Terrorism, Fear, and the Future of American Foreign Policy: An Interview with Cato Historian Christopher Preble
By Jesse Curtis (Ph.D. Student, Temple University)

Christopher Preble is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He is a veteran of the U.S. Navy and holds a Ph.D. in history from Temple University. Preble is the author of numerous books and articles, including The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free (Cornell University Press, 2009). He recently took time from his busy schedule to offer some historical perspective on recent terror attacks, Donald Trump, and the future of American foreign policy. He also shared his advice for graduate students pursuing careers in history.

In your 2009 book, The Power Problem, you wrote that the United States’ enormous military power has become counterproductive to U.S. security and damaging to our democracy. How do you think this dynamic has changed in the Obama years? Has Obama exacerbated it or begun to reverse it?

The Obama years have definitely been a mixed bag when it comes to U.S. foreign policy. I think that the president was significantly constrained in what he was able to do by the general war-weariness growing out of Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if he had wanted to significantly grow U.S. military power, and use it more frequently around the world, he would have had great difficulty doing so. The public would not tolerate it, and the economy wouldn’t easily bear it.

His critics claim that these constraints were mostly self-imposed, and that Obama never really wanted to use U.S. power in the first place. I do not think that is entirely fair or accurate. Public sentiment and fiscal realities cannot be erased with the wave of a magic wand. Meanwhile, those who claim that Barack Obama has some peculiar aversion to the use of military power, and use it more frequently around the world, he would have had great difficulty doing so. The public would not tolerate it, and the economy wouldn’t easily bear it.

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So, we still have a power problem. We still have a vast national security apparatus. We spend many hundreds of billions of dollars a year on the military. And we still use it with some frequency. I do not think that Barack Obama has exacerbated this problem, but he surely has not reversed it. And I am increasingly of the opinion that he could not fix the power problem, even if he was so inclined. The national security state is more powerful than the head of state.

That is a bold statement. We might expect to hear that a country such as Pakistan, for example, has a security apparatus stronger than the official head of state, but this is not something many people are accustomed to hearing about the United States.

It might seem like a bold statement, but I believe it. Even a president who truly wanted to make a major change to U.S. foreign policy would have a hard time doing so. The implementation of policy is controlled by what some call the deep state, or what Tufts University’s Michael J. Glennon calls “double government” – a de facto permanent class of national security professionals and institutions.

What’s more, this same double government limits and constrains the types of people that rise through the political system in the first place, reducing the chances that a true change agent would ever reach the pinnacle of national security policymaking.

We are now approaching a decade and a half since September 11, 2001. How do you think Americans’ perception and fear of terrorism has changed over the period?

My Cato colleague John Mueller, also a renowned political scientist at Ohio State, has studied this phenomenon at great length. In addition to three different books on the subject, and numerous papers and articles, John has found that Americans’ fears of terrorism have not abated despite the fact that there has not been a major attack on U.S. soil since 9/11, and the total number of Americans killed on U.S. soil by Islamist terrorists -- the type that we have been most worried about ever since 9/11 -- is not greater than 50. Mueller’s study of the 76 post-9/11 terrorism cases puts the figure at 41 killed. As John notes, 41 innocent people killed by terrorists is 41 too many; but the amount of money that we are spending to stop future terrorist attacks and the amount of fear that terrorism still inspires seems strangely disconnected from objective reality that a host of other threats pose a far greater risk of injury or premature death.

In short, our perceptions have not changed, despite my and my colleagues’ best efforts to convince Americans that they are terrorizing themselves.

After the attacks in Paris, San Bernardino, and Brussels, fears of terrorism seemed to come roaring back and appeared to affect the presidential race. To put it bluntly, why are Americans so scared?

The answer is that we simply do not know why Americans are so scared about terrorism. I do not think Americans should be so scared. We enjoy a measure of safety that our ancestors would envy, and that our contemporaries do envy. Virtually anyone else, in any country in the world, would gladly trade places with Americans in terms of our physical safety. And yet we are scared. Really scared.

The simplest explanation is that people do not accurately assess threats according to widely available statistics, and they do not conduct probabilistic assessments of the likelihood that something will occur and the magnitude of the harm. Even if you demonstrate conclusively that a person is far more likely to drown in their bathtub than be blown up by a terrorist, people tend to focus on what is highly visible in the news – a phenomenon that Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman describe as “the availability heuristic.”

This is true even if the terrorist fails to kill anyone at all (for example, the Underwear Bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab; or the Times Square Bomber, Faisal Shahzad). The mere fact that they attempted to carry out a
terrorist attack reminds people that there are terrorists out there. And the fact that we have created a vast apparatus to fight terrorism helps to keep it in the public eye, even when it is telling us about plots disrupted. There is not a comparable agency telling us about people killed or almost killed by lightning strikes.

We tolerate some degree of danger in our lives. We do not expect that the government can provide perfect security from fire, flood and firearms. And yet the public appears to expect the government to stop all acts of terrorism.

If Americans have an inflated sense of the terrorism threat, do you see this threat inflation as unique to the post-9/11 world or is it better thought of in the context of earlier foreign policy fears, such as the “missile gap” for example?

Threat inflation is not a new phenomenon. Beyond the missile gap of the late 1950s, there was the bomber gap of the early 1950s, the window of vulnerability in the 1960s, the Team B and Committee on the Present Danger in the 1970s. There were the Palmer Raids and the Red Scare. It seems to be essentially ubiquitous. Mueller’s research shows that public fears of terrorism have remained high, whereas comparable fears in past eras slowly abated over time. So the durability of terrorism fears is unique, and worth studying.

The bigger question is: Why are Americans so susceptible to threat inflation? My colleagues and I have done some work on this, including a conference and edited volume. I’ve settled on the explanation that our security makes us prone to threat exaggeration. It is a paradox. Our relative physical security and economic prosperity gives us a huge margin for error, and biases the public toward a wait-and-see attitude. Our neighbors to the north and south are friendly and weak, and we have an enormous economy to help us confront challenges if our security environment suddenly changes.

But policymakers are risk averse. They are less inclined than the public at large to wait and see. They will be held accountable if things go awry, but are generally not punished if they overreact to an unlikely threat, or one that never materializes. Indeed, if the danger turns out not to be as great as they said (the swine flu scare of 1975 is a notorious case), they can claim (and do) that it was their action that stopped it. Proving the counterfactual – that it wouldn’t have happened in the absence of the policy – is impossible.

Policymakers want to act, but that costs money, and diverts attention from other priorities. So in order to mobilize the public to deal with a distant problem before it becomes a proximate one, they inflate the threat. This is not a new phenomenon, as I explained last year at “War on the Rocks.” When the Truman administration was pondering ways to rally public support for the nascent Cold War, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan advised the administration to “scare hell out of the American people” by painting a picture of the global communist menace that was, as Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained, “clearer than the truth.”

You have written that the United States needs a more restrained foreign policy. What would a more restrained foreign policy look like, and is there a former administration that contemporary policymakers could look to as an example?

It starts by carefully defining America’s vital national interests, and outlining a series of criteria limiting the use of force. And then, once we have signaled to other countries around the world that we will restrain the impulse to use our power when our vital interests are not directly engaged, they will be encouraged and empowered to do more.

Such restraint is harder than it sounds, but essential for a country with as much military power as the United States. There is no shortage of situations in which the U.S. government might be called upon to intervene. The reach of the U.S. military is practically limitless – and I am just talking about our conventional power: think B-2 bombers taking off from Missouri, dropping bombs over Serbia or Iraq, and then returning to Missouri. And since it all seems so easy, with little cost, and practically no risk to the lives of American troops, what would stop us from using it? The answer, loosely, is the American people.

The general public is far less enamored of open-ended nation-building missions, and meddling in distant civil wars, than the small number of Americans who actually devise the nation’s foreign policies. Most Americans, unlike most elites, also like the idea of other countries taking responsibility for their own defense, and doing more to help address common challenges. Americans are a generous people, and we are willing to help people in need, but we do not like being played for suckers. And there is a fine line between being unable to help yourself, and being unwilling to do so.

After World War II, and during the early years of the Cold War, the countries of Western Europe and East Asia, in particular, were in no position to fend off the Soviet Union (and, eventually, Communist China), all by themselves. U.S. assistance provided them with the breathing space needed to rebuild their economies and reform the political systems that had given rise to fascism during the interwar period. But our allies are now stable, prosperous democracies who are more than capable of defending themselves and their interests. We are long overdue for some real burden sharing.

At the risk of asking you to play prophet, are we more prepared now than we were fifteen years ago for a restrained response to a mass-casualty terrorist attack in the United States? Or would we likely double down on interventionism abroad and curtailment of civil liberties at home?

I would like to say yes. I would like to say that we have learned not to terrorize ourselves. But we are still terrorized, and even a relatively small-scale attack could convince Americans to accept even more costly and draconian counterterrorism measures than those adopted after 9/11. Indeed, it appears that a failed attack – Abdulmutallab’s doomed attempt to detonate his undergarments on Christmas Day 2009 – convinced the Obama administration to shed most of its civil libertarian instincts, and double down on a number of counterterrorism initiatives, including a dramatic increase in the use of armed drones, and other exercises of unilateral executive power. Charlie Savage tells the whole sordid tale in Power Wars.

I have to ask you about Donald Trump. Do you see a precedent for this kind of figure as a potential major party nominee? What do you make of his foreign policy? Does it fit comfortably in a traditional current of American foreign policy? Some have called it Jacksonian.

Trump talks about free-riding allies, so there is public sympathy for that message. And since elites have pushed foreign policies that do not enjoy broad public support, that bolsters Trump’s anti-establishment message. Tensions between elites and the rest of the country have surfaced from time to time in American history, but Trump is the first to pull it off in the modern era. Ross Perot and Pat Buchanan both attempted it in the 1990s, but Trump has been more successful.

His protectionist trade agenda would wreck the U.S. economy. I do not make that claim lightly. His draconian tariffs would drive up the cost of imported goods here in the United States. Then, when the countries that we are keeping out of the U.S. market retaliate with their own protectionist policies, U.S. exporters would be devastated. It is as though he has never heard of Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression. We have seen this.
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His anti-immigrant policies would have a similar effect on the service economy in the United States, and the blatant racism and xenophobia of his rhetoric – the execrable claim that Mexicans are criminals and rapists being only the most memorable of many – has mobilized an entire constituency in this country that seems committed to shutting the United States off from the rest of the world.

Isolationism may be Jacksonian, a la Walter Russell Mead’s famous formulation, but it is neither a wise nor noble foreign policy. Americans’ active engagement with the outside world has been the source of our exceptional prosperity and our true strength. And it still can be.

What are the major differences in working at a think tank as opposed to a university setting?

The biggest difference is the obvious one. Some wag once said that think tanks were like universities without students. I think that is about right. This is a double-edged sword. On the plus side, think tank scholars have more time to dedicate to research and writing, and we have more control over our schedules. On the other hand, think tank scholars do not have a captive audience of students to speak to every week, a group of (mostly) eager young minds hungry for knowledge. Or at least hungry to know what they need to know for the exam. So we have to work a little harder to convince the lay public that they should care about what we have to say, and that they should take a few minutes to read or listen to us.

I think this makes think tank scholars a little more attentive to the how (communication), as well as the what (the actual scholarship and research). Many think tank scholars are also a bit more focused on communicating directly with policymakers, or those who advise them, and thus are always thinking about the policy relevance of their research.

But this distinction can surely be overdone. After all, good university teachers need to be good communicators, too. And I think that the gap between think tanks and academia is, hopefully, narrowing. There are many scholars who both teach at a college or university, and reach a wider audience through popular books or blogs. I won’t name them all, because I will surely miss some important examples. Instead, I would point to the work of the “Bridging the Gap” initiative that is trying, as the name implies, to increase academics’ exposure to policymakers, and vice versa.

What in your opinion should be the role of the historian in trying to influence popular discourse and political debate?

My opinions on this point come mostly from a book that I read a few years before entering graduate school, Thinking in Time by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May. There are many terrific insights in there, but the best for historians come from May’s earlier work on the misapplication of historical analogies to policy. Non-historians tend to see superficial similarities between a contemporary case and one from the recent or distant past, and predict that the future will play out the same way if we do not act. The Munich analogy is merely the most famous, and most frequently misused, of these – and that seems to have a unique hold on Americans, despite the fact that few know what actually happened in 1938. Every tin-pot tyrant becomes a Hitler. Every reprehensible ideology becomes Nazism. But there are many other examples.

Historians can play a huge role merely in fleshing out the facts, and revealing that the superficial similarities are often just that: superficial. It is often said that history does not repeat itself, but it rhymes. Fair enough, but I would not sleep on my head, or wear a hat on my bed. Details matter. And if the historical case du jour suggests that a given action will solve a problem, it is helpful to remind people that what worked before might not work again. That is not history. That is just common sense.

Historians can also provide context. So many times we hear that something in the present-day is “unprecedented.” But there is (almost) nothing new under the sun. A good historian will always be ready with a useful “Not necessarily” or, a “Well, actually...” when they hear someone say, “It’s never been this way before.”

How can historians do better at bringing our insights to bear in the public sphere?

My first piece of advice it to write well. You might think that what you are studying is the most interesting and important thing in the world, but if you cannot communicate clearly and creatively, you are missing out. There is so much competition out there for people’s attention: from sports, to politics, to Dancing with the Stars. What historians do needs to be just a little bit entertaining.

And it should be entertaining. So, my second piece of advice is to own it. Love what you study. If you, as a historian, cannot get excited about a story, then you are in the wrong business. And if you cannot get other people excited, you need to work harder at it. Get passionate about what you are studying, find the hidden nuggets that make the story pop – from a previously obscure document to an interview with someone who saw it first hand – and then write.

Writing is a skill, and, like shooting a basketball or playing piano (neither of which I can do well, by the way), you get better with practice and some good coaching. So, when you write, seek out feedback. When you write a lot, you might get a lot of feedback, and that should make you a better writer.

Technology provides us with so many different ways to tell stories. We should use all of them. Books and journal articles will always be important, but we cannot ignore the power of other mediums to reach a very wide audience. Oh, what Plutarch and Gibbon could have done with the Internet.

How has your background as a Navy Officer shaped your work?

When I look back at my brief naval career (1989-93), most of what I learned has to do with leadership and management, and that has shaped my work throughout my career, not just at Cato. There is nothing quite like the military for putting relatively young people in positions of responsibility, and testing their abilities. Some excel. Others fail. All learn. I was extremely fortunate to be surrounded by great mentors, from my first chief petty officer and a few mid-grade enlisted personnel who took me under their wing, to a Chief Engineer who was a first-rate teacher, and who has since become a great friend. Everything that I have done since I got out of the Navy has been made easier by my time in the Navy.

The other way in which my naval service helps me is by exposing me to a unique set of experiences that cannot easily be replicated in civilian life. This allows me, and perhaps obligates me, to tell these stories. A small and shrinking share of the U.S. population has any first-hand knowledge of military life. Those who are serving, or who have served, have a special duty to communicate their experiences. The British novelist L.P. Hartley wrote, “The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there.” The U.S. military should not be a foreign country to the nation it serves.

Do you have any advice for graduate students pursuing a career in the history of diplomacy, war, and foreign relations?

My main pieces of advice would be to be doing it for the right reasons, to study what interests you, and (I repeat myself) to...
write well. I still believe that the primary purpose of graduate school is to train future college professors, and I especially believe that for those in a Ph.D. program. If you do not want to teach, even a little bit, ask what that extra three or four years writing a dissertation will get you that you could not obtain through some out-of-the-academy experience.

But if you finish the dissertation, and you get the Ph.D., and then you do not land that dreamed-about tenure-track job, there are many other career tracks for diplomatic historians. And one of them is work at think tanks. It seems to have worked out pretty well for me. And my predecessor also happened to be a diplomatic historian, and was a wonderful mentor. I would be very pleased if I could help a few others along their way.

Book Reviews


By Thomas A. Reinstein (Ph.D. Candidate, Temple University)

On February 14, 1950, the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with the People’s Republic of China. This agreement united the two states as allies on an economic, political, and military basis. But by 1962, the alliance had collapsed under the weight of mutual distrust and acrimony. This cleavage had major consequences for the international Communist movement as China and the USSR competed for the loyalty of leftist groups around the world, and they never officially reconciled.

