson, derived partly from her interest in the Air Force lends credence to the argument that those who are already predisposed to the military are interested in JROTC. The ones with this interest are the ones who enlist, according to this theory. The ones who do not enlist, were the students who were interested in JROTC for other reasons.\(^\text{23}\)

I asked Hyman what she felt the purpose of JROTC at PMA – Elverson was. She explained, “that it was to be better citizens.” Torres interjected that this was “JROTC’s motto.” Both seemed to be very familiar with the stated purpose of JROTC and seemed to have genuinely internalize the importance of the mission. Hyman explained that before her involvement in JROTC, and the internalization of this purpose, she “used to be disrespectful to mom [and had bad] relationships with [her] family.” This changed with her involvement with JROTC. Torres explained citizenship by pointing to “service learning [and] parades.” A strong belief in respect of oneself and others was evident at PMA – Elverson. Numerous cadets acknowledged my presence in the hallways, greeted me, or held doors for me. These actions were done without any faculty oversight.

I asked Torres if he were involved in any extra-curricular activities at PMA – Elverson. He explained that he was the “battalion commander” and was involved in the “riffle competition drill team.” Further, he was involved in the starting of a “Home and School Association and a Gospel Choir.” Considering that its PMA – Elverson’s first


year, the academy was able to offer an impressive variety of activities very early. It is notable that not all of the activities are directly related to the military. This reflects well for PMA – Elverson, by giving students a full range of options.\textsuperscript{24}

I asked Hyman how she attained the rank of Command Sergeant Major. She explained that she was the “best drill leader” and that she knew how to “control [and] calm down people.” Leadership skills seemed to be appropriately reinforced. She interacted with the rest of the cadets and me in a very mature manner that reflected what would be expected of adults. She at one point needed to encourage me to introduce myself to the instructor, after I seemed a little shy in my interaction. Perhaps, most impressively, all of the cadets seemed to know how to differentiate between when to be serious and when to have a good time. They were still “able to be kids.”\textsuperscript{25}

I asked Torres and Hyman what their favorite class was and they both agreed that it was JROTC. Torres explained why he liked it saying that they get to “practice leadership [and he] recites the creed.” Hyman elaborated saying that they work on cadet portfolios, where “each student writes a biography, and has good/bad things recorded about them over time.” It was impressive to see them so enthusiastic about learning. JROTC seemed to have value to them and did a variety of academically useful things, like teaching leadership, hygiene, and having students construct portfolios. By having marching throughout the entire day and having teachers who emphasize group work, Torres, Hyman, and many other cadets’ enthusiasm continued throughout the entire school day. JROTC definitely had a positive impact on the perceived value of school.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24} Shawn Torres, interview by author, transcript, Philadelphia, Penna., 30 Nov. 2005.
\textsuperscript{25} Asia Hyman, interview by author, transcript, Philadelphia, Penna., 30 Nov. 2005.
One point of all four of my interviews was to address the issue whether JROTC was a tool used by the military for recruitment purposes. To gain an insight on this issue, I asked both Torres and Hyman, that despite being freshman, whether or not they had any idea what career interested them. Torres said that he wanted to go, “into the military,” where Hyman explained that she was interested in “pathology.” In Torres revealing his family’s worries about the current Iraq War, it seemed interesting that he had an interest of pursuing in a career in the military. It appears in this case that JROTC may have inspired him to consider a career in the military. Torres explained that during “the first week of November, they went to West Point.” The purpose of this particular class trip, he explained, was “to get them to go there.”

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hobson resisted any implication that the JROTC program at PMA – Elverson was in any way a recruitment tool. He specifically responded that they “don’t act like a recruitment tool” and they “won’t allow recruiters into the school.” If a cadet was interested in the military, he would tell them “to go to college.” PMA – Elverson’s purpose is specifically to:

[PMA – Elverson’s purpose is to] motivate young people to become better citizens. We gauge success through graduation results. 90% of graduates [of JROTC programs] go on to universities of higher learning. The goal is for the students to go to any institution of higher learning of choice. We target getting an SAT above 1000.

PMA – Elverson’s actively pursues a mandate of getting as many people to graduate as possible. This being spelled out seems to avoid any unintentional recruitment.

In understanding the concerns relating to recruitment, it is important to understand the actual motivation of JROTC instructors. Hobson explained that the opportunity to

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27 Ibid.
teach “was advertised prior to retirement[, as] part of the troops-to-teachers program.”
He elaborates that “one option was a vocational program including JROTC.” He explains
that he decided that he would like to stay in uniform. Even if to the military
establishment, a secondary benefit of JROTC is as a potential recruitment tool that does
not mean that the actual instructors, involved in the JROTC program, would share the
goal. These instructors chose to become involved in JROTC as a means to help the
youth. Perhaps, the best unintentional benefit of the JROTC reforms during the 1960s
was banning active duty military personnel from teaching JROTC. Retired members of
the military are capable of keeping their desire to serve inner city youth, separate from
the institutional needs of the military. They cannot complete ignore the military, as they
have tremendous respect for it, but it does not influence their day-to-day duties.29

Regarding any problems, Hobson explained that the only problems “were getting
equipment” and that JROTC was “a change for them [the cadets].” Principal Manning
was similarly impressed. The only problem he experienced was that “some parents want
to enroll their students for the wrong reasons.” He elaborated the wrong reason:

[PMA – Elverson is] not a discipline school. Some people think that
because it’s a military academy it’s a boot camp – it’s not. If you have a
discipline problem, we, or the military academy at Leeds, don’t want you.
The only difference between Masterman, Central, and Girl’s High [and us]
is the leadership component.

JROTC, as a part of PMA – Elverson, has been very effective. Few problems have arose
and the individual students have internalized the benefits. It seems that the military plays
a vital role in providing this academic opportunity.30

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29 Ibid.
30 Michael Hobson, interview by author, transcript, Philadelphia, Penna. 1 Dec. 2005. ; Dr.
CONCLUSION
THE FUTURE OF RESEARCH ON PHILADELPHIA’S JROTC PROGRAMS

The chosen method of evaluation, specifically, the modified version of the criteria presented in the 2001 RAND Corporation study “Implementing High School JROTC Career Academies” helped in isolating the factors impacting the potential success of PMA – Elverson. In agreement with Coumbe and Corbett, the most effective aspect of JROTC is its creation of a “sense of identity.” This paper presented a variety of collected data from the field, including four in depth interviews and observations. It demonstrates that significantly greater amounts of research are necessary to understand JROTC.

Future research in order to be valid by social scientific standards, requires: standardized interviews with all administrators of the seventeen JROTC programs in the city of Philadelphia, random standardized questionnaires given to students at all seventeen JROTC programs, resembling the ones in the CSIS study, the acquisition of district documents capable of formulating the history of JROTC, under the direction of the School District of Philadelphia, and finally focus groups with the parents of JROTC students. This data, along with a consultation with psychologists, educators, military experts, and sociologists, should precede the formation of a twenty-year longitudinal study comparing the progress of students across all seventeen JROTC programs, with non-JROTC students in the same or a comparable school.
## Appendix A: JROTC Curriculum

### Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps Leadership Education and Training Program - Mandatory Classroom Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Citizenship in Action</th>
<th>Leadership Theory and Application</th>
<th>Foundations for Success</th>
<th>Wellness, Fitness and First Aid</th>
<th>Geography, Map Skills, and Environmental Awareness</th>
<th>Citizenship in American History and Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Approved Electives</td>
<td>Leadership Application</td>
<td>Service Learning</td>
<td>Approved Electives</td>
<td>Approved Electives</td>
<td>Approved Electives</td>
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<td>LET 2</td>
<td>Leadership Application</td>
<td>Service Learning</td>
<td>Achieving a Healthy Lifestyle, First Aid for Emergency and Non-emergency Situations, and Drug Awareness. 28 hrs.</td>
<td>Cadet Challenge (President's Physical Fitness Program)</td>
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<td>Approved Electives</td>
<td>You the People, Citizenship Skills and We the People. 36 hrs.</td>
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<td>Assistant Teaching</td>
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</table>

### Additionally each JROTC unit must:
- Compile Cadet Portfolio entries from LET training program
- Ensure that Cadets have Learning Plans at the beginning of each lesson.
- Teach math and science modules in the classroom and/or at camp.
- Teach Lessons using the 4-phase Lesson Plan, integrating programs such as UYP, SP, QL, etc.

### Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps Leadership Education and Training Program - Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category 1 Approved Electives</th>
<th>Extensions of Mandatory Subjects</th>
<th>Any material from hardbound text.</th>
<th>Success Profiler (SP)</th>
<th>Quantum Learning (QL)</th>
<th>Command and Staff Procedures</th>
<th>Safety and Marksmanship</th>
<th>Unlocking Your Potential (UYP)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category 2 Approved Electives</td>
<td>Extensions of Mandatory Subjects</td>
<td>Computer Training</td>
<td>Media Communications</td>
<td>Physical Training</td>
<td>Water, Hunter, and Wilderness Survival Safety</td>
<td>Exhibition Drill</td>
<td>Admin/Supply Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Category 3 Approved Electives</td>
<td>Teen eGetting Web Based Activities</td>
<td>High School Financial Planning Program</td>
<td>Chief Justice</td>
<td>You the People and We the People</td>
<td>Written Communications for Sergeants</td>
<td>Lions' Quest</td>
<td>IntelliLearn™ Materials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Category 1** - Electives that have supporting curriculum materials developed; they are included as chapter descriptions in this program of instruction.

**Category 2** - Electives in which instructors must provide/develop their own curriculum materials.

**Category 3** - Electives in which partial materials are available and/or can be ordered; their use is highly recommended to support/reinforce specific subjects.
WORKS CITED


“Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps: Contributing to America’s Communities,” Final Report of the CSIS Political-Military Studies Project on the JROTC.


Speech, President George H. W. Bush at Lincoln Technical Institute, Union, New Jersey 24 August 1992, excerpted in Coumbe, 10 Year History.

WORKS REFERENCED

Dohle, James. JROTC – A Study of Two St. Louis Schools. Carlisle, PA, 2001


