All Strategy is Local: The Long War, Human Terrain, and U.S. Grand Strategy in the 21st Century

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This past spring, CENFAD and the history department launched the Hertog Program in Grand Strategy here at Temple University to explore the “craft” behind civil-military policymaking. In April, the program’s Grand Strategy course, co-taught by professors Richard Immerman and William Hitchcock, invited Dr. Conrad Crane, current director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute and co-author of The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, to discuss his role in producing the controversial new counterinsurgency doctrine currently used by American forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. The manual and the doctrine are controversial, in part, due to their emphasis on understanding and integrating knowledge of foreign societies and cultures into military operations. This article seeks to connect this trend with the development of American grand strategy in the 21st century.

While the position of policymaking elites in the development and implementation of grand strategy remains salient, the exigencies of U.S. national security policy in the post-9/11 world elevate the role of lower-level military personnel in the fulfillment of strategic objectives. Current friction with Iran, North Korea, and China, needless to say, continues to place a premium on high-level statecraft and the intellectual labor of policymakers within the federal government. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, make it clear that the decisions and actions of military personnel at the operational and tactical level also have a significant impact on the development, implementation, and outcome of American grand strategy in the 21st century. In short, tactical level military actions can have strategic consequences. For that reason, there is a newfound imperative within the Department of Defense (DOD) for understanding the “human terrain” of military operations or, more specifically, the political, social, and cultural dynamics of foreign nations and their populations. Such knowledge, many argue, helps eliminate strategically damaging mistakes by American forces operating overseas.

The United States currently faces many global asymmetric challenges to its national security and strategic interests, including irregular warfare, insurgency, terrorism, arms proliferation, and other threats posed by weak and failing states. These threats—along with a host of nonstate movements, networks, and actions—have complicated conventional means of war and diplomacy over the past decade. America’s response to this array of unconventional threats, dubbed the “long war” by some because of its lengthy and intractable nature, has taken shape in a number of overseas contingencies that include counterinsurgency, nation-building, stability, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. Whether or not one agrees with the wisdom, necessity, or legitimacy of such incursions into the internal affairs of foreign nations, the fact remains that the United States is—and will continue to be in the future—engaged in such missions. As a result, military personnel deployed overseas operate in increasingly diverse and precarious operational situations among socially and culturally unfamiliar populations. These operations are conducted under the scrutiny of a ubiquitous and vigilant globalized media, which can transform even the most minor or routine military judgments into strategically-relevant actions. Consequently, individual decisions made by military personnel of every rank can directly affect grand strategic aims within the international system.

In an effort to better understand foreign peoples and the human terrain encountered in the long war, and to avoid costly tactical mistakes that can potentially threaten operational and strategic objectives, DOD has called for an infusion of sociocultural knowledge and training—especially linguistic, ethnographic, and anthropological—into counterinsurgency, stability, and peacekeeping doctrine and operations. This shift in focus will not only help the military respond to a variety of operational contingencies in ethnically- and culturally-distinct regions throughout the world, but will also reduce the cultural friction that occurs between American forces and the indigenous population within an area of operations.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the fact that misunderstanding social and cultural contexts or misinterpreting the behavior and actions of the local population can lead to rash action by U.S. forces. The unnecessary use of deadly force, when it occurs, alienates allies, incites hostilities against American forces, and creates more adversaries around the world. Hence, increased understanding of the human terrain at the tactical level—the history, language, customs, religion, and the social and cultural motivators that
drive behavior within an area of operations—can reduce the application of military force, help limit or prevent civilian casualties, create codes of behavior that avoid violating or insulting local customs and practices, assist in negotiating and mediating conflict between opposing groups within the local populace, and limit targeting to protect religiously and culturally significant buildings and locations. Such efforts can strengthen ties between American forces and foreign populations and serve grand strategic aims by building bridges between the United States and the international community.

Changes in doctrine reflective of both the critical need for social and cultural understanding among military personnel and the connection between human terrain knowledge, successful military operations, and grand strategy are found in the new U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Counterinsurgency, the manual argues, constitutes a human endeavor that relies more on cognitive skills and language and cultural understanding than it does on military technology. Because people, rather than weapons systems, geography, or political and military infrastructure, are the center of gravity in insurgent conflicts, knowledge of the motivations, strengths, and weaknesses of insurgents and other indigenous actors is critical. Understanding the culture and society in which counterinsurgency operations take place—particularly the identities, values, attitudes, beliefs, and concerns that motivate and shape individual and group behavior—helps U.S. forces identify discrepancies in the interests, values, and belief systems of insurgents and the population, and develop appropriate strategies for driving a wedge between the two. Such an understanding proved critical in Iraq in 2007 and continues to play a critical role in the ongoing battle against Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan.

Another initiative designed to improve the military’s understanding of human terrain focuses on language acquisition and cultural awareness. Designed to construct a language- and culture-savvy soldier who can operate in a variety of difficult overseas operational contingencies (something the Marine Corps calls “the strategic corporal”), DOD introduced instruction in foreign languages and cultures in every service branch and at every level from NCOs to career officers in order to meet the pressing demand for such expertise at both the tactical and operational levels. DOD also revamped curricula at staff and war colleges, and established two institutional centers, the Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Culture Center and the Marine Corps’s Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, to provide formal training for officers and enlisted personnel. These centers are also charged with collecting, analyzing, and cataloging sociocultural information for use by combatant commands and provide regional briefs, area handbooks, and culture “smart cards” for use at the tactical level. Training facilities such as the Army National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California were redesigned to replicate social and cultural scenarios most relevant to ongoing military operations.

The Human Terrain System (HTS), a joint civil-military program designed to navigate the human dimension of military operations, also reflects an understanding that military operations, even at the tactical level, can have strategic implications. Created to remedy military deficiencies in cultural knowledge and capabilities, HTS integrates the professional expertise of civilian social scientists, linguists, area study specialists, and military personnel into five-to-nine person Human Terrain Teams (HTTs). HTTs are deployed at the brigade and regimental levels and embedded with in-theater units. Team composition is a combination of senior military specialists and civilian social scientists hired as independent contractors. Civilian team members, predominantly anthropologists, serve as cultural and regional studies analysts. Military members, by contrast, function as team leaders, research managers, and terrain analysts. Forward-deployed HTTs are supported by a U.S.-based network that provides analytical and research support as needed. In 2006, five HTTs participated in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. An additional five were deployed the following year, and by 2008, roughly two dozen HTTs were operating overseas. The Obama Administration expanded the program even further. Despite controversy and concern that the Human Terrain System subverts anthropology and other social science disciplines and uses sociocultural information as a tool for oppression and expanding American empire, the program—all with the argument that it has helped win “hearts and minds” in Iraq and Afghanistan, reduced the use of deadly force by the U.S. military, and garnered important allies in the wars against the Taliban and Al Qaeda—receives wide support in civilian and military circles.

