By Silke Zoller (Ph.D. Candidate, Temple University)

Security checkpoints are indispensable at modern airports. Air travel is an everyday feature of our current lives, and passenger screenings are a necessary byproduct of navigating this mode of transportation safely. Woe to the unwary traveler who forgets to remove shoes or belt buckles in time, has deigned to bring more than three ounces of liquid in a single container, or does not take a notebook computer out of its bag? With passenger screening ubiquitous, it is hard to imagine an era in which the U.S. government would categorically refuse to support airport security measures. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, the Nixon administration did not want to expend political capital and federal resources on airport security, even when faced with a rising threat of domestic and Palestinian-backed hijackings. Instead, the U.S. turned to multilateral diplomatic negotiations, hoping to create an international treaty which would deter hijackers and simultaneously undermine Palestinian and other national liberation movements. These negotiations failed. It took the threat of a nuclear catastrophe in 1972 before the Nixon administration finally implemented mandatory passenger screenings at home. Even then, the administration could not resist trying to link airport security with its diplomatic efforts against national liberation movements, and it was this connection that finally secured the introduction of passenger screening practices at U.S. airports.

Until the late 1960s, security screenings at U.S. airports occurred at the discretion of the airlines operating there. Most companies did not want to overly inconvenience their customers, and nearly all passengers boarded without having their luggage or their persons searched. This approach did not deter hijackings in general – there were hundreds of hijackings in the U.S. in the late 1960s. The American public, however, did not consider hijacking a political issue. Most hijackers in the U.S. in the late 1960s were U.S. citizens, and either criminals or political fugitives trying to reach Cuba. Since Fidel Castro’s government returned the hijacked passengers and planes promptly, being hijacked seemed more like a thrilling tropical island detour than an actual threat. For the U.S. and its European allies, hijacking became a political threat from 1968 onward, when Palestinian Fedayeen began targeting large international flights in order to gain recognition and support for their national liberation struggle against Israel. The 1967 Six Day War radicalized Palestinian guerilla fighters, and small groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), began focusing on airplanes and airports well outside of the Middle East. Their key targets were the national airlines of Western industrial democracies, and U.S. airline companies such as Pan American World Airways and Trans World Airlines suffered multiple hijackings in 1969 and 1970. Compounding this problem was the global expansion of international civil aviation in the 1970s. As airplanes became an affordable mainstream mode of transportation, the amount of potential targets for hijackers rose as well.

These facts notwithstanding, the Nixon administration, with the support of U.S. airline companies, resisted instituting higher security measures within American airports, fearing that these precautions were too expensive both politically and fiscally. The administration instead turned to diplomatic initiatives, advocating in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a UN agency, for a convention which would force all countries to extradite hijackers (or face harsh sanctions instead). This proposed convention placed the burden of acting against hijackers on the destination countries of hijacked flights. The American initiative stalled, however, as developing nations resisted the American delegation’s proposals. Many developing nations represented in ICAO had recently weathered their own national liberation struggles, and they sympathized with the PLO and other national liberation fighters. Hence, they refused to universally condemn and criminalize hijackers who might be national liberation fighters.

Meanwhile, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), the union representing a majority of U.S. airplane pilots, lobbied heavily in the State Department and Federal Aviation Administration to institute security screening measures at U.S. airports. Most pilots were scared of potential injuries or deaths resulting from hijackings, and they favored expensive preemptive measures over after-the-fact extradition. In 1970, ALPA President Charles Ruby presented the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with a detailed list of recommended security measures, which included the full screening of passengers and their baggage with x-ray or magnetometer scanners. With strong support from ALPA, the FAA instituted a prototype program at the New Orleans airport, testing magnetometer scanners which project electromagnetic fields in order to detect metal weapons.

Though screening technology and procedures were available, the Nixon administration still shied away from this expensive form of civil aviation security. After the Dawson’s Field Hijackings in 1970, when the PFLP held three airplanes and over three hundred hostages in Jordan, President Nixon tried a constrained militarized solution. Within days of the hijacking, he introduced a Sky Marshal program that would place armed marshals on flights originating in the U.S. He drew on military personnel to serve during the interim period before several hundred marshals could be trained. This program did not mandate any passenger screening, however. Federal reticence about passenger screening persisted for the next two years, even as mainstream presses in the U.S. and elsewhere began writing about the actions of the Fedayeen as “international terrorism.”

The Nixon administration’s stance on airport security changed on November 10, 1972. Three fugitives hijacked Southern Airways Flight 49 (Memphis, Tennessee, to Miami, Florida), taking the airplane on a four-thousand-mile journey which ended in Havana, Cuba, the following day. The hijackers threatened to cause a nuclear disaster by crashing the airliner into the High Flux Isotope Reactor at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee, and received two million dollars in ransom from Southern Airways. Cuban authorities returned the plane, passengers, and ransom, imprisoning the hijackers for eight years before extraditing them to the U.S.

The threat of a nuclear disaster finally provided the political capital the Nixon administration felt it needed in order to
institute preemptive airport security measures. On January 6, 1973, the FAA put into effect Federal Aviation Administration Regulation (FAR) 107.4, which required the screening of 100 percent of passengers at all airports within the U.S., and on all flights operated by U.S. air carriers. The Nixon administration shifted the financial burden for these measures onto local institutions and airline corporations. A range of small airports asked their Senate representatives to lodge protests with the FAA, claiming that they could not shoulder the burdens of hiring additional law enforcement officers to serve as screeners. The FAA, however, refused to make exceptions or delay the introduction of FAR 107.4. Congress did allot funds for the FAA to purchase previously tested magnetometer scanners and other security equipment. The FAA passed on this equipment to U.S. registered airlines, who took over its operation. To cut management costs, the FAA quickly turned over the titles of the equipment to the airlines. By mid-1973, U.S. air carriers operated security detection equipment by themselves in both U.S. and in foreign airports, which shifted the financial burden of civil aviation security onto them.

The State Department sought to exploit these new passenger regulations diplomatically. Negotiations over hijacker extradition and sanctions against non-extraditing countries were still stalling within ICAO. The American delegation took the lead in international civil aviation security, promising aid to any country that would support its strict sanctions policy for extradition offenders. Though the State Department hinted that it might provide magnetometer scanners, the aid actually offered consisted mostly of airport inspections and information materials about screening technology. The FAA also trained foreign airport security officers in passenger screening procedures at its Transportation Safety Institute in Oklahoma City.

American officials thus utilized their novel airport security screening measures in order to promote a strict international anti-hijacking convention and punitive sanctions regime. A range of countries took up the U.S. offer, sending officers to the FAA for training, and asking for FAA inspectors to recommend security measures for local airports. These countries were most often U.S. allies, however, and they did not connect civil aviation security aid to the American hijacker extradition efforts. Developing nations still ardently opposed U.S. laws about passenger screening to force higher civil aviation security standards onto other states. Instead of acting multilaterally, U.S. officials thus utilized American standards to measure other countries, and attempted to unilaterally influence their civil aviation practices.

2 For a detailed analysis of U.S. hijackings to Cuba, see Teishan Latner, “Take Me to Havana! Airline Hijacking, U.S.-Cuba Relations, and Political Protest in Late Sixties America,” _Diplomatic History_ 31, 1 (2015), 16-44.
3 A congenial description can be found in “What to do when the Hijacker Comes,” _Time_, December 6, 1968, 82.
6 William Rogers, “Memorandum for the President, Subject: Aircraft Hijacking,” September 17, 1969, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record Group 59: Records of the Department of State (RG59), Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF) 1967-69, AV 12 US, 9/16/69.
9 Memorandum from William V. Vitale, Executive Secretary, FAA, to Mr. Moore et al., “Meeting with Mr. Charles Ruby on Aircraft Hijacking,” July 31, 1970, NARA, Record Group 237: Records of the Federal Aviation Administration (RG237), Administrative History (A1), Office of the Administrator (14), 8040 Hijacking 1970 (2).
With the use of hundreds of bases abroad at the annual cost of about 71.8 billion, revealing that the country currently maintains about eight magnificent maps, Vine emphasized the scale of U.S. bases, Abroad Harm America and the World based on his new book, David Vine (American University) delivered a keynote address Friday evening at Temple University and Director of CENFAD), the symposium opened on Friday, October 9, and Saturday, October 10, CENFAD brought together a community of interdisciplinary scholars for a symposium on U.S. bases and the construction of American hegemony. The symposium offered a space for distinguished participants in the emerging field of base studies to discuss new frameworks, ideas, and information. The symposium also provided these scholars an opportunity to network with each other.

The first panel of the day, “Local Meanings: Negotiating an Empire of Bases,” highlighted different examples of the relationship between U.S. bases and host nations. Rebecca Herman (University of California, Berkeley) presented her research on Latin America and American military bases during World War II. Herman explained how those bases in Latin America became a sensitive regional issue by raising questions of sovereignty. Eric Andrew Schewe (University of Michigan) spoke next about his study of Egypt during World War II. He traced the role of bases in the transition from British hegemony in Egypt to American hegemony in that country. Lauren Hirshberg (Stanford University) delivered the final presentation of the panel on the role of American bases in the Marshall Islands during and after World War II. Hirshberg focused on the tensions between the American military on Kwajalein Island and the neglected inhabitants on Ebeeye Island.

The second panel, “Paths of Power: From Disaster Relief to Drone Landscapes,” examined base environments and base missions. Andrew Friedman (Haverford College) presented first on the imperial nature of the American base system during World War II. He showed how the construction of the international base system followed colonial trading routes, included colonial labor, and prescribed colonial notions of race. Julia Irwin (University of South Florida) sounded a more positive note. Her presentation drew attention to the connections between American military bases and American disaster relief. She highlighted how U.S. military bases abroad are integral to America’s supremacy in providing humanitarian logistics. The last presentation in this panel by Mark L. Gillem (University of Oregon) focused on the landscapes of U.S. bases abroad and the role of drones in the base system. Gillem showed how drones are changing the pattern of base construction and landscape by moving bases from highly visible areas into remote areas away from protestors.

Organized by Andrew Buchanan (University of Vermont), Susan Carruthers (Rutgers University-Newark), Gretchen Heefner (Northeastern University), Marilyn Young (New York University), and Richard Immerman (Temple University and Director of CENFAD), the symposium opened Friday evening at Temple University’s Center City Campus. David Vine (American University) delivered a keynote address based on his new book, Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World. With the use of magnificent maps, Vine emphasized the scale of U.S. bases, revealing that the country currently maintains about eight hundred bases abroad at the annual cost of about 71.8 billion dollars. He persuasively argued the overabundance of overseas military bases does not enhance America’s national security. They are expensive and wasteful, exacerbate tensions between the U.S. and host countries, and potentially antagonize U.S. strategic rivals. Vine’s remarks emphasized the importance of academic research on American military bases.

Following Vine’s address, Amy Austin Holmes (American University in Cairo) screened her recent documentary, Occupy Turkey: Resistance in Base World. The film provided an overