Hitchcock Brings Hertog Seminar in Grand Strategy to CENFAD

Dr. William I. Hitchcock, professor of history at Temple university and until recently CENFAD’s acting director, launched an initiative that has culminated in making the center the beneficiary of one of America’s leading philanthropists. Roger Hertog, the retired vice chairman of Alliance Bernstein and the winner of the National Endowment for the Humanities medal for philanthropy, has spent the last eleven years bestowing more than $100 of his own money on what he considers worthy causes. Following negotiations with Hitchcock and Dr. Richard H. Immerman, CENFAD’s director, Hertog has chosen Temple University as a site for replicating Yale University’s “Grand Strategy” course – a yearlong seminar on military strategy taught by Charles Hill, John Lewis Gaddis, and Paul Kennedy.

Dr. Immerman spelled out the details of CENFAD’s arrangement with Hertog in a announcement to Temple’s History Department in mid-April 2009:

“CENFAD is pleased to report that thanks primarily to the efforts of Will Hitchcock, the Hertog Foundation has made a significant gift to establish the Hertog Seminar in Grand Strategy at Temple University. We are among a group of five universities receiving support for similar projects. The seminar will be housed in CENFAD, and the initial gift will allow us to run the program for three years.

“The Hertog Seminar is composed of three parts. First, Will and I will co-teach a seminar that explores the foundations and practice of grand strategy, which we define as “a way of thinking about power.” That course will be open to undergraduates and graduate students, and funding will be available for research projects associated with the course. This latter dimension is especially advantageous to graduate students.

“Second, working in conjunction with the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, CENFAD will form a Consortium on Grand Strategy, made up of academic scholars and practitioners who are located in the mid-Atlantic area. This group will meet six times each academic year to discuss scholarship and recent findings.

“Third, using FPRI’s journal Orbis, the seminar will publish selected work of those scholars and students who participate in the Seminar and Consortium.

“This should evolve into an outstanding program, with great potential to advance the mission of both CENFAD and Temple University at large. We expect eventually to develop a program of public lectures attendant to the Seminars. We will of course issue updates on developments. In the meantime, because ‘grand strategy’ is a central concern of CENFAD’s associates, supporters, and friends, and because many of you bring to the subject both expertise and insight, we invite any and all ideas related to the Hertog Seminar. Simply email them to either Will (whitch@temple.edu) or me (rimmerm@temple.edu).”

According to an interview Hertog gave to Wall Street Journal in May 2008, he does not believe in making unrestricted gifts to academe. He believes in setting benchmarks for the programs he supports to ensure that they achieve the goals that he envisions for them. There can be no doubt that CENFAD, its associates, and students will expend every effort to meet this challenge and ensure that the Hertog Seminar in Grand Strategy remains at Temple. In the meantime, the next three years should be the liveliest yet in the center’s history.

Ensuring Proper Analytic Tradecraft: Temple Professor Richard H. Immerman Works to Improve Intelligence Analysis

By Martin G. Clemis, Ph.D. Student

Ever since legal scholar and political philosopher Francis Lieber collaborated with the War Department in 1863 to produce General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, academic scholars and other intellectuals have played a prominent role in the development and implementation of national defense policy. For a year and a half beginning in fall 2007, Richard H. Immerman, Temple University’s Edward J. Buthusium Distinguished Faculty Fellow, Professor of History, and Director of the
Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, continued this tradition by serving as the Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analytic Integrity and Standards and Analytic Ombudsman for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Prompted by U.S. intelligence failures and the inability of analysts to either foresee the September 11 attacks or uncover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) created this position to correct analytical deficiencies within the intelligence community and to improve the overall quality of intelligence estimates.

To fulfill these goals, Immerman was charged – aside from general oversight and management of intelligence analysis and production – with protecting the “analytic integrity” of intelligence estimates. This not only meant ensuring that finished intelligence products were timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources of available evidence, but reflected the standards inherent to “proper analytic tradecraft.” Defined by a common set of analytic criteria, proper analytic tradecraft ensures that national intelligence estimates are properly vetted vis-à-vis a thorough, critical, and rigorous interrogation of national defense intelligence – something, many argue, that was seriously lacking prior to 2004. Additional tasks for protecting the analytical integrity of intelligence estimates include providing detailed reviews of finished reports, drafting “lessons learned” and identifying “best practices” within the intelligence-gathering process, and making recommendations for improvement in the assessment and production of national security intelligence.

In addition to protecting the analytic integrity of intelligence estimates, Immerman was expected to draw on the skills set he developed as a historian to create and implement standards and procedures to ensure that intelligence assessments adhered to rigorous intellectual and methodological standards. Analytic standards include detailed descriptions on the quality and reliability of sources, caveats and expressions of uncertainty or confidence in analytic judgments, and distinctions between core intelligence and the judgments and/or assumptions of analysts. Analytic procedures, meanwhile, incorporate alternative analysis when appropriate, discuss the relevance of particular intelligence to U.S. national security, employ logical argumentation, highlight consistency or change over time in specific areas, and seek greater accuracy in the judgments and assessments of intelligence analysts.

Two additional functions rounded out Immerman’s responsibilities. The first was safeguarding objectivity in intelligence estimates. Working closely with analysts and administrators within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Immerman, who also had the title of Analytic Ombudsman, offered counsel, conducted arbitration, made recommendations, and – when appropriate – initiated inquiries into any “real or perceived” problems associated with intelligence analysis, including “ politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objectivity.”

Immerman’s second function was to develop and administer a training program for intelligence analysts aimed at honing critical thinking skills and ensuring proper analytic tradecraft. He helped create a foundational/methods course titled Analysis 101. Later rechristened Critical Thinking and Structured Analytical Techniques, the course teaches analysts to think critically when assessing national defense threats and drafting intelligence estimates. Moreover, it helps them attain greater analytic proficiency by developing many of the cognitive skills used by professional historians. Selective use of evidence, distinguishing fact from assumption, recognition of diverse interpretation and multiple possibilities, and tolerance for ambiguity, constitute a few of these skills.

Immerman’s recent work at ODNI raises a number of important questions concerning collaborative efforts between scholars and the defense establishment and, more specifically, about the benefits – if any – that historians can bring to intelligence analysis. Can the skills, craft, and thinking of the professional historian assist analysts, or improve the overall quality of intelligence estimates? If so, how? Finally, what are the drawbacks to such collaboration? Do professional or ethical dilemmas inevitably arise when historians and other scholars work for ODNI or other defense-related agencies?

Immerman and others believe that historians and other scholars can bring tangible benefits to intelligence analysis. As “outsiders,” they offer a “fresh perspective” on issues pertinent to defense intelligence and national security. Moreover, their input provides “value added” to the analytic tradecraft of assessing and constructing intelligence estimates. Thanks to Immerman’s efforts at the ODNI, national security estimates now take 25 percent longer to craft than in the past. This – along with improved critical thinking skills and greater analytical proficiency among analysts engendered through the aforementioned foundational/methods course – leads to a more thorough and rigorous interrogation of national security intelligence and, by extension, provides a greater chance that defense analysts and policymakers will “get it right.”

Getting it right in regards to intelligence estimates and judgments on national security threats, however, may be a matter of perspective. As a recent commentary in the Weekly Standard reveals, some individuals view Immerman’s work in defense intelligence as a detriment rather than
an asset to U.S. national security. In an article titled “If Michael Moore had a Security Clearance,” conservative political pundit Gabriel Schoenfeld took issue with Immerman’s criticism of the Bush administration’s questionable use of CIA intelligence. Schoenfeld denounced Immerman as a “rabid ideologue” who is not a dispassionate student of these matters, but a combatant in the political intelligence wars himself.” Schoenfeld also called the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, which was reviewed by Immerman and his staff prior to publication, “bizarre,” arguing not only that the estimate was soft on Iranian intentions for developing a nuclear weapons program, but also that it contradicted itself by stating that Iran had abandoned the pursuit of a nuclear bomb on one hand while acknowledging that it continued to enrich uranium on the other. The article went on to criticize Immerman’s professional integrity and question his ability and – more acerbically – his willingness to lay aside political biases in order to protect the objectivity and analytic integrity of intelligence estimates. Asserting that Immerman’s position resembled a case of the fox watching the henhouse, Schoenfeld wrote that “those responsible for making analytic integrity are themselves lacking in the very quality.”

Criticism of academic participation in national defense policy has also come from the other side of the political spectrum in recent years. When social scientists, humanitarian and legal scholars, and other academics collaborated with the U.S. military in drafting and implementing new counterinsurgency doctrine for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, such liberal pundits as Tom Hayden strongly disapproved. Hayden derided collaboration between academics and the military as “the Pentagon occupation of the academic mind” in an article written for the Nation. He and others condemned the working relationship between scholars and the Department of Defense, fearing that it would lead to the “militarization” of the university and the “weaponization” of academic scholarship.

Aside from these few strident voices from the far right and far left, most individuals – including Immerman and a majority of the people with whom he worked while Assistant Deputy Director – are sympathetic to the idea of historians and other academics contributing to national defense. The idea that scholars and government officials can work together to correct analytical deficiencies and improve the overall quality of intelligence estimates resonates with many representatives from both academia and the defense establishment. Immerman considers his work under the Director of National Intelligence to have been a highly successful collaboration. It was, he contends, a positive experience with few drawbacks. In addition to improving the overall quality of defense intelligence by addressing its analytic and methodological shortcomings, his work helped establish trust within the intelligence community, and improve working relations among its various branches, including the CIA, FBI, and Military Intelligence. Although instances of dissonance and friction sometimes arose – particularly from military and CIA sources – most defense and intelligence officials were generally receptive to his work and respectful of his professional and intellectual credentials.

Overall, one can conclude that Immerman’s time as Assistant Deputy Director has produced positive tangible results by improving the overall quality of intelligence analysis through instruction and new analytic standards that inject intellectual rigor into intelligence assessment. In addition, his stint at government service also demonstrated that historians and other scholars can play an integral role in the development and implementation of national defense policy. In closing, however, there is one caveat to Immerman’s recent work that is worth mentioning. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of defense intelligence and the essential role it plays in national security, Immerman’s publications are now subject to review by government officials in order to prevent intelligence leaks or the dissemination of classified materials. Although respectful of the classification system and cognizant of the need to protect sensitive material related to national security, Immerman is wary that government surveillance may force him to blunt criticism or pull punches in future analyses out of respect for his former co-workers and their close collaboration at ODNI. Given Immerman’s dedication to the historical profession and his penchant for sound scholarship, his colleagues and students can expect his published research to retain the integrity, originality, and bite for which it has always been known.

Confronting a Paradox: Pacifism and Military History

By Josh Wolf, Ph.D. Student, Temple University

When I set out to write this piece, it was intended to be a response to Colonel James Boling’s rejoinder to earlier articles by Earl Catagnus and Jason Smith. For those who have not read those articles, the debate has revolved around the importance of actual military service for a military historian. Smith believes that it is not necessary, while Catagnus and Boling, both veterans, argue that having served is beneficial, providing them special insight into combat that a civilian cannot have. That was my starting point; yet I finished in an unintended place.
Like Smith, I have never served in the armed forces, nor will I ever serve in the armed forces, and I believe that this does not affect my work as a military historian. Unlike Smith, I did not have a childhood filled with toy armadas under my command, nor toy soldiers, toy guns, etc. My parents felt that such playthings led to a glorification of violence. They did, however, strongly encourage my interest in the Civil War, which was sparked as a preteen when my mother took me to see the movie Glory. One of the first books on the Civil War that my parents purchased for me was a volume of Matthew Brady’s battlefield photographs. They made me take a long, hard look at the images of the battlefield dead. They hoped to drive home the point that while it is well and good to read about the courageous stand of the 20th Maine at the Battle of Gettysburg or the genius of “Stonewall” Jackson in the Valley Campaign of 1862, there were real consequences to these actions. Casualties of war were more than just statistics in a book.

Thus from a young age I was conscious of the realities of violence. This awareness matured as I did. During my freshman year in high school I was involved in a fist fight. It left me feeling empty and weak and I have never struck a person in anger since. From my decision to not participate in violent acts grew a conviction that violence was wrong, and if violence was wrong on a personal level, it came to make sense that violence was wrong on any level. Experiences between 2000 and 2001 both strengthened and validated my growing pacifism. In no particular order, a reevaluation of my religious convictions, reading Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front and Tim O’Brien’s The Things They Carried, losing too many close friends in a series of unfortunate accidents, and the events of September 11, 2001, convinced me that life was too precious to be wasted and that violence accomplished nothing more than further violence. Any lingering doubts I may have had regarding pacifism disappeared with the United States’ preemptive strike on Iraq in 2003.

There are a few things that I would like to make clear before I continue. While I consider myself to be a firm pacifist, I do not have anything against those who serve in the armed forces. My sister was an Army medic for six years. My brother-in-law is a veteran of Operation Desert Storm and I lost a cousin in the same conflict. Additionally, my maternal grandfather served as a Seabee in World War II, of which he was very proud—a pride that I share, though I am equally proud of my paternal grandfather, a conscientious objector, who, when drafted, served as a nurse in Hawaii. I find the conviction and sense of honor and duty with which many soldiers live their lives admirable. Nonetheless, on a personal level I disdain violence.

Perhaps it is odd then that I came to study military history. When I entered graduate school I believed that by studying the armed conflicts of the past, I might be able to one day have an impact on the avoidance of armed conflict in the future. Maybe that is naïve of me, but Alfred Thayer Mahan proved to all the potential impact of an historian on larger society. Peace is the goal that I am not prepared to give up.

I do not think that being a pacifist completely defines me as an historian. There is more to my historical pursuits than that. In a similar vein, I do not think that Earl Catagnus and James Boling are solely defined by their experience as soldiers. Yet as much as Catagnus admits that he imposes his “twenty-first century Marine Corps experience across time and space” and finds himself unable to “break completely from this mental trap,” I often find my pacifism creeping into my studies. I do not always fight it. I cannot study, nor do I want to study, the War of 1812, First World War, or Vietnam without reflecting on how unnecessary those wars were. Is this problematic for a military historian? Maybe, but personally I do not believe that it is, otherwise I would have long ago changed the focus of my studies. Education in military history allows for a more erudite critique. To put it another way, being a pacifist educated in military history allows me, I believe, to make a stronger, more structured argument against the necessity of war.

If being a pacifist has affected my work as a military historian, though, studying military history has forced me to temper my pacifistic views. While I continue to maintain a personal commitment to nonviolence, I have also been forced to concede, if only to myself, that the total avoidance of armed conflict is impossible. Historian Reginald Stuart once described Thomas Jefferson as a “half-way pacifist” because he firmly believed that diplomacy should be thoroughly exhausted before the United States entered into war. “Three-quarters pacifist” might be the term that best applies to my views: diplomacy should be exhausted, once it has been if violence can still be avoided without placing the American people in imminent danger, the U.S. should exercise the proper restraint; preemption is never justified; imperialism, expansionism, or the defense of “American interests” is not just cause for the use of deadly force; spreading democracy through the barrel of a gun is tyranny. Despite the fact that over the course of the last few years my pacifism has become milder, there are still only two American wars to which I can reconcile my conscience as an American citizen. But I have also come to accept that there are people in this world who only under-
stand force and it is occasionally necessary to employ force against those same people.

To return to the original question – does military service make for a more effective military historian? It does not. Intelligence, hard work, and tenacity make for a more effective military historian. Are there advantages to being a military historian with military experience? Perhaps, but not because of any special “insider status” that goes with being a soldier and it is no more advantageous than being a pacifist and a military historian. The personal convictions that each of us brings to the field influences our scholarship and allows for a greater diversity. The greater the diversity, the more nuanced the debate; the more nuanced the debate, the richer the field.

Temple at the 2009 SMH Meeting

Temple professors and alumni have along played a prominent role in the Society for Military History (SMH), the world’s largest professional organization devoted to the study of past military affairs. When more than 400 of the SMH’s 2,450 members assembled at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, from April 2 to 5, 2009, for the organization’s seventy-sixth annual meeting, their ranks included a sizable Temple contingent.

Gregory J. W. Urwin, professor of history and CENFAD associate director, was elected to a four-year term on the SMH Board of Directors. That new office necessitated his stepping down from the Finance Committee, on which he had served for two years. During the conference, Urwin commented on a paper panel on “African-American Soldiers and Society in the American Civil War.” On the last day of the meeting, SMH President Brian McAllister Linn asked Urwin to chair the program committee for next year’s meeting.


Randy Carol Balano (Ph.D., 2007), Office of Naval Intelligence, presented a paper on “OP-16-Z: The Special Activities Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence, 1942-45.” Henry G. Gole (Ph.D., 1991) commented on a panel devoted to “The U.S. Army in Open Ended Wars.” Christopher S. DeRosa (Ph.D., 2000) of Monmouth University, commented on three papers concerning “Cross-Cultural Dimensions of the Afghanistan War.”

Among the other Temple alumni attending the conference were Kevin C. Holzimmer (Ph.D., 1999), School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base; Peter S. Kindsvatter (Ph.D., 1998), U.S. Army Ordnance Center and Schools, Aberdeen Proving Ground; Sean M. Maloney (Ph.D., 1998), Royal Military College of Canada; Matthew S. Muehlbauer (Ph.D., 2008), Michael E. Lynch (A.B.D.) of the Army Heritage and Education Center; and Richard N. Grippaldi (A.B.D.).

Book Reviews

Compiled by Earl J. Catagnus, Jr.


By Earl J. Catagnus, Jr., Ph.D. Student, Temple University

U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and Selected Bibliography is one of the first books published by the newly created Marine Corps University Press. The editor, Col. Stephen S. Evans, earned his Ph.D. at Temple University in 1995 under the tutelage of Russell F. Weigley. He also served as a field historian for the Marine Corps History Division at the time the anthology was published. Having the look and feel of a textbook, this exquisitely bound work uses journal articles, separated into eleven parts, to trace the history of the United States Marine Corps’ involvement in unconventional warfare. There is good reason for the anthology to be packaged as a textbook. According to the introduction, it was published as a “primer . . . intended to serve as an initial educational resource that provides Marine officers and other national security professionals with the historical basis for modern-day USMC counterinsurgency strategy and operational doctrine.” This work does exactly what it was intended to do, and does it well.

The anthology contains articles from a variety of peer-reviewed scholarly journals. Some are taken from conventional military service magazines such as Naval Institute Press, Marine Corps Gazette, Parameters, and Military Review. Others come from journals and publication
not traditionally connected with military affairs such as Washington Quarterly, Revista/Review Interamericana, and Hispanic American Historical Review. Each article is placed in a specific historical and geographical context that produces a nuanced narrative of specific interventions and campaigns. The articles are not triumphantist descriptions of Marine successes, but scholarly discussions of controversial topics. For instance, Brian McAllister Linn’s “We Will Go Heavily Armed: The Marines’ Small War on Samar, 1901-1902” details the leadership failures and atrocities sanctioned by Maj. Littleton W. T. Waller. Linn illustrates that Waller, an officer touted as a mentor for many of the Marine Corps’ most notable “irregular warriors,” was not only brash and reckless with the lives of his Marines, but criminal in issuing orders for the execution of ten Philippine civilians.

The work is constructed around a series of articles on historical U.S. counterinsurgency efforts, including those in the Philippines, Nicaragua, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. It also contains commentaries on current counterinsurgency doctrine and theory. One in particular touches upon a recurring theme found throughout many small wars and highlighted in numerous works on U.S. counterinsurgency efforts and irregular warfare. Thomas X. Hammes’ “Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation” analyzes methodological trends in Marine warfighting philosophies and strategies. Building on William S. Lind’s 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Hammes illustrates how insurgents forego military objectives in order to achieve political goals. Battlefield defeats, he contends, mean nothing to insurgents. Their main priority is influencing public opinion and defeating counterinsurgent nations from within. Rather than fight a conventional war against superior military forces (something it lacks the resources to do), insurgents will instead attempt to drain popular support for counterinsurgency conflicts through a lengthy and costly guerrilla war. If successful, low-tech insurgencies can defeat superpowers like the United States by merely changing public opinion.

U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare also contains a select bibliography. It is important to note, however, that it is a “selected” bibliography gleaned primarily from the footnotes of works contained within the anthology. It is not intended to be an exhaustive or comprehensive list of scholarly works on the Marine Corps’ involvement in irregular wars. The titles that are listed, however, fulfill Evans’s mission of providing active counterinsurgency practitioners with a valuable historical and intellectual resource.

Overall, the work provides an excellent primer in the history of the United States Marine Corps’ involvement in small wars and insurgencies. Moreover, it can be utilized either as a military textbook in an undergraduate course, or as a tutorial for fighting insurgencies. If this book is any indicator of the quality of work to come from the nascent Marine Corps University Press, military historians and defense professionals will eagerly await the next installment.


By Christopher Golding, Ph.D. Student, Temple University

Henry G. Gole notes in the preface to his biography of General William E. DePuy (1919-1992) that he asked himself two questions before setting out on his task: Was there a need for such a biography? And if so, was there sufficient evidence to do a proper job? Happily, he found the answer to both questions to be “yes,” and the product of his labors is a noteworthy addition to the historiography of the U.S. Army. In many respects Gole’s contribution bears striking resemblance to Ronald G. Machoian’s William Harding Carter and the American Army: A Soldier’s Story. Both Gole and Machoian trace the intellectual growth and reorganization of the United States Army through the lives of the men who had a profound influence on that development.

Gole’s narrative begins in South Dakota, where DePuy spent the early portion of his life and attended South Dakota State College. Through interviews with childhood friends and acquaintances, Gole finds early evidence of the intellectual, diplomatic, and leadership traits that would be the hallmarks of DePuy’s character for the rest of his life. In college, he was a member of ROTC, and in 1941, he sought a commission in the United States Marine Corps but was denied. This prompted him to seek and receive a commission from the U.S. Army, thus beginning an influential military career that spanned four decades, and was central to the reorganization of the U.S. Army following the Vietnam War.

DePuy served in combat both during World War II and in Vietnam – he missed out on serving in Korea due to a leg injury. In addition, he had a memorable stint as a military attaché in Hungary (where he broke his leg), and served for two years in the developing CIA (where he met his second wife). There is evidence that DePuy could have made an easy transition into the intelligence community,
but he always viewed himself as a soldier. Therefore, as his career progressed, DePuy avoided any position that might take him away from a combat role.

His formative combat experience came in France during World War II. It was an experience that Gole sees as having a profound and permanent impact on DePuy. As an infantry battalion commander and regimental operations officer, DePuy grew disgusted with the low level of education and training for infantrymen, and the low quality of leadership. In the years that followed the Second World War, DePuy stressed professionalism and effectiveness. In practical terms, it meant that DePuy became a demanding and hands-on leader, especially in combat, with little time for those he viewed as incompetent or inferior officers. The units he commanded were known for their effectiveness, but his brusque manner and quick dismissals of officers in Vietnam caused friction and almost ruined his career.

The combat record of DePuy is deserving of attention, especially during World War II. His ultimate value to the U.S. Army, however, was in his influence on doctrine and training. His final command was that of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973, which put DePuy in a position to make a personal stamp on the trajectory of the U.S. Army into the 1980s and 90s. While at TRADOC, Dupuy rewrote the Army’s warfighting philosophy in an unprecedented doctrinal innovation called “Active Defense.” This was a top-down, intellectually developed doctrine that sought to abolish the linear, frontal, attrition type warfare the Army had embraced. It caused enormous controversy and sparked debate in the Army as well as the USMC. This intellectual overhaul of Army doctrine and its warfighting philosophy – along with the debate it stirred – constitute DePuy’s most significant contribution to military professionalism.

Gole gives great weight to the importance of the Yom Kippur War on DePuy’s thinking as well. The lethality of that conflict was a stark reminder of the need for highly trained and effective troops (he remained faithful to infantry squads and platoons throughout his career) in order for the U.S. Army to be successful. DePuy strove for the next four years to revitalize education and implement training that avoided the pitfalls he witnessed thirty years earlier on the battlefields of Europe. Gole argues that the result of these ministrations was the modern U.S. Army that we have today.

On the whole, General William E. DePuy represents an excellent example of biographical work. Gole avoids the trap many biographers fall into of being either too laudatory or too critical of their subjects. Gole is sympathetic to DePuy, but not blind to the fact that he had his faults. In the end, his depiction of DePuy on a personal level is that of a complex man, who was capable of separating his professional and personal self. In the professional setting of combat, DePuy could be faulted for his quick trigger to dismiss those he deemed inferior. When assigned to non-combat positions, however, he urged others to respect the work and effort of their inferiors. In his personal life, he is presented as an excellent father who managed to play a significant role in the lives of his children despite a heavy workload and time spent abroad.

For historians interested in the contemporary U.S. Army, or the development of military organizations, General William E. DePuy is well worth reading. The work fits nicely into the growing historiography that is granting ever greater attention to the intellectual development of military organizations, while at the same time casting light on an officer with a long shadow.

News from Faculty, Alumni, and Students

Faculty


Professor Petra Goedde is finishing up a chapter on “Global Cultures since 1945” for a multi-volume work on the New World History to be published by Harvard University Press. She has been awarded a fellowship at the Shelby Collum Davis Center for Historical Studies at Princeton University to continue work on her book project on the international discourse on peace during the Cold War. Last December, she co-hosted the International History Workshop on Human Rights at Temple. Since January she is serving on the editorial board of Diplomatic History and continues as co-chair of the SHAFR committee on the status of women (no longer an ad hoc but a regular committee). In June she will take part in a panel on military occupations at the annual SHAFR conference in Washington DC.

Professor William Hitchcock published The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe, 1944-45 (Free Press, 2008). A selection of the History Book Club, the book was reviewed in numerous venues, including the Financial Times, the Sunday Times (UK), and Foreign Affairs. The Independent named the book a Top Ten selection, and the book was a Finalist for the Lynton History Prize awarded by the Columbia University School

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Dr. Jay Lockenour is still plugging away at the Ludendorff biography but has started work on an unrelated article on the recent film, Valkyrie, starring Tom Cruise. The film’s subject is the attempt to kill Hitler that was carried out by a group of military officers on 20 July 1944. This event became a crucial part of post-war West German political culture because it demonstrated (allegedly) that there had been “good Germans” who recognized the evil of Nazism and were willing to risk their lives to stop it. Not surprisingly, it has been the subject of numerous dramatizations over the past five decades, and Cruise’s Stauffenberg bears comparison with those previous efforts. However, Valkyrie, has an additional resonance for contemporary Germany because of the controversial beliefs of its star. The Church of Scientology, of which Cruise is a member, is an anti-democratic, “totalitarian” organization according to the German government and is subject to surveillance and legal restrictions. Hostility to the Church of Scientology is widespread among the media and the public. Therefore, the reaction to the film in Germany is shaped by the apparent dissonance between the beliefs of the hero and the beliefs of the star. The article will examine, official, popular, and scholarly reactions to the film as a way of tracing the changing place of the conspiracy in German political culture.

Professor Lockenour will be providing the comment at the Lees Seminar at Rutgers University on Professor Marcus Jones’ (USNA) paper: “Wunderwaffe: The Politics and Technology of Nazi Submarine Innovation, 1941-1945” in late March and will attend the Philadelphia area Modern Germany Workshop in April.

Gregory J. W. Urwin, professor of history and CENFAD associate director, had his article from the summer 2008 issue of Army History, “When Freedom Wore a Red Coat: How Cornwallis’ 1781 Campaign Threatened the Revolution in Virginia,” promptly reprinted in Richard G. Davis, ed., The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775-2007: Selected Papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians. That essay collection was published late last fall by the U.S. Army’s Center of Military History. Editor Richard Davis explained why Urwin’s interpretation of an eighteenth-century campaign has captured a modern army’s attention in the book’s introduction: “Two takeaways from Urwin’s paper are that, first, there is a tipping point in the level of public support necessary to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations. . . . And, second, consistent follow-through is required for sustained effective counterinsurgency operations. . . .”

Urwin continues to deliver invited lectures to civic and professional audiences. On February 3, 2009, he braved a blizzard and drove to Allentown to regale 150 members of the Civil War Round Table of Eastern Pennsylvania with “Glory and Me: A Professor’s Brief Love/Hate Affair with Hollywood.” On March 29, he spoke on “From Parade Ground to Battlefield: The Pictorial Record of the British Soldier in the American Revolution” at the symposium “Lock, Stock, and Barrel: The World of the Revolutionary Soldier.” The event was sponsored by the Friends of Valley Forge Park and held at the Crown Plaza Hotel in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Urwin addressed a packed house at Philadelphia’s Union League on April 18 when he spoke on “Sowing the Wind and Reaping the Whirlwind: Abraham Lincoln as a War President.” That lecture was part of a day-long program on “Abraham Lincoln & Leadership” sponsored by the Union League, the Abraham Lincoln Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. Fordham University Press will publish an expanded version of Urwin’s remarks and those of other program participants in an essay collection to be edited by Professor Randall Miller of St. Joseph’s University.

Urwin looks forward to two upcoming visits to the National World War II Museum in New Orleans. He will travel to the “Big Easy” in June to preside over a Teaching American History program sponsored by the U.S. Department of Education. This event is aimed at improving the coverage given the Second World War by social science teachers in secondary schools. In November, Urwin will join CENFAD director Richard H. Immerman and several other distinguished scholars in a day-long assessment of the work and legacy of Stephen E. Ambrose – historian, best-selling author and the museum’s founder.

Urwin supported the History Department’s graduate students by chairing a panel on “The British Military and Imperial Crisis” at the Barnes Club Conference on March 21, 2009. He also chaired the committee that chose the best paper in military history for the Russell F. Weigley – U.S. Army Heritage Center Foundation Award, which has become one of the main draws of the conference. Urwin attended the Society for Military History Annual Meeting at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, from April 2 to 5, where he commented on a panel concerning “African-American Soldiers and Society in the American Civil War.”

Urwin helped CENFAD gleam a little more
brightly this current semester by facilitating two of its best attended events. He arranged for the renowned and prolific historian, Dr. Jeremy Black of the University of Exeter, to speak to a standing-room-only crowd on “War since 1990.” Urwin also played a leading role in organizing “Obama, America, and the World: Strategic Challenges and Choices,” recruiting two of three distinguished panelists – Dr. Conrad Crane, director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, and Dr. Michael Palmer of East Carolina University. Urwin also prevailed on Trudy Rubin, the well-known foreign correspondent and columnist for the Philadelphia Inquirer, to attend the event, which paved the way for her serving as moderator.

Finally, Urwin’s colleagues honored him with election to a four-year term on the Board of Trustees of the Society for Military History. He has also been named chair of the program committee for the SMH’s 2010 annual meeting at the Virginia Military Institute.

Alumni

Kevin C. Holzimmer (Ph.D., 1999) has had a busy year. In March 2008, while in the position of Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at the Air Command and Staff College (Maxwell AFB, Alabama), he was promoted to full professor. Then, in November 2008, he became part of General David Petraeus’s CENTCOM Assessment Team, a four-month assignment (November 2008 – February 2009), whose mission was “a comprehensive assessment of the situation in the CENTCOM area of interest, reviews existing theater strategies and plans across relevant departments and organizations, and develops a draft strategy and plan to direct the integration of all instruments of national power and efforts of coalition partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve goals and objectives.” Upon Holzimmer’s return, he accepted a position at the School of Advanced Air and Space Power (Maxwell AFB, AL). The School of Advanced Air and Space Studies “is a 50-week, follow-on school for selected graduates of intermediate-level Department of Defense PME schools. SAASS creates warrior-scholars with a superior ability to develop, evaluate, and employ airpower within the complex environment of modern war. Upon completion of all requirements and with faculty recommendation, graduates receive a master of airpower art and science degree.” Holzimmer wrote his dissertation under the direction of the late Dr. Russell F. Weigley, which was subsequently published as General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War (University Press of Kansas, 2007).

Dr. Charles E. Merkel (M.A., 1983) is being honored by his undergraduate institution, Widener University (formerly Pennsylvania Military College), with the John L. Geoghegan Citizenship Award for 2009. Second Lieutenant Geoghegan, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, fought under Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore at Ia Drang on November 15, 1965. He was killed in action trying to carry one of his wounded soldiers to safety. As the Widener University web site explains: “The award is given annually in the memory of John L. Geoghegan ’63 to an alumnus/alumna who has brought honor to the University through academic achievement, demonstrated leadership capabilities and community service.” This award is all the more fitting in light of the fact that Chuck is a retired officer. Chuck and his wife Diane will return to Philadelphia for the award ceremony on April 4. Chuck wrote his M.A. thesis, “Unraveling the Custer Enigma,” under the direction of Dr. Russell F. Weigley.

David J. Ulbrich (Ph.D., 2007) continues to teach in Ohio University’s History Department and in the online M.A. in Military History Program at Norwich University. Ulbrich is also co-directing the Cantigny First Division Oral History Project. The forty videotaped interviews from last summer are now web streamed and transcribed at http://libx.bsu.edu/collection.php?CISOROOT=/CtgnyOrHis Ulbrich’s article, “Thomas Holcomb, Alexander A. Vandegrift, and Reforms in Amphibious Command Relations on Guadalcanal in 1942,” is appearing in the
May issue of the peer-reviewed and international journal, War and Society.

Mathew J. Wayman (M.A., 2005) left his position as a librarian at Penn State Abington last summer to become the head librarian at Penn State Schuylkill, which is located in Schuylkill Haven, Pennsylvania. In addition to mastering the challenges of being an administrator, Wayman sits on a promotion and tenure committee and currently chairs the university-wide Library Faculty Organization.

Lieutenant Colonel Grant T. Weller, USAF (Ph.D., 2008) was promoted to that rank effective January 1, 2009. He has been selected as the next Deputy for International History in the Department of History at the U.S. Air Force Academy, a post he will assume in May 2009, where he will supervise one core course and seventeen upper-division offerings in world and regional history.

Students

Jim Bolling, Ph.D. student and a Regular Army colonel, serves as a faculty instructor at the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania while pursuing studies in Military History at Temple. He is currently deployed to Kabul, Afghanistan where he is assigned as a senior planner on the staff of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commanded by the U.S. Army’s General David McKiernan. Boling works daily with NATO allies, but serves primarily as an advisor to strategic planners within the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army (ANA), where his team and its Afghan counterparts co-develop ISAF-ANA integrated counterinsurgency combat and security plans at the operational level. Boling says the insights he has gained into the people, politics, and culture of both Afghani and European allies is simply fascinating, and hopes to leverage this understanding as he continues his studies. Boling also wants to thank Temple University for its demonstrated commitment to its military students, as it granted him a temporary suspension of his Ph.D. program requirements while sustaining his enrollment until his expected return in July 2009. He wishes all of the History Department staff, faculty, and students a great spring semester, and asks them to remember that the worst day in Philadelphia is surely better than the best day in Helmand Province!

Earl J. Catagnus, Jr., Ph.D. student studying under the direction of Dr. Gregory J.W. Urwin, is completing his final semester of coursework. This spring, he was awarded the Russell F. Weigley – U.S. Army Heritage Center Foundation Award for best paper in military history at the 2009 Barnes Club Conference. His paper, "Innovation and Adaptation in the U.S. Army Infantry, 1930-1941," argued that contrary to most historiography, the U.S. Army Infantry during the interwar period created and institutionalized the foundations for victory in World War II.

In addition, Earl’s article, “Professionalizing the Marine Infantry NCO Corps,” was accepted for publication by the Marine Corps Gazette. It will appear in the July 2009 issue. He also had two paper proposals accepted for conferences. The first, “Counterinsurgency at the Small Unit Level: A Comparative History of the Combined Action Platoon and the Distributed Operations Platoon,” will be presented at the 2009 Conference of Army Historians in Washington, D.C. on July 27-30. The second paper, "Intellectual Warrior: General Alfred M. Gray’s Transformational Commandancy, 1987-1991," will be delivered at the Naval History Symposium at the United States Naval Academy in September 2009. In addition, he was awarded a McMullen Research Honoraria by the McMullen Seapower Fund and the Naval History Symposium committee, which will help facilitate his research for the proposed paper.

Martin G. Cleonis, editor-in-chief of Strategic Visions and second year Ph.D. student studying under the direction of Gregory J.W. Urwin, is currently finishing coursework this spring and serving as a teaching assistant. He plans on taking his comprehensive exams in the fall and hopes to finish his dissertation prospectus by the end of the year. Martin has also been recently published in Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 20, No. 1 (March 2009) with an article titled “Crafting Non-Kinetic Warfare: The Academic-Military Nexus in U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine.” In spring 2009, he served both as a commenter and on the awards panel for the Russell F. Weigley – U.S. Army Heritage Center Foundation Award at Temple University’s James A. Barnes Club Graduate Student Conference. In July 2009, Martin will present a paper at the Conference of Army Historians in Alexandria, Virginia, titled “The ‘Cultural Turn’ in U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations: Doctrine, Application, and Criticism.”

Michael Dolski, Ph.D. candidate, is proud to announce his acceptance as the 2009 Research Fellow for the Cantigny First Division Foundation. The fellowship offers financial assistance to help defray the cost of research at the foundation’s museum and archives as well as the opportunity to present findings in a public talk. Michael will present a
paper at the “Overlord Echoes” Conference held at Liberty University this coming June. His paper, “D-Day in the Movies: Collective Honor, American Exceptionalism, or Just Riveting Drama?,” will explore evolving themes in the depiction of D-Day in major films. He continues teaching at Ball State University and Burlington County College during spring semester 2009.

Eric Klinek, Ph.D. candidate, won the Dissertation Fellowship offered by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. That honor comes with a $10,000 stipend and access to CMH facilities at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. This award will allow Eric to easily finish the research for his dissertation, “The Army’s Orphans: The United States Army Replacement System in the European Campaign, 1944–1945.”

Drew McKevitt, former Strategic Visions editor-in-chief and CENFAD Thomas Davis Fellow, successfully defended his dissertation, “Consuming Japan: Cultural Relations and the Globalizing of America, 1973-1993,” in February. Drew’s research benefited from generous assistance from the Temple University Graduate School’s Dissertation Completion Grant and CENFAD’s 2008 Jeffrey Bower Endowed Research Fellowship, which provided him with funding to conduct ethnographic research at Epcot in Disney World in Orlando, Florida, and at a national convention for fans of Japanese animation (anime) in Baltimore, Maryland. A revised version of a dissertation chapter on anime fans has been accepted for publication in Diplomatic History. The article, “‘You Are Not Alone!: Anime and the Globalizing of America, 1977-1989,” explores the transnational social and cultural communities created by anime fans in the context of early U.S. encounters with contemporary globalization.

In June 2009 Drew will present a paper at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). The paper, “Ohayo: (Good) Morning Again in Marysville,” examines the impact of the arrival of the first Japanese-owned automobile plant in the United States, which Honda opened in Marysville, Ohio, in 1982. Also, Drew has been invited to attend the 2009 SHAFR Summer Institute at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, which will meet for a week to discuss “Turning Points in the Cold War.” During the spring 2009 semester he offered two courses at Temple. He taught “Cold War Culture in the United States” for the History Department, and “Global America” for American Studies.

Jerome Montes, MA student, will present a paper at the Conference of Army Historians in Alexandria, Virginia, titled in July 2009 titled “The Limitations of Military Power in Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency Campaigns.”

Kelly Shannon is a fourth-year Ph.D. candidate specializing in U.S. foreign relations and international history. In June, Kelly presented a paper, “Battling the Veil: Popular Western Concern for Muslim Women’s Human Rights Since the Late 1970s,” at the 2008 SHAFR annual meeting in Columbus, Ohio. Her paper explored American reactions to the Iranian Revolution’s effect on the rights of Iranian women. At that conference, she also sat on a roundtable entitled, “Is SHAFR Sexist? A Report and Discussion,” where she presented the results of the SHAFR Ad Hoc Committee on Women’s survey of SHAFR membership and discussed ways to encourage more women graduate students to join the organization. Kelly also received CENFAD’s 2008 Marvin Wachman Fellowship in Force and Diplomacy, which she used to travel to Duke University over the summer to conduct research in the papers of the Sisterhood Is Global Institute. In December, she presented a work-in-progress titled “Sending a Message: The International Campaign against FGM Comes to the United States, 1994-1996” at the CENFAD International History Workshop, “Human Rights in History.” In March, she traveled to the Library of Congress to conduct research in popular U.S. magazines. Kelly is currently a member of the SHAFR Ad Hoc Committee on Women and will be presenting a paper at the 2009 SHAFR annual meeting, which will be held in Washington, D.C., in June. That paper will be a revised version of the paper she presented for the IHW and will explore the ways in which American anti-FGM activists cast the practice as a distinctly Muslim one from the late 1970s through the mid-1990s.

Kelly was recently awarded the Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grant by SHAFR, and will use those funds this summer to conduct research at the archives at Smith College and the Schlesinger Library at Harvard. She has also been awarded the CHAT Graduate Teaching Fellowship for the 2009-2010 school year.

Joshua Wolf, a Ph.D. student, won a fellowship to attend the 2009 West Point Seminar for three weeks this June at the U.S. Military Academy. The summer seminar provides academics with advanced training in military history. In addition to interacting daily with Military Academy history faculty, fellows also work with a long list of distinguished guest speakers.