Recent DOD efforts to understand human terrain and inculcate political, social, and cultural awareness throughout the armed forces such as those discussed here signal more than an adjustment in military doctrine, training, and education to meet the exigencies of the “long war” and global conflict in the post-9/11 era. They reflect the reality that all strategy is local, and that the decisions and actions of corporals, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains at the most basic level of military operations can carry strategic consequences. This is true now and will remain so as America continues to fight the long war in the years to come.

Consortium on Grand Strategy Features Six Distinguished Speakers in First Year

The 2009–2010 academic year featured the inaugural series of the Consortium on Grand Strategy (CGS). The CGS was launched in autumn 2009 as a joint venture between CENFAD and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, with the generous support of Mr. Roger Hertog. Six times in 2009–2010, a select group of professors of history, international relations, and political science, together with graduate students from Temple University, met at the Foreign Policy Research Institute to hear
presentations by some of the most esteemed scholars of grand strategy. Following each of the keynote speeches, the Consortium engaged in lively debate over the details of the presentation and how it applied to grand strategy in general.

The Consortium began the year with a keynote speech by John Lewis Gaddis, Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, and Director of the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University. It is Professor Gaddis, along with Professor Paul Kennedy and Charles Hill, Diplomat-in-Residence at Yale, who established the multi-semester program in grand strategy at Yale that serves as the model for Temple University’s course in grand strategy, taught by Professors Richard Immerman and William I. Hitchcock. Gaddis’s speech focused on the development of George Kennan’s grand strategic thinking, and how the Yale program sought to mirror his stages of development. Gaddis, as Kennan’s biographer, is uniquely positioned to speak about the diplomat’s life and thought. For those interested in reading Gaddis’s definition of grand strategy, his explanation of the start of the Yale Program, and his prescriptions for creating the next generation of grand strategists, a copy of his prepared remarks are available at http://www.duke.edu/web/agsp/grandstrategypaper.pdf.

The second of the Consortium’s speakers was Walter A. McDougall, Alloy-Ansin Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania. McDougall is well known for his writings on American history and foreign relations, and is a recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age. His presentation, entitled “Can America Do Grand Strategy?,” was an erudite and witty examination of contemporary writings on grand strategy. McDougall’s essay, with its treasure trove of footnotes, is also an excellent first stop for any student interested in grand strategy. It is available as “Can the United States Do Grand Strategy?” in volume 54, issue 2, of the journal Orbis. It can also be found via the Temple University Library’s Diamond catalogue.

The final speaker of 2009 was John Nagl, a former army officer and the current president of the Center for a New American Security. Nagl is renowned for his writings on counterinsurgency, first coming to national attention with the publication of his Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. In keeping with his expertise, Nagl spoke on “Afghanistan and American Grand Strategy.” A shortened version of Nagl’s remarks can be found in the CENFAD-FPRI Telegram at http://www.fpri.org/telegram/20091130.nagl.winning-the-wars.html. A longer version is available as “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In,” in the Joint Forces Quarterly (issue 52, 1st quarter, 2009).

In February, Melvyn Leffler spoke on “Rethinking the Cold War.” Leffler is the Edward Stettinius Professor of History at the University of Virginia and the author of the authoritative tome Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. More recently, he wrote For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. Leffler offered a careful analysis of the Cold War, and rejected narratives that cite American strategy as either “triumphalist” or as the progenitor of “blowback.” He also visited the CHAT lounge in the tenth floor of Gladfelter Hall, where he led an intimate group of Temple students and professors in a discussion of George W. Bush’s foreign policy.

Tami Davis Biddle, Professor of National Security Policy and Military History at the U.S. Army War College, spoke on Allied Grand Strategy in World War II. Biddle, an expert on air operations and strategic bombing, considered how the British and American ways of war came together to destroy Nazi Germany. Ultimately, British caution and American ingenuity combined to defeat the Luftwaffe, launch the Normandy landings, and push on to Berlin.


The first year of the Consortium on Grand Strategy was a tremendous success. It benefited, too, from close integration with the Temple University honors course in grand strategy, as Temple undergraduates were invited to the lectures. All involved look forward to the return of the CGS in the Fall 2010 semester.

CENFAD Hosts Conference on Consumption

On Friday, April 16, the CENFAD hosted a conference on “The State of Buying: Consumption, Culture and Power in the Global Marketplace.” Prominent historians, anthropologists, and sociologists gathered on the campus of Temple University to discuss the history of foreign relations and how consumption shapes international history. Richard Immerman, Petra Goedde, and Bryant Simon organized the conference as a way to explore the exciting, yet relatively neglected intersections of culture and power.

Richard Immerman, Temple University Professor of History and Director of CENFAD, and Kathy Peiss, University of Pennsylvania Professor of History, kicked off the conference with brief introductions. Kristin Hoganson, Professor of History at the University of Illinois, then followed with a talk entitled,
“Buying into Empire: U.S. Consumption 1865–1920,” which drew much from her trailblazing work, Consumers’ Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865–1920. She showed how consumption patterns shaped American thinking about the wider world, thus paving the way for the creation of the American empire by the turn of the twentieth century. Paul Kramer, Associate Professor of History at Vanderbilt University, provided insightful comments on Hanson’s talk.

After the lunch break, the conference resumed with University of Maryland Sociologist George Ritzer’s presentation on how corporations shape globalization. His talk was entitled, “Romanticizing the Consumer and the Local: Is McDonald’s (or Starbucks) Really that Powerless in the Global Age?” Ritzer was in dialogue with Temple University’s own Bryant Simon, who recently wrote Everything but the Coffee: Learning about America from Starbucks. Ritzer demonstrated how corporations combine global and local desires and needs in shaping their products for markets around the world.

Philadelphia University’s Drew McKeveit then introduced MIT Associate Professor of Foreign Languages and Literatures Ian Condry. Condry presented “Real Anime: Japanese Animation, Toys, and the Soft Power Wars.” He found that consumers of anime in Japan played an active role in shaping the creative decisions of anime producers and those of other popular cultural products. In the process, they not only influenced the production of the goods they were consuming, but also reshaped the meanings of those goods so as to fit their desires. Todd Bennett, Assistant Professor of History at East Carolina University, commented on Condry’s presentation.

Temple University Professor of History Petra Goedde introduced the day’s final presenter, Uta Poiger, Professor of History at the University of Washington. Poiger’s presentation, entitled “Beauty and Globalization,” was an investigation of cosmetics, cosmetic advertising, and beauty standards in Germany and the United States. She argued that changes in consumption patterns demonstrate the profound effects of globalization. Poiger identified numerous parallels between American and German standards of beauty and how these standards were presented in popular media in order to demonstrate the connections between the two countries. St. John’s University Professor of History Frank Ninkovich capped off the conference with closing remarks, during which he tied together its major themes. He also enlightened attendees during a brief talk on culture and the Cold War.

Commendations go out to Professors Immerman, Goedde, and Simon; to Tim Sayle, the CENFAD Thomas Davis Fellow; and to the chairs of each individual panel for putting together such a stimulating conference. The four presenters persuasively demonstrated the power of consumption in shaping larger historical trends, and how various methodologies and interdisciplinary approaches can lead to groundbreaking new scholarship.

CENFAD Presents Three Diverse Talks

The spring semester proved exciting for CENFAD as three distinguished speakers presented diverse talks in front of a group of faculty, graduate, and undergraduate students.

On March 30, Brian McAllister Linn, Professor of History at Texas A&M University, and President of the Society for Military History, spoke on “The American Way of War: Slight Return.” Linn began his talk by considering the ways in which historians have defined the American way of war, from definitions based on characteristics of national culture and military policy, to weapons systems and the conduct of operations in wartime. In particular, Linn noted that the Weigley thesis, which identified a pattern of alternating wars of attrition and annihilation throughout American history, implies consistencies in methods of war-making for wars that are, in fact, so different from one another.

Linn suggested that historians have focused too much on the study of war itself, and too little on how a service branch prepares for war, how it thinks, and how it learns. He proposed, instead, that historians devote more attention to the interwar periods, especially to the intellectual background of war plans and doctrine. As an example, Linn drew parallels between the assumptions, concepts, and ideas that lay behind the 1958 Pentomic Division and that of Joint Vision 2010, even noting similarities in the language used to describe both. In each case, the army responded to its role, diminished respectively by the New Look and the “peace dividend,” by co-opting ideas from the Air Force, and anticipating threats that bore little relation to the wars it would actually fight. Following the talk, Linn remained for an impromptu discussion with graduate students on the tradecraft of the historical profession.

On March 31, Jeffery Prushankin, Visiting Professor in Civil War Era Studies at Millersville University, Adjunct Professor at Montgomery County Community College, and a lecturer in American history at Penn State Abington, delivered a talk on the impact of local politics on the conduct of Confederate Army operations in the Trans-Mississippi in 1864. Inverting Clausewitz’s famous dictum, he entitled that talk, “War by Other Means: Political Combat in the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy.” Prushankin argued that Lieutenant-General Edmund Kirby Smith, indebted to politicians from Arkansas and Louisiana for his transfer to the command of the Trans-Mississippi Department, was influenced as much by political pressures in his conduct of operations as he was by purely military considerations. Prushankin’s narrative centered on the acrimonious rivalry between Smith and his subordinate Major-General Richard Taylor, a politician-turned-general who was resentful that Smith had diverted half of his troops at the critical moment of the Red River Campaign. That rivalry carried over into the Louisiana congressional campaign between the quarreling generals’ respective supporters, Henry Gray and John Langdon Lewis. Prushankin noted that the media, seeking a sensational story, turned the campaign...
into a referendum on the military competence and moral turpitude of these two well-connected generals. Of additional interest is the fact that the Trans-Mississippi’s isolation after the fall of Vicksburg compelled Smith to assume extraordinary ad hoc powers. Smith seized the opportunity to engage in freelance foreign policy with Mexico and France, and even proposed unilateral emancipation as a means to persuade France into throwing their support to the Confederacy.

On April 21, Robert Epstein, Professor of History at the School of Advanced Military Studies, presented a talk titled, “The Influence of Domestic Politics on the Formulation of Grand Strategy during the Second Punic War.” Epstein’s narrative focused on the debate within Rome and Carthage over the conduct of the war. He argued that Hannibal developed a sophisticated grand strategy based on a nuanced understanding of the political context in the Italian peninsula. By invading Italy directly, Hannibal hoped to compel the Latin Confederacy to relinquish its ties with Rome and join Carthage so as to weaken the Roman state and give Carthage mastery of the Western Mediterranean. After the Battle of Cannae, however, when neither Rome nor its allies would treat with Hannibal, there emerged an intense debate in the Carthaginian Senate over whether to send Hannibal more men and supplies. Hann and the faction that had initially opposed war with Rome won out. Despite Hannibal’s three consecutive battlefield victories, his grand strategy failed.

Rome, by contrast, initially failed to develop a consistent grand strategy to deal with Carthage, sending an army to Spain and North Africa without any long-term objectives or idea of what the peace should look like. Epstein argued that the debate between the Fabius Maximus and the young Scipio Africanus in the Roman Senate pitted two different views of Rome’s future. Scipio’s campaign platform for the position of consul aimed at forcing Hannibal to retreat from Italy by invading Carthage itself while Fabius, as part of the Roman Senate’s old-guard, adopted a Rome-first policy which sought to expel Hannibal from Italy while avoiding overseas expansion. Fabius failed to prevent Scipio’s election as consul. Scipio’s grand strategy, culminating in the defeat of Carthage at the Battle of Zama, in 204 BCE, set Rome on a path to empire.

### Book Reviews


By Jason Bartlett, Ph.D. Candidate, Temple University

Fred Kaplan, a columnist for the online magazine Slate, has crafted an engaging, yet critical analysis of the interplay between military action, global strategy, diplomatic theory, political maneuvering, and statecraft during the administration of George W. Bush. While Kaplan’s conclusions may echo earlier critical assessments of this administration’s foreign policy, his monograph is exemplary in that it is firmly rooted in the documentary record. He examines formerly classified military planning documents, the latest academic histories of American diplomacy, and the public record. Until new sources become available, Kaplan’s work will stand as a creditable first draft of America’s recent history.

Kaplan asserts that American leaders fundamentally misread the end of the Cold War when they concluded that the United States had emerged as the world’s “sole superpower” (1). His argument is based on the belief that the Cold War provided a system of stability and order between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the absence of this system of international security there was no longer a fulcrum of pressure to keep allies aligned with America’s foreign interests. The nature of power, warfare, and politics among nations remained much the same, yet policy experts mistakenly came to believe that they were living in a new world where the reach of American military power was absolute.

Kaplan fortifies his arguments by highlighting two key factors that reinforce these post-Cold War assumptions. First, the prodigious advance in military technology and capability threatened to invert the traditional relationship between air and ground forces. The possibility of airpower taking the lead and ground forces playing a supporting role in America’s future conflicts set off a firestorm of competition in which both services raced to bolster their strategic importance with new studies and analyses. Two technological advances ignited this firestorm. The armed Predator drone and the Joint Direct Attack Munition’s (J-Dam) “near zero miss” technology reduced the likelihood of American casualties and allowed for a faster response. These qualities were essential as the United States looked to assert its military muscle in new, and smaller theaters of war.

Second, advocates of this innovative technology claimed that it represented a “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) that would make it possible to use airpower to topple an enemy’s leadership, and disrupt military and support architecture in the opening phases of a campaign. Thus, as Donald Rice, President of the RAND Corporation reasoned, a ground war would not be needed at all. He said, “The American troops could stand by, like a ‘cocked fist,’ waiting to pounce if needed” (21). Once accomplished, it would be possible to install democratically elected leaders and overthrow rogue states in record time.