Studies of the Sino-Soviet split have proliferated in recent years. Prior to the end of the Cold War, most monographs by Western scholars relied on extrapolation from official statements. These works typically blamed factors such as nationalism and strategic thinking for the alliance’s breakdown. But recent works have used newly released documents from China and former Eastern bloc nations to challenge our understanding of how and why the world’s foremost Communist nations turned from staunch allies to bitter foes. These works emphasize the importance of ideological disputes, toxic personal politics between Soviet and Chinese policymakers, and Soviet domination of the alliance as principal factors in the split.

Austin Jersild, an associate professor of history at Old Dominion University, has made a fascinating contribution to this debate with The Sino-Soviet Alliance. Most studies of the split examine how Mao Tse-Tung, Nikita Khrushchev, and their key advisers influenced events from 1950 through 1962. Though Jersild structures his book around Mao’s two visits to Moscow in 1949-1950 and 1957, he largely eschews a high politics-centric approach. Instead, Jersild favors a bottom-up approach. Using archival documents from China, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, Jersild examines how interactions between low and mid-level officials on both sides of the alliance contributed to the split.

As part of the 1950 treaty, roughly 20,000 cultural, economic, and scientific advisers from the USSR and other Eastern Bloc states traveled to China to guide the newly Communist nation on how to advance according to Marxist principles. For many of these officials, engaging in this form of komandirovka (work-related travel), was a serious task, and they worked hard to build constructive relationships with their Chinese brethren. But a significant number treated the trips as opportunities to consume vast quantities of alcohol while staying in luxury accommodations. And even advisers who remained sober often acted in ways that reminded Chinese officials of colonialism. These actions ranged from using rickshaws – hated vestiges of China’s colonial past – to graver offenses such as treating cultural, economic, and scientific exchange like a one-way street. Though the advisers may have been eager to teach the Chinese, they were generally not eager to learn from their hosts. Officials from Central Europe were often the most adamant that the still agrarian China had little to offer the industrial USSR. Such treatment frequently exacerbated tensions.

Soviet and Central European advisers in China were also present for what they (and Moscow) saw as an increasingly radical Chinese path during the late 1950s. China acknowledged the USSR as the leader of the Communist bloc after Khrushchev’s 1956 “Secret Speech” in which he denounced Stalinism. But that support was reluctant, since Khrushchev’s speech had infuriated Mao. China expected that in exchange for its support, the USSR would begin exercising increased reciprocity in the Soviet-Chinese intellectual exchange. The Soviets refused to do so. That refusal occurred in part because in 1958, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward. An effort to rapidly industrialize China, the Leap led to mass famines and severe economic damage. Soviet advisers in China, along with their Central European colleagues, were horrified by Mao taking such an extreme course, and were the first to alert Moscow. That reaction helped isolate China from the rest of the socialist bloc.

To the Chinese, such a reaction constituted Soviet imperialism and a betrayal of Marxism.

Ideological disagreements proved increasingly damaging to the Sino-Soviet relationship. Mao had intended the Great Leap Forward as a challenge to the Soviet system as well as to the West. Conflicts over interpretations of Marxism worsened until Khrushchev withdrew the advisers during the summer of 1960. Jersild argues Khrushchev did so in large measure due to a concerted Chinese effort to convince the advisers of the Chinese system’s superiority. The withdrawal led the Chinese to lose whatever inhibition they might have had otherwise in making a similar outreach effort to the rest of the socialist bloc. But that effort largely failed. While other members of the socialist bloc might have had disagreements with the Soviet system, they did not see the Chinese as saviors due to the depth of Mao’s radicalism.

Ultimately, Jersild contends that the legacy of colonialism destroyed the Sino-Soviet alliance. China’s long history under colonial rule not only left many Chinese officials sensitive to slights from Soviet and Central European advisers, but also imbued them with a strong desire to build China into a powerful state on their own terms. For their part, Soviet officials inherited the legacy of Russian imperialism, while the Central Europeans often thought themselves superior even to their Soviet bosses. Both groups tended to treat China as a “backward” nation in need of civilizing, similar to how Western colonial powers had acted during the 19th century.

The Sino-Soviet Alliance is a welcome addition to the historiography on the split. Jersild’s work is well argued and comes with an impressive source base. His many examples of friction between Soviet, Central European, and Chinese officials demonstrate how poor personal politics between low and mid-level officials can undermine alliances. His decision to structure the book around Mao’s two trips to Moscow is curious, given that Mao is not a principal actor in his argument. The book’s somewhat dense prose and narrow focus make it most appropriate for readers at the graduate level and above. But overall, The Sino-Soviet Alliance is an excellent ground-level study of how the alliance began, evolved, and ultimately fell apart.


By Britnee Smith (M.A. Student, Temple University)

Hajimu Masuda’s new book, *Cold War Crucible*, focuses on the post-World War II world in the United States, China, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Great Britain to explain the creation and acceptance of a global Cold War paradigm. He identifies his work as a cross between traditional diplomatic history and social history and local and global histories. He focuses less on the decision making of elite politicians and more on political grassroots movements. Consequently, his study shows how the Cold War paradigm was not solely a top-down creation, but also a reality forged by both ordinary people and elite policy makers. He compares the idea of a global Cold War to an imagined community. According to Masuda, it was created in several nations in the aftermath of World War II to respond to social and political upheaval. He argues that “by tracing the social construction of a fantasy of the Cold War world, it reveals that the actual divides of the Cold War existed not necessarily between Eastern and Western camps but within each society, with each, in turn, requiring the perpetuation of the imagined reality of the Cold War to restore and maintain order and harmony at home.” His work adds to the body of scholarship that emphasizes the links between foreign policy and domestic politics as both elites and local peoples participated in the construction of an imagined Cold War. As the subtitle signals, Masuda identifies the Korean War as central to the creation and adoption of a global Cold War mentality.

In an effort to trace the construction and adoption of a global Cold War paradigm in many, but not all, nations, Masuda divides his work into three largely chronological and thematic sections. The first and shortest section focuses on the period between 1945 and 1950. This section highlights the social upheavals caused by World War II in the United States, China, and Japan. The second section examines the months following the start of the Korean War and focuses on the domestic politics of the United States and China. The third and final section studies the various domestic purges that occurred in the United States, China, Japan, Great Britain, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

Masuda places the Korean War in a global context. His work, however, does not focus on the Korean War itself. In Masuda’s work, the war acts as a catalyst for the acceptance of a global Cold War paradigm. He shows how people in the United States, China, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Great Britain interpreted the outbreak of the Korean War. He argues that one of the chief functions of the Korean War in various postwar societies was its symbol as the beginning of World War III. The fear of World War III was strongest in those nations most involved in World War II. In contrast to those countries directly dealing with the legacy of World War II, Masuda argues other nations did not interpret the Korean War as the outbreak of World War III and were less likely to adopt the Cold War framework. These countries included many in Africa and South America who were undergoing decolonization and post-colonial transformations. Consequently, Masuda shows how the Cold War was not a universal paradigm in what is traditionally understood as the early Cold War period, but a framework actively created and adopted in several nations for domestic reasons.

Compounding the fear of World War III, many postwar societies faced social upheaval during the aftermath of World War II. Masuda identifies the resulting political and social purges as a global conservative backlash against the various social changes of World War II. The domestic purges included the suppression of counterrevolutionaries in China, the White Terror in Taiwan, the Red Purge in Japan, the crackdown on “un-Filipino” activities in the Philippines, McCarthyism in the United States, and anti-strike and anti-labor drives in Great Britain. By placing the domestic purges into a larger global context, Masuda shows the commonalities between each movement and identifies a broader trend of the postwar period. Masuda uses the purges as a way to understand how local politicians used the Korean War and the idea of a global Cold War paradigm to support domestic conservative backlashes against social changes wrought by World War II.

Masuda, an assistant professor of history at the National University of Singapore, utilizes archival material from nine different countries. His impressively researched work questions the traditional historiography of the early period of the Cold War by showing how the creation of a global Cold War framework was more than a top-down, geopolitical, and ideological confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. By focusing on local politics and using social history methods, Masuda shows “how grassroots conservatives fought and suppressed various kinds of postwar change under the name of the global Cold War confrontation, and how power operated in such contexts, not just from the top down, but from the bottom up.” Masuda’s offers a new perspective on the postwar world and questions the strength of a global Cold War paradigm in the late 1940s and early 1950s. While Masuda includes several nations as examples, the Soviet Union was absent from his study. Future studies can and should examine the value of Masuda’s ideas in other nations. Masuda’s ideas and research make *Cold War Crucible* a thought-provoking work that is recommended for graduate students interested in the early postwar world and the Cold War.


By Jesse Curtis (Ph.D. Student, Temple University)

On September 13, 2007, the United Nations approved the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In the face of overwhelming support from member states, just four countries cast dissenting votes: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. Not coincidentally, all four countries strongly in the field of Native American studies. Audra Simpson’s study of the Mohawks of Kahnawake, an Iroquoian reserve community in southwestern Quebec, is an excellent ethnography of indigenous life told from a settler colonial framework. Simpson convincingly shows that contested sovereignties, colonialism, rights of citizenship, and the very meaning of nation continue to shape life in contemporary settler
colonial states such as Canada and the United States. The resonance of these themes—from Palestine to Tibet and beyond—is quite familiar to historians of foreign relations. *Mohawk Interruptus* compels North American historians to examine these questions closer to home.

In six chapters, Simpson deftly moves across boundaries of political theory, history, and ethnography. At the core of the book are her oral interviews and careful ethnographic observations revealing indigenous political life under the umbrella of the settler state. For Simpson, settler colonialism is an ongoing project rather than an accomplished fact. She argues that the Mohawks of Kahnawa:ke practice a politics of refusal that carves out what she calls nested sovereignty within the sovereignties of the settler states. They speak of themselves as a nation and act accordingly. For example, many refuse U.S. and Canadian citizenship. They reject U.S. and Canadian passports and claim the right to travel across borders using their own Haudenosaunee passports. They insist on the applicability of the 1794 Jay Treaty, which allows trade with other indigenous nations across settler state borders. They retain the prerogative to determine citizenship status in Kahnawa:ke and use it as an assertion of indigenous sovereignty. Precisely because belonging in Kahnawa:ke is a political and rights-bearing question rather than only a matter of cultural identity, conflicts over membership rules have been intense. In these ways and more, indigenous people declare and perform the existence of the Iroquois Confederacy as a nation distinct from the sovereignties of the settler states layered over it.