Kaplan cites the October 15, 2001, engagement in the Afghan village of Mazar-i-Sharif as one example of this new technology’s potential. In gripping detail that reads much like a Tom Clancy novel, Kaplan recreates the night when an American special-ops officer, disguised in local garb and mounted on horseback, sighted an approaching regiment of Taliban fighters through the viewfinder of his night vision binoculars. Using nothing more than a laptop, this officer communicated with a Predator drone, flew it over the inbound enemy and observed their actions in real time video. The drone broadcast the images...
to the Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Upon review by an operations officer, the Taliban unit’s coordinates were beamed to a B-52 bomber on patrol in the area. The coordinates were promptly programmed into a J-Dam bomb and the column was wiped out in less than nineteen minutes. This same action would have taken three days in the first Gulf War, and would have been unthinkable in previous conflicts. The metrics of time and space had clearly been condensed and some military planners believed that this battlefield technology could be applied on a nationwide scale.

Technological advances certainly made new options on the battlefield possible, yet these remained relatively untested and were not accepted by the Pentagon’s senior brass. In order for the RMA to catch on, advocates had to perform an end run around the established military leaders. The prospects of this new technology encouraged them to engage in an all out public relations campaign with members of the Armed Services Committee at the very same time that many of these weapons systems went into testing or production. The RMA concept was conceived by mid-level Pentagon personnel like Andy Marshall, Director of the Office of Net Assessment, and Albert Wohlsetter from the Strategic Alternatives Panel. Their ideas had currency among think tanks like the RAND Corporation, and with hard-driving members of the Air Force like Lieutenant Colonel Dave Deptula and Colonel John Warden. These men hoped to revolutionize the nature of air combat. Deptula and Warden were ardent believers in the vision of World War I aviator Billy Mitchell, who envisioned that future wars would be won by air power alone. With the advances in military technology and political support, this group worked to turn Mitchell’s prediction into a reality.

While these ideas continued to ferment within the Army and Air Force, they were quickly adopted by Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Cheney, men with close ties to Marshall, whom they fondly dubbed “Yoda.” Upon the neoconservative return to power, after their exile during the Clinton years, these mid-level managers were ready to put the RMA into practice and shake up the Department of Defense with new strategies that would keep wars fast and short. The allure of an instant victory, however, proved to be nothing more than a mirage in the postwar quagmire of insurgency.

Kaplan expands his examination of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy to include North Korea, and Israel, and reassess America’s place on the international scene. He notes that the administration realized that boots on the ground were still necessary and, despite their much-vaulted technological capabilities, that GPS-plotted bombing runs still killed innocent people. Furthermore, the failure to make postwar plans in Iraq and Afghanistan over-committed U.S. forces. The failure also limited diplomatic options to negotiate over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and soured Israel’s relationship with Lebanon and the rest of the Middle East.

When the speedy victory promised by the Revolution in Military Affairs proved elusive, the Bush Administration looked to incorporate a series of big ideas into its foreign policy in an effort to justify its actions. Kaplan examines the ways in which ideology was acquired by the Bush Administration in the persons of Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky, author of The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror, and speechwriter Michael Gerson, a Christian fundamentalist. Both Sharansky and Gerson quickly became pivotal advisers to President Bush by helping to craft the post 9-11 doctrine of fighting terrorism and promoting democracy throughout the world. Both were powerful voices within Bush’s inner circle and succeeded in converting Condoleezza Rice from a realist to a promoter of democracy. President Bush appears in these pages as a naive and uncertain leader who was more interested in asserting big ideas than in dealing with the realities of America’s position on the world stage. In contrast, Dr. Rice’s conversion to the president’s line of thinking arises less from conviction than as a coping mechanism to deal with Rumsfeld and Cheney who had outmaneuvered her in their quest to manage the military. Cheney had even gone so far as to set up a parallel national security apparatus within the office of the vice president to keep Rice in check. With few administrative options remaining, Rice resolved herself to serve as the president’s foreign affairs adviser. Rumsfeld and Cheney appear as two rogue members of the Bush Administration, and as men who never adopted his views about freedom and democracy. They remained committed to maximizing American power across the globe at any cost.

Ultimately, Kaplan concludes that the greatest casualty in all of these miscalculations was the art of statecraft. Aspiring military empire-builders believed that smart bombs and computerized intelligence networks could win wars. They failed to see that the very same political objectives that created the war in the first place could only be changed with boots on the ground, shrewd military tactics, and the knowledge of language and culture. Because of these mistakes America must now live with a potent reminder of the limits of its power when it acts unilaterally. Kaplan argues that if the United States is to forge a new policy, it must accept that it is impossible to vanquish all foes, capture all terrorists, and topple all tyrannical regimes on its own. Diplomacy remains the most viable option because all the military options have been exhausted. Policymakers in Washington do not need to be less assertive about its strategic goals, but must convince its allies that the United States is worthy of being followed. Ultimately, America will need to accept the world as it is with the understanding that freedom cannot be imposed anywhere and at any time with the force of military arms.


By Andrew Dauphinee, M.A. Student, Temple University
Jim Piecuch, Professor of History at Kennesaw State University, examines the American Revolution in the Southern colonies by focusing on three groups that played a significant role in the outcome of the conflict in his Three Peoples, One King. He presents the story of Britain’s ancillary group of allies, which included Loyalists, Native Americans, and slaves. Long misunderstood by historians, these secondary participants never occupied a solid place in the thinking of British political and military officials and, as a result, were never utilized to their full potential. Although Piecuch believes that coordinating their efforts with the British military would have been “a difficult, but not impossible task,” he argues that only through this cooperation would the British have had any opportunity to regain the southernmost colonies of East and West Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina.

The narrative is organized chronologically with each chapter divided into separate discussions of each group in the following order: Loyalists, Native Americans, and slaves. Presumably, this ordering reflects the more prominent role that the Loyalists played throughout the conflict. Piecuch employs a host of primary resources and makes judicious use of the correspondence between military officials, as well as personal accounts from a variety of participants. He also substantiates the many military engagements by using Whig accounts, allowing for a more holistic narrative. As a result, the reader gains a deeper sense of the unique nature of the conflict in the South that made it strikingly different from that in the North.

Loyalists were most numerous in the Southern colonies. Although they were continuously harassed by their Whig counterparts, and consistently demoralized by overwhelming defeats and the broken promises of British Army officers, they nonetheless remained steadfast in their allegiance to Great Britain. Native Americans played a crucial role in the defense of the frontiers of Georgia and East and West Florida. Their efforts gave the fleeing Loyalists time to reestablish their collective presence and reassert themselves militarily after the initial attacks by their Whig opponents. Piecuch’s thorough examination reveals that even when native warriors were not actively employed by the British, owing to the latter’s distrust of them, they still posed a threat to the Whigs, forcing them to allocate resources and men to protect the frontier areas and weaken the defenses of cities and military posts.

Finally, slaves occupied a very tenuous position in British strategy, owing to the fact that both Whigs and Loyalists owned slaves. Even non-slaveholders were dependent on the slave economy of the South. Piecuch notes that when the British Army established a permanent presence in the South, slaves tended to flock toward the army seeking promises of freedom. Though slaves did not actively partake in the fighting until late in the war, they played prominent roles in the logistical operations of the army, including transportation and defense construction. The lack of coordination between British supporters and the British military, as well as the failure of British leaders to develop a sound policy for utilizing them significantly, hampered any attempt to pacify and regain control of the Southern colonies and bring an end to the rebellion.

There is much to praise in this work, which is well-researched. Piecuch provides fresh insight into the role that these three groups, heretofore neglected by historians, played in the Southern campaigns. The book, however, is not without its faults. Piecuch’s sections on the Loyalists contain hints of romanticism, as if he idolizes their sacrifices. As a result, he seems to suggest that Loyalist atrocities against Whigs were always in response to those suffered by the Loyalists. This bias oversimplifies the nature of the civil war raging throughout the Southern colonies and provides an inaccurate representation of the nature, attitudes, and motivations of the Loyalists. Throughout his work, Piecuch fails to examine the role of the three groups in the two other Southern colonies, North Carolina and Virginia, leaving much to be explained. This is an even more egregious omission when one considers that Lieutenant General Charles, Second Earl Cornwallis, believed that he could gain the support of many colonists in Virginia and North Carolina. By neglecting to examine the events and trends in these colonies, Piecuch misses an opportunity to provide more support for his claims. He could have developed a more nuanced examination, especially considering that by the time Cornwallis reached Virginia, he had given up on the Loyalists and instead focused on enticing slaves to serve in his army in greater numbers and capacities.

These criticisms should not diminish the importance of Piecuch’s narrative and the immense contribution of this work to our understanding of the deeper nature of the American Revolution. Piecuch confirms the new interpretation that there was a significant Loyalist population in the Southern colonies that played an active role throughout the conflict. He reaffirms the notion of a civil war raging between Loyalists and Whigs. British officials were unprepared to wage the type of war needed to secure ultimate victory, and they did not develop cohesive and lasting strategies to integrate a great number of allies to offset greater demand placed on British regulars to win the war.

Charles Esdaile is one of the preeminent English-language scholars of the Napoleonic period, and in Napoleon’s Wars: An International History, his breadth of knowledge and writing skills are on full display. Esdaile’s purpose in this work is two-fold: first, he hopes to bring the work of academic historians on the period to a more public audience; and second, his goal is “to write a history of the Napoleonic Wars that reflects their...
pan-European dimension and is not just francocentric” (xiv–xv). Readers interested in classic military history will be notably disappointed in this work, as Esdaile eschews close analysis of the many battles and campaigns of the era—and given their coverage in other works, this is a defensible choice. Rather, Esdaile’s analysis remains focused throughout on the person of Napoleon Bonaparte and the international relations of the period, and his argument on each can be addressed separately.

For starters, Napoleon’s Wars is not particularly kind to Napoleon himself. Esdaile employs a bit of psychohistory in establishing who Napoleon was and the motivations that drove him. Esdaile pulls out vignettes ranging from Napoleon’s childhood on the island of Corsica, his experiences as a student at the military academy at Brienne and then École Royale Militaire in Paris, and the infidelity of Josephine shortly following their marriage. The depiction of Napoleon that Esdaile arrives at is a figure incapable of compromise, lacking in social skills, and ambitious to an extreme. He was “a man filled with loathing of the mob, contemptuous of ideology, obsessed by military glory, convinced that he had a great destiny and determined to rise to the top” (39). This personality, more than anything else, drives Esdaile’s narrative of the Napoleonic Wars. Thus, by 1798, Esdaile considers General Bonaparte as “a disturbing new element—a personal ambition so great that it could not be constrained within the boundaries of the European states system” (70).

In the arena of international relations, Esdaile ponders an important question: Should scholars look at the Napoleonic era as global history or European history? Even though Esdaile’s argument concerning Napoleon’s role in driving events puts him at center stage, he is less willing to give him such prominence on this front. Essentially, Esdaile argues that depicting Napoleon’s story as the “history of mankind”—a quote with which Esdaile begins the work—ignores Europe’s preexisting interests, which remained at the forefront throughout the years of his reign as emperor of France. Indeed, Esdaile argues that the diplomatic community continued to operate as it had previously done and this played a significant role in Napoleon’s ability to maintain control for as long as he did. He notes that “most of the powers of Europe continued to pursue traditional foreign policy objectives long after Napoleon had emerged as a far greater challenge to the international order than the French Revolution had ever been” (563–64).

What, then, is one to make of the Napoleonic Wars? According to Esdaile, they were largely the product of Napoleon himself. Esdaile provides many examples of how Napoleon’s personality constantly pushed the nations of Europe toward war with one another. At the very moment when Napoleon could have rested on his laurels and maintained control of France, his ambitions and obsessions would not allow him to do so. Esdaile pairs this dose of “great man” history with a caution against imparting too much importance to Napoleon and France when evaluating the foreign policy of other nations. Russia, in particular, continued to pursue goals that had little to do with Napoleonic France. What is clear, though, is that Napoleon left France worse off than he found it, and in his wake laid the foundation of a new era.

For those unfamiliar with the history of the period, Napoleon’s Wars represents an excellent, comprehensive introduction to both the figure of Napoleon and the course of the conflict at the diplomatic level. The only aspect left out of the story, as noted above, is a detailed account of the campaigns and battles. Esdaile’s arguments are coherent and well-reasoned, though they largely depend upon the reader’s agreement with his interpretation of Napoleon’s personality. For readers interested in the period, his contribution is well worth their time both for its scholarship and its clarity.


By Joshua Wolf, Ph.D. Candidate, Temple University

Joan Waugh, Professor of History at the University of California, Los Angeles, attempts to trace the legacy of Ulysses S. Grant in her new book, U. S. Grant: American Hero, American Myth. Waugh argues that “Grant was a gigantic figure in the nineteenth century . . . and the memory of what he stood for—Union victory—was twisted, diminished, and then largely forgotten” (2). She does an excellent job buttressing both halves of her argument, but in the end leaves the reader wanting more.

Waugh organized her book in two sections. The first three chapters compose a basic biography of Grant, and the last three chapters analyze the mythic status of Grant in the three decades after his death. The biographical section of the work is drawn largely from secondary sources and offers little new information. Waugh does do an admirable job, however, in tackling the problem of Grant’s drinking and highlighting the positive aspects of his presidency. Unfortunately, the common perception of Grant remains that of a flawed military leader and a failed president with a moderate to severe drinking problem, regardless of evidence to the contrary. As Waugh so aptly demonstrates, this was not always the state of Grant’s reputation.

In the two decades after the Confederate Army’s surrender at Appomattox, Ulysses S. Grant was arguably the most popular man in the United States. He was also an international celebrity of the first order. Everywhere Grant went, huge crowds followed. He was hailed as a military genius, and both his leadership and magnanimity were almost universally praised. During Grant’s struggle with throat cancer, a near constant vigil was kept outside his home and expressions of sympathy were received at the Grant house from across the country. Following his death, the nation mourned together and his tomb in New York City attracted over half a million visitors a year for decades after its completion. Grant, along with Washington and Lincoln, was
considered a member of the triumvirate of great Americans. Waugh demonstrates the near universal affection for Grant through a wide array of sources, including the newspaper attention focused on Grant’s illnesses, the numerous eulogies given in his honor, and the controversy surrounding Grant’s burial site. She also examines how the symbolism of Grant evolved and changed following his death. Grant went from being the conqueror of the rebellion and the enforcer of emancipation to the champion of reconciliation and reunion in order to aid national unity.

Although the second section of the book is an excellent read and an intriguing contribution to the historiography of Ulysses S. Grant and American memory, the book as a whole will leave many readers disappointed. Waugh often discusses the decline of U.S. Grant in the nation’s collective memory. She points to both the influence of Lost Cause ideology and American disillusionment following the First World War as key factors in the deterioration of Grant’s iconic status. Unfortunately, every time Waugh starts to scrutinize the collective American memory of U.S. Grant, she begins by stating that Grant’s failing image is not the topic of her work. This gap in the historiography, which Waugh does not fill adequately, may provide a rewarding avenue of investigation for future scholars. Understanding how U.S. Grant went from being viewed as one of the three greatest Americans to the current dilapidated condition of his reputation is at least as important and intriguing as knowing that he was a universal and nearly mythic hero.

Joan Waugh has produced a first-rate biography of Ulysses S. Grant. Her contribution will undoubtedly help in the recent effort to repair Grant’s damaged reputation. This book is highly recommended for anyone interested in the victor of the Civil War and America’s eighteenth president, particularly those wanting to learn more about the perception of Grant among Americans in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century.

News from Faculty, Alumni, and Students

Compiled by Jerome Montes and Jean-Pierre Beugoms

Faculty

Beth Bailey’s recently published book, America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force, received the Army Historical Foundation’s Distinguished Writing Award, Institutional/Functional History. Over the past several months she delivered the Lemnitzer Lecture to the Association of the U.S. Army, spoke to the Seminar on Security, the Military, and US Society at Columbia University, participated in the three-year “Fighting for a Living” project at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, and was a visiting scholar at the University of Melbourne. This August she attended, by invitation, the Army Officer Force Management Integration course at the Army Force Management School, Fort Belvoir. She is currently serving as chair of the history department.

The big news is that this spring Princeton University Press published David Farber’s The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism, an overview of American conservatism from the New Deal through the election of Barack Obama. Otherwise Professor Farber kept busy lecturing here and there, including serving as a visiting scholar at the University of Melbourne, where he was hosted by Trinity College and the School of Historical Studies. Other highlights included an invited lecture at the University of Utrecht on the Vietnam War and at the Université Lyon II, IEP de Lyon, where he spoke on the development of political opposition within the United States against the Bush administration.

Petra Goedde spent much of the academic year away from the Temple campus. In the fall semester she was a fellow at the Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies at Princeton University, where she worked on her book project, a study on the international debates about peace during the cold war. In January she presented a paper on the subject at the American Historical Association in San Diego. Professor Goedde spent much of the spring semester in Munich, co-editing two collections, one on the history of the cold war (with Richard Immerman), another on the history of human rights (with Will Hitchcock), as well as completing a draft on global cultures since 1945 for Harvard University Press’s multi-volume World History. In addition, she presented papers at Erlangen and Augsburg universities, both in Germany. In April she returned to Temple for the State of Buying conference, which she had organized together with Bryant Simon. The conference brought together scholars from different disciplines exploring the intersection between consumption and power.

William I. Hitchcock continued to give lectures around the country based on his recent book, The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe. He also began teaching, with Richard Immerman, a new seminar of “Grand Strategy: History and Policy,” which took him back to the classics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and related works. He continued to work on a collection of essays on the history of human rights (with co-editor Petra Goedde) and drafted a number of essays relating to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Richard Immerman’s Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz came out with Princeton University Press. He continues to speak at multiple venues on multiple topics, including the keynotes at a conference on the CIA and U.S. Foreign Policy at the Clinton Institute, University College, Dublin, and at the U.S. Army War College’s Teaching Strategy Workshop. He also has been busy serving as the representative of the American Historical Associa-
Jay Lockenour continues to work on the Ludendorff project described in previous issues but is pleased to announce that a long-simmering project on German war films will finally be published. Look for “Black and White Memories of War: Victimization and Violence in West German War Films of the 1950s,” to appear in the Journal of Military History in early 2011. Readers of Global War Studies (formerly World War II Quarterly) will also see a long review-essay on the historiography of the 20th July 1944 attempt to kill Hitler appear in the next issue (7:2). Otherwise Professor Lockenour is looking forward to a busy year of research and conferences. If you are attending either the Society for Military History (Lexington, VA in May) or the German Studies Association (Oakland, CA in October), be sure to look him up.

Since publishing Everything But the Coffee: Learning about America from Starbucks, Bryant Simon has been on-line, on the radio, on television, and at colleges, universities, and bookstores around the country talking about his findings. Highlights included an appearance on Nightline and on the radio programs, “Here and Now,” “The Chef’s Table,” “Radio Times,” and “AirTalk.” He gave the keynote address at the 6th Annual Consumer Culture Theory Conference and a featured presentation at the inaugural Harrisburg Book Festival. He also published scholarly articles on globalization, the “enduring” South, the Wall Street Bombers of the 1920s, and Depression Chic. More recently, he returned to his work on Atlantic City, doing an interview for a documentary that will run on HBO alongside the premier of the new Martin Scorsese series, Boardwalk Empire. He also was a featured guest on “Radio Times,” and was quoted in multiple newspapers on a proposed takeover of the city by the state. Recently he appeared as, according to the Washington Post, “the requisite academic talking head,” in a new documentary about the legendary north Alabama rock band, The Drive-By Truckers.

Gregory J. W. Urwin, professor of history, published “William John Arabin of the 2nd Life Guards” in the Winter 2009 issue of the Guards Magazine: Journal of the Household Division. Urwin joined five other historians in a panel discussion on “The Most Overrated Generals,” which appeared in the December 2010 issue of North & South: The Official Magazine of the Civil War Society. Urwin’s ninth book, Victory in Defeat: The Wake Island Defenders in Captivity, will be released by Naval Institute Press this November. This past semester, Urwin delivered invited lectures at the University of Washington; the School of the Soldier of the Brigade of the American Revolution at New Windsor, New York; Rider University; and the Puget Sound Civil War Round Table in Seattle. He also led a tour of Gettysburg National Military Park last April for the Temple Undergraduate History and Social Sciences Association. Finally, Urwin received a Summer Research Award from Temple University to research a new book on Cornwallis in Virginia at the William L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan, the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, and the Boston Public Library.

Vladislav Zubok continued to work on a biography of Russian cultural historian Dmitry Likhachev that explores the difficult negotiations between European enlightenment legacy, Russian nationalism, and Soviet realities of the 20th century. He also worked on translation into Russian of his book, A Failed Empire. Addressing a different subject on each occasion, he lectured in Italy at Roma Tre University and the post-graduate program of the Institute for Markets; at Swarthmore College; in Munich at Ludwig-Maximilians-University’s Center for Advanced Studies; and at Hamburg Institute of Social Research. He was also busy throughout the spring preparing for the fifth summer school in Crimea (Ukraine), "Russia, its Neighbors, and The Idea of European Space: Scenarios for Cooperation," as well as the international workshop on the same topic which he scheduled to overlap the school. Co-sponsored by CENFAD, the school and workshop ran successfully from July 16–29, 2010.

Alumni

William B. Ashbaugh (Ph.D., 2000) was just awarded the Susan Sutton Smith Prize for Academic Excellence from the State University of New York, College at Oneonta, where he is associate professor and chair of the History Department, teaching U.S. foreign relations and Asian history. In addition to a cash award, the prize allows him to present scholarship from a recently-published essay to the College community on April 30. That essay is “Contesting Japanese Traumatic War Narratives through Anime: Space Battleship Yamato and Mobile Suit Gundam,” and it appeared in Imag(in)ing the War in Japan: Representing and Responding to Trauma in Postwar Literature and Film, edited by David Stahl and Mark Williams (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 327–59. He also won, in 2008, the Chancellor’s Award for Excellence in Teaching, a SUNY-wide award. Ashbaugh will be spending the Fall 2010 semester in Kyoto, Japan, as a Fulbright Lecturer at Doshisha University and Kwansei Gakuin University, teaching U.S. Foreign Relations and Cold War through Film. He wrote his dissertation, “‘The Yardstick of Trade’: The Far Eastern Division and American-East Asian Relations, 1933–1935” under the direction of Richard Immerman.
Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Lockhart, USMC (M.A., 2003) will complete his tour on Okinawa, Japan, this June with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, a forward-deployed 2,200-man Marine Air Ground Task Force. Since Lockhart’s last CENFAD update, he completed operational deployments to the Philippines, Australia, South Korea and Thailand and participated in a Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief mission in the Philippines in the wake of Typhoons “Ketsana” and “Parma” this past fall. In July 2010, Lockhart will assume the duties as the Executive Officer for the Houston-area Naval Reserve Officer Training Course consortium, serving on the faculties of both Rice and Prairie View Universities. Finally, in time for the airing of HBO’s The Pacific, his book 782 Gear: United States Marine Corps Field Gear & Equipment of World War II, edited with author Harlan Glenn, was released by Schiffer Publishing in February.

Alan Luxenberg (M.A., 1988) has written two books for secondary school students: Radical Islam (Mason Crest Publishers, 2010) and The Palestine Mandate and the Creation of Israel (Mason Crest Publishers, 2008). He is director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Wachman Center, a program designed to promote civic and international literacy in the community and in the classroom. Visit: http://www.fpri.org/education/wachman.html.


David J. Ulbrich (Ph.D., 2007) assumed his duties as a historian with the U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, in November 2009. He teaches branch history, developing the school’s archival collections, fielding requests for information, and researching and writing articles on the history of combat engineering. Beyond this work for the Army, Ulbrich submitted the full manuscript for his book titled Thomas Holcomb and the Making of the Modern U. S. Marine Corps, 1936–1943. Naval Institute Press will publish this book in early 2011. Ulbrich also worked with fellow Temple alumnus, Professor Bobby Wintermute (Ph.D., 2006), to co-author a major revision of the “Seminar in Race and Gender in Military History” for the online M.A. in Military History program at Norwich University. Lastly, Ulbrich completed his second year as co-director of the Cantigny First Division Oral History Project at Ohio University. As part of this project funded by a $25,000 grant from the Robert R. McCormick Foundation, Ulbrich helped train and supervise Ohio University students in military history and oral history techniques. The students then interviewed twenty-two veterans of the First Infantry Division. These interviews are available at http://media.library.ohiou.edu/cantigny/index.html.

Grant T. Weller, Lt. Col., USAF (Ph.D., 2008) has been reassigned from the U.S. Air Force Academy to the Pentagon. He serves as the deputy chief of the Air Force Operations Group C3 Division. The division tracks and reports current operations to the Air Force’s military and civilian leaders, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Air Force. The division maintains twenty-four-hour operations to manage the initial Air Force response to emerging crises such as the recent earthquakes in Haiti and Chile. Aside from Weller’s military duties, he remains an active book reviewer, and is revising his dissertation, “‘Come Hell, High Water, or Nazis’: The U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps Develops and Implements the First Motorized Logistics System, 1919–1945,” completed under the direction of Professor Gregory J. W. Urwin, for publication.

Jason A. Wittemen (M.A., 2004) became a Class of 2004 Presidential Management Fellow (PMF) with the federal government in Washington, D.C. During this two-year fellowship, he worked rotations as a congressional liaison for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and as an action officer for the Chief of Naval Operations’s War on Terrorism strategy and policy branch (OPNAV N5SP-WOT) at the Pentagon. Upon completion of the PMF program in November 2006, Wittemen received a non-competitive appointment to a regulatory and legislative affairs analyst position with the Administration for Children and Families’ (ACF) Office of Legislative Affairs and Budget (OLAB). While working for OLAB, he was selected as a member of ACF’s Leadership Consortium, given a Special Service Award for extraordinary achievement and completed a graduate program in legislative studies at Georgetown University’s Government Affairs Institute. In March of this year, Wittemen left OLAB and joined the Immediate Office of the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). In his current capacity, Wittemen serves as the Director’s lead on variety of assignments involving ORR Program staff and stakeholders, including the drafting of regulatory language, briefing books, and policy guidance/analysis.

Students

Jason Bartlett, Ph.D. candidate, has been working on his dissertation for the last year after he and his wife Adrienne purchased their first home in Havertown, Pennsylvania. Bartlett recently completed research trips to the Brooklyn Historical Society and the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture. He has been invited to conduct research at the private archive of the Ford Foundation and will be visiting the Senator Jacob Javits collection at Stony Brook University in April. Bartlett recently spoke at the Seventh Annual Underground Railroad and Black History Conference, “Faith, Activism, and Reform in African American Women's Discourse,” and at Temple University, where he served as a commentator on Dr. Betty Collier-Thomas’s latest book, Jesus, Jobs, and Justice: African American Women and Religion.

Jean-Pierre Beugoms, Ph.D. student, is the editor-in-chief of Strategic Visions and serves as a teaching assistant for the GenEd course “War and Peace,” taught by Dr. Jay Lockenour. Beugoms recently completed his M.A. thesis, “Alexander Macomb and United States Indian Policy, 1828–1841,” under the supervision of Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin and Dr. Andrew C. Isenberg. He is currently preparing for his comprehensive exams.

Benjamin Brandenburg, Ph.D. candidate, successfully defended his prospectus, “Evangelical Empire: Globalizing the Gospel in the Age of American Superpower” in February. Brandenburg’s prospectus research benefited from generous assistance from CENFAD’s 2009 Marvin Wachman Endowed Research Fellowship, which provided him with funding to conduct research at the Billy Graham Center Archives. In June 2009, Brandenburg presented a paper at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). The paper, “Religious Rights: Global Evangelicalism and the Origins of U.S. Religious Freedom Policy,” examined the impact of foreign religious actors on the secular American foreign policy establishment. Also, Brandenburg has been invited to attend the 2010 SHAFR Summer Institute at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, which will meet for a week to discuss the ways historical narratives are used in policy debates. The Institute is co-sponsored by the Texas A&M University’s Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs. This summer, he will teach “The Global Crisis: Power and Politics in the 20th Century” at Temple University.

Eric Klinek, Ph.D. candidate, is currently a senior lecturer at the University of the Arts in Philadelphia, where he teaches a course on Modern Spain and the Franco Regime. He was also an adjunct instructor at Temple University during the spring 2010 semester. He taught “War and Society” and will be teaching the World War II course during the Summer II Session at Temple. Klinek will be a fellow at the West Point Summer Seminar in Military History during June 2010. He is presently finishing his fellowship year with the Center of Military History; the CMH fellowship aided in Klinek’s research and writing of his dissertation, which is titled “The Army’s Orphans: The United States Army Replacement System in the European Campaign, 1944–1945.” Klinek gave a talk on his research at the Center for World History and the Origins of Modernity conference in Lexington, VA.

Martin G. Clemis, Ph.D. student, passed his comprehensive exams this spring and is currently working on his dissertation prospectus. Clemis’s dissertation will explore the failure of pacification in the Vietnam War. In January, his article, “The ‘Cultural Turn’ in U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations: Doctrine, Application, and Criticism,” was published in the winter 2010 issue of Army History: The Professional Bulletin of Army History. This is his second scholarly article to see print. Clemis also attended this year’s Summer Seminar in Military History at West Point. He is also the recipient of the 2010 Robert L. Ruth and Robert C. Ruth Fellowship, a research internship provided by the Army Heritage Center Foundation located in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Michael Dolski, Ph.D. candidate, continues teaching at several institutions. He will be presenting a paper at the upcoming SMH Conference in Lexington, VA. The paper, which is based on his dissertation research, is titled “‘Portal of Liberation’: D-Day’s Role in American Self-Affirmation.” Dolski continues to work diligently on his dissertation.

Richard N. Grippaldi, Ph.D. candidate, has secured a visiting lecturer’s position in the Department of History at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, to teach military history while a tenured faculty member is on leave. Grippaldi also secured a spot on the program of the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History, where he will deliver a paper on “Hindquarters for Headquarters? Class Rank at West Point and Appointments to the Cavalry Branch, 1832–1861.”

Michele L. Louro, Ph.D. candidate, will join Salem State College as an assistant professor of history in the fall 2010. Louro is currently finishing her doctoral dissertation from the Department of History at Temple University. Her doctoral dissertation situates Indian nationalist politics in a broad, international context of anti-imperial movements beginning in the late colonial and inter-
Michael E. Lynch, Ph.D. candidate, successfully defended his dissertation prospectus and advanced to candidacy on Feb. 8, 2010. Lynch is now at work on his dissertation, “Sic ‘Em, Ned: Edward M. Almond and his Army, 1916–1953” under Dr. Gregory J.W. Urwin’s supervision. He has completed research trips to the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Virginia Military Institute Archives, George C. Marshall Research Library, and National Archives. Lynch is currently employed as Chief of Educational and Historical Programs at the Army Heritage and Education Center in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, where he coordinates and hosts the Perspectives in Military History (monthly) and Brooks E. Kleber Memorial (quarterly) lecture series; coordinates VIP escort and tour requirements for visiting dignitaries; develops programming for adults and school-aged children; and conducts battlefield staff rides for senior visitors. One of those staff rides recently included the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy. Last fall, Lynch was also named executive vice president of the General of the Omar N. Bradley Foundation, which is charged with providing scholarships to math and history students at the U.S. Military Academy in accordance with the terms of General Bradley’s will. The Bradley Foundation also provides support to the Army Heritage and Education Center as required. Lynch also served on the General and Mrs. Matthew B., Ridgway Research Grant Committee, which awards grants to deserving scholars in accordance with the terms of General Ridgway’s will. Finally, in September 2009, Lynch escorted astronaut Buzz Aldrin throughout his visit to the Army War College as part of the Perspectives in Military History lecture series.

Kelly Shannon, Ph.D. candidate, gave a presentation on March 3 at Paley Library about American reactions to the Iranian Revolution’s effect on Iran’s women as part of the panel, “Gender, the Middle East, and Western Reactions: A Conversation with Joan Scott, Todd Shepard and Kelly Shannon, Moderated by Laura Levitt.” The panel was part of the Free Library of Philadelphia’s “One Book, One Philadelphia” program, which focused this year on Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis. Shannon is also in the final stages of writing her dissertation and plans to graduate in August 2010.

Joshua Wolf, Ph.D. candidate, learned that his article, “To Be Enslaved or Thus Deprived: British Impressment, American Discontent, and the Making of the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, 1803-07,” was accepted for publication by War & Society and will be appearing in the May 2010 issue of the journal. Additionally, in January, Wolf successfully defended his dissertation proposal, received a research grant from Temple University’s Graduate Fund for Excellence in February, and was named a recipient of the Russell F. Weigley Graduate Student Travel Grant by the Society for Military History. The Weigley Award will defray the costs of traveling to Lexington, Virginia, where Wolf will deliver a paper on the President-Little Belt confrontation at the Annual Meeting of SMH. Finally, to cap off a busy year, he and his wife Erin are happy to announce the birth of their second child, Leia Rose, born on May 7. Wolf will promptly abandon his child to conduct research in College Park, Maryland, for the first three weeks of June.

Jason Smith, Ph.D. candidate, presented a paper titled “Charting Sea Space: Hydrography and the U.S. Navy in the Nineteenth Century” at the annual Society for Military History Conference in May 2010. In June, he was grateful to receive the Rear-Admiral John D. Hayes Pre-dissertation Fellowship in Naval History from the Naval History and Heritage Command, which offers $10,000 for the 2010-2011 academic year. Forthcoming in October, The Northern Mariner, a quarterly academic journal of maritime history, will be publishing Smith’s book review of Lorraine McConaghy’s excellent new book, Warship under Sail: The USS Decatur in the Pacific West. He continues to work on his dissertation, titled “Controlling the Great Common: Hydrography, Empire, and the U.S. Navy in the Nineteenth Century.”

Matt Shannon, Ph.D. student, studies American foreign relations, and will be CENFAD’s 2010–11 Thomas Davis Fellow. Shannon is presenting a paper titled “Winter in Tehran, Springtime Abroad: American Foreign Policy, Iranian Student Dissent, and the Global Sixties, 1967–1969,” at SHAFR’s annual conference this June in Madison, Wisconsin. He will also serve as a co-chair for next year’s Barnes Club Conference.

For questions, comments, or to offer your support, contact: The Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy Department of History Temple University Gladfelter Hall (025-24) 1115 W. Berks St. Philadelphia, PA 19122
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