What exactly are the Mohawks of Kahnawa:ke refusing by rejecting citizenship in one nation and claiming it in another? They reject the recognition offered by the settler colonial state. Couched in the garb of multiculturalism, settler states purport to honor the cultural identity of indigenous peoples. For Simpson, this is only the latest iteration of the settler state’s centuries-long project to discard indigenous peoples’ claims to land. Cultural recognition, bathed in nostalgic tones of essentialized identity, sidesteps contemporary indigenous sovereignty claims. In this multicultural milieu, so-called real Indians are those who are dramatically distinct from the settler society around them, their cultural practices preserved as if in amber from an earlier era. In the settler-state imagination, they are not modern political actors with sovereign capacities. But through their politics of refusal, the Mohawks of Kahnawa:ke insist on political sovereignty rather than mere cultural recognition. As they struggle in practical ways against the constraints of settler state sovereignty, they experience the United States and Canada not as settled facts but as present projects threatening to eliminate their political life and national identity.

Simpson’s study of the Mohawks of Kahnawa:ke raises three main arguments that are transferable and relevant to scholars across a range of disciplines. First, historians must attend to the ways multiple sovereignties can exist in tension with one another. Simpson’s notion of nested sovereignty reminds us that the sovereignties of modern states are assertions as much as accomplished outcomes. Second, her argument complicates the popular assumption that the suite of individualizing rights and privileges offered by the modern liberal state is a self-evident good. For indigenous peoples, such citizenship can raise the specter of national destruction and lost sovereignty. Third, her argument calls historians to rethink nation-state-centered approaches that often obscure alternative ways of imagining sovereignty and identity. The study of nation-states and the relations between them—their contested claims, their wars, their treaties—is central to much diplomatic and military history. Yet these national and international stories often take certain kinds of sovereignty claims for granted. This is particularly so for a superpower such as the United States.

Implicit in many historical accounts is the assumption that the sovereignty claims and borders of the United States are settled. Such narratives declare that when it comes to the construction of the American nation-state, the end of history is effectively here. This posture bars the possibility of a future devolution of the American settler colonial project. Simpson’s book is a potent reminder that indigenous people did not stop being political actors with the declared closing of the so-called frontier. They have resisted, and do resist, the assimilationist sovereignty claims of settler states. They claim their own nationhood. In short, perhaps the most striking claim is also the most obvious: historians do not know what the map of North America will look like a century from now.

*Mohawk Interruptus* deserves a wide reading beyond the fields of anthropology and Native studies. Simpson’s book is a call for scholars to take seriously the political life of indigenous peoples and reject the supposed polarity between nation and indigenous. Her insights into contested questions of sovereignty, rights, land, and citizenship can be read with great profit by scholars of political science, diplomatic history, and foreign relations. Though the book is likely to be a difficult read for undergraduates, graduate students and seasoned scholars alike will find it useful.

**CENFAD News & Updates**

The Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy is pleased to announce it has received a generous donation from the estate of Colonel Joseph J. Freaney, Jr., USAF, that will allow the center to expand its programs.

Freaney was born January 10, 1915, and grew up in Bradford, Pennsylvania, a town of about 15,000 people in the northwest of the state. In 1938 he graduated from Temple University, where he was president of the senior class. He attended law school at Ohio State University before joining the Army Air Corps in the fall of 1941.

During the World War Two Freaney served as a flight instructor at Spence Field in Georgia and Maxwell Field in Alabama. Later in the war he was stationed at Randolph Field, Texas, where he trained veteran combat pilots to be flight instructors.

After World War Two Freaney worked at the U.S. Air Force headquarters at the Pentagon and was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1952. In 1955 he transferred to the Rhine-Main Air Base in West Germany. After leaving the Air Force, Freaney practiced law in Virginia. He died January 12, 2006 and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

As a result of Freaney’s generous support, we propose creating a Center for the Study of International and Transnational History (CITH) to be housed within CENFAD. CITH will build and sustain a “virtual” global classroom that will bring U.S.- and internationally-based students and faculty together from a range of institutions around the world to consider crucial questions in World, Empire, and Culture. This innovative program will encourage graduate students to explore the impact of the global on the local, national, and regional, creating a transnational learning experience for Temple’s graduate students. Look for more details on the program in our next issue!

**Faculty**

In addition to hosting another successful semester in CENFAD’s Colloquium series, Director Richard Immerman chaired the search for the inaugural CENFAD postdoctoral fellowship. He is extremely excited that Kyle Burke, who completed his Ph.D. at Northwestern and spent this past academic year at NYU’s Center for the United States and the Cold War, will be joining CENFAD
in the fall. Immerman, who returned this spring to the US Army War College as the Francis DeSerio Chair in Strategic Scholarship, found time for some scholarly endeavors as well. Enlisting Lori Gronich as his co-author, he overhauled his article “Psychology” for the third edition of Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, which Cambridge University Press published in March. And because Oxford University Press decided to publish a paperback edition of the Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, Immerman and co-editor Petra Goedde made sure all the chapters were up to date and error free. A “book talk” at the 92nd Street Y on Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provided an opportunity for a reunion with Beth Bailey. And in March Immerman delivered the Gary Hess Lecture on Policy History at Bowling Green. Drawing on research for his new project, Immerman’s title was “A Grain of SALT: Arms Control, the Soviet Threat, and the War on the CIA.”

Jay Lockenour, associate professor of history and chair of the History Department, recently organized the 15th Modern Germany Workshop at Temple’s Center City campus. Participants included faculty and graduate students from Temple, Queen’s College/CUNY, Rutgers, Johns Hopkins, St. Joseph’s University, Villanova, Moravian College, and Central European University in Budapest. Dr. Lockenour presented a paper entitled: “War Stories: State Control, Authenticity, Propaganda 1898-2015.”

Eileen Ryan, assistant professor of history, just returned from the archives after being awarded a CLA Research Award to begin research for a project tentatively titled “Settlers, Refugees, and Citizenship: Decolonization in the Italian Republic.” She is looking into the process of repatriation from colonial territories as Italian colonial settlers were classified as refugees at the end of the Second World War.

Gregory J. W. Urwin, professor of history, addressed “How Did the British Lose the American Revolution?” on December 5, at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center and then engaged Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy in a round table discussion of the latter’s book, The Men Who Lost America.

Urwin spoke on March 16 at Philadelphia’s National Liberty Museum on “Emory Upton Looks Outward: The U.S. Army, Europe, and the Reform Legacy of the Civil War” during an evening devoted to “The Geopolitics of the American Civil War.” Co-sponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Free Library of Philadelphia, the event was part of the 2016 One Book One Philadelphia program.

On April 16, Urwin presented a paper, “‘To Bring the American Army under Strict Discipline’: British Army Foraging Policy in the South, 1780-81” at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History in Ottawa. Urwin’s paper was part of a presidential panel devoted to “Setting New Borders in British Army History.” The SMH also honored Urwin with the Edwin H. Simmons Memorial Service Award, which is presented annually for “particularly outstanding service” to the society.

At the start of the spring 2016 semester, Temple’s Office of Alumni Affairs flew Urwin to Atlanta, Georgia, to entertain local donors to the university with a lecture on “Getting to the ‘Real War’: Racial Atrocities, Reprisals, and the Civil War” during a catered affair at the Atlanta Historical Society. Urwin wrapped up the semester by conducting an external review of the Humanities Department at Philadelphia’s University of the Sciences.

Finally, Urwin received a research fellowship from the Robert H. Smith International Center of Jefferson Studies and will spend the month of July at Thomas Jefferson’s Monticello working on his current book project.

Graduate Students

Tyler Bamford, Ph.D. Candidate, has been awarded an ABC-CLIO research grant from the Society for Military History to continue research on his dissertation, tentatively titled “‘Hands Across the Sea’: American and British Military Attatchés and the Anglo-American Military Relationship, 1919-1941.” Tyler received the award on April 15 at the Society for Military History’s Annual Meeting in Ottawa where he also presented a paper based on the research he has completed so far.

Jesse Curtis, Ph.D. student, is enjoying his final semester as the CENFAD Davis Fellow while preparing for comprehensive exams in May. He had the pleasure of sharing some of his new research at Temple University’s James A. Barnes Graduate Student Conference in a paper entitled, “Crafting the Colorblind Campus: White Evangelicals and Black Students in the Civil Rights Era.” His article, “Remembering Racial Progress, Forgetting White Resistance: The Death of Mississippi Senator John C. Stennis and the Consolidation of the Colorblind Consensus,” will appear in the journal History & Memory in 2017.

This semester, former Davis Fellow Carly Goodman finished and defended her dissertation, "Global Game of Chance: The U.S. Diversity Visa Lottery, Transnational Migration, and Cultural Diplomacy in Africa, 1990-2016," thanks to generous funding from SHAFR and the support of her committee including advisor Richard Immerman. She will be presenting work at several conferences in the spring and early summer, including the 10th Annual Greater New York Area African Historians Workshop, Law & Society in New Orleans, SHAFR in San Diego, and Ghana Studies Association's meeting in Cape Coast, Ghana. Her painting won second place in its category at the 118th Annual Student Exhibition of the Fleisher Art Memorial in South Philadelphia.

Brian McNamara, Ph.D. student, is adjusting well to the rigors of the Ph.D. program at Temple. This semester was a busy and productive one. In addition to his coursework, Brian presented a paper drawn from his master’s thesis entitled “A Crisis of Credibility: The Ford Administration, Congress and the Battle over Angola” at the Ohio University History Graduate Student Conference, and Temple’s own James A. Barnes Conference. A generous travel grant from CENFAD helped defray the costs of attending the former conference. This summer, Brian will revise and submit his article for potential publication – fingers crossed! He looks forward to following in Jesse Curtis’ prodigious footsteps as CENFAD’s 2016-17 Davis Fellow.

Former Davis Fellow Kaete O’Connell, Ph.D. candidate, recently received a Roosevelt Institute Grant which will fund a trip to the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library this summer. In March, she participated in the annual Heidelberg Spring Academy hosted by the University of Heidelberg’s Center for American Studies, where she enjoyed the opportunity to discuss her dissertation in an interdisciplinary environment. She will travel to Austria in July to present at a conference on Children and War hosted by the University of Salzburg.

Britnee Smith, M.A. student, had the honor of serving as part of the Planning Committee for the Twenty-First Annual James A. Barnes Conference for graduate students. She also had the great pleasure to intern at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) this semester. She worked with Dr. Ronald J. Granieri.
and Dr. Michael P. Noonan as a research intern.

Silke Zoller, Ph.D. candidate, had a good start to her year when she received SHAFR’s Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant. She will be using the grant to visit archives throughout Germany in the summer. This research is also supported by Temple University’s Global Studies Graduate Student Research Grant. Before her travels, Silke will be busy with conferences. She just gave a paper at the twenty-first annual James A. Barnes Graduate Student Conference, and is excited to be presenting at the Twenty-Third International Conference for Europeanists in April and the SHAFR 2016 Annual Meeting in June.

Friends & Alumni

John A. Bonin (Ph.D., 2006) Colonel, U.S. Army (ret.) has been recently reappointed to serve for three more years as the Professor of Concepts and Doctrine at the U.S. Army War College located at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Assigned to the College’s Center for Strategic Leadership, he and his colleague major Jason Warren, Ph. D., provide doctrinal advice to the faculty and students. He also supports the center’s other programs such as strategic wargaming, the Basic Strategist Art Program, and the General Officer Joint Force Land Component Commanders Course. In May 2014, he and Major Warren conducted a “Drawdown Conference” at Carlisle concerning the long history of military draw downs in America. The papers of the proceedings, edited by Major Warren, will be published by NYU Press this fall. More recently this past December, Dr. Bonin and Major Warren conducted a “Strategic Landpower” Conference appraising the Army’s performance over the past fifteen years. Bonin also continues to work with U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to redesign and reshape the U.S. Army for 2025. For the College of Strategic Landpower, he serves as a resident course seminar historian, provides electives on landpower and Greco-Roman Warfare, and supports the Distance Education Program. As part of his duties during the past three years, he made presentations on doctrine and provided advice to the U.S. Army Pacific in Hawaii; the U.S. Army Africa in Vicenza, Italy; U.S. Army Cyber at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia; U.S. Army Europe in Wiesbaden, Germany; and the National Defense University in Astana, Kazakhstan.

Daniel J. Cormier, Colonel U.S. Army, completed his first year teaching in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. He teaches the Theory of War and Strategy and National Security Policy and Strategy courses, which form half of the core curriculum. He is also the Director of Middle East Studies and teaches regional Studies Course. He continues to chip away at his dissertation and misses the days of attentive inquiry at Temple.

Marc E. Frey (Ph.D., 2002) is the Executive Director of Bancroft Global Development, a non-profit and venture partnership working in conflict zones. He is also a senior affiliate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ International Security Program. He recently served as a guest lecturer at the U.S. Military Academy and at the University of California Washington Center, where he led the Africa-focused section of a U.S. Foreign Policy course taught by fellow Temple alumnus Christopher Preble.

John McNay, Professor and Chair Department of History, Philosophy, and Political Science at the University of Cincinnati - Blue Ash, has been awarded a visiting research fellowship at the Nobel Institute in Oslo, Norway. While there in April and May, he will be giving a talk entitled: "I Would Rather Have Peace than Be President": American Presidents Choosing Peace from Truman to Obama." The book project he is working on is tentatively titled, "Presidential Decisions for Peace.”

The national American Association of University Professors honored McNay with the Al Sumberg Award for his lobbying efforts with the Ohio legislature on behalf of the higher education. He has been elected to a second term as the president of the Ohio Conference, AAUP, which represents about 6,000 faculty. He also received the Faculty Senate Award for Exemplary Service to the University of Cincinnati.

Tim Sayle (Ph.D., 2014) is winding down his two-year Postdoctoral Fellowship at Southern Methodist University’s Center for Presidential History. In July, he will take up his new appointment as assistant professor of history (Modern Global Security) at the University of Toronto. He recently published an article “A Great List of Potential Mistakes’: NATO, Africa, and British Efforts to Limit the Cold War” in Cold War History; the article was derived from a chapter in his Temple dissertation.

David J. Ulbrich (Ph.D., 2007) continues to serve as an assistant professor of history at Rogers State University, and as senior instructor in Norwich University’s online M.A. in Military History program. Ulbrich is currently on research leave to complete The History of the U.S. Army Engineer School, 1802-2016. This official history will be the first book-length study of its kind to appear in print.

Ulbrich and Temple alumnus Matthew S. Muehlbauer have signed a contract for the second edition of Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-first Century. Routledge will publish this in 2018. Ulbrich and Muehlbauer also teamed up to make a presentation on their book at the Army Heritage and Education Center. Lastly, they are co-editing an anthology titled The Routledge Global History of War and Society. Forthcoming in 2018, this anthology will include contributions from several other Temple historians, including Bobby Wintermute, Eric Klinek, Michal Dolski, Jason Smith, and Jay Lockenour.

Ulbrich continues to be active in Marine Corps history. He was awarded the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation’s 2016 Colonel Robert Debs Heinl Jr. Prize for his article titled “The U.S. Marine Corps, Amphibious Capabilities, and Preparations for War with Japan.” Ulbrich’s critical review of Aaron O’Connell’s book Underdogs was published in the inaugural issue of Marine Corps History. This peer-reviewed magazine will publish a research note by Ulbrich in a future issue. Ulbrich also presented papers at the U.S. Marine Corps Recruitment Command’s National Operations and Training Symposium, the U.S. Army Command and Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.

Paul Zigo is pleased to announce that he has retired from Brookdale Community College effective December 31, 2015. He has now assumed the responsibility of directing and promoting the World War II Era Studies Institute. The Institute is dedicated to furthering knowledge and understanding of the World War II era and its impact on history. A few programs available for presentation before associations, clubs, and classes are “The Longest Walk: Story of the 29th Infantry Division on D-Day 6 June 1944,” “D-Day, 6th of June, 1944: A Near Failure – Why Did It Succeed,” “The Strategy to Defeat Imperial Japan. 1943-1945,” and “A Failure of American Diplomacy – Summer 1941: The Proposed Roosevelt-Konoye Meeting.” Anyone interested in arranging for a presentation, may contact Zigo at WW2ESI@gmail.com. He is looking forward to committing time and effort through the institute to shedding further light on an era that changed the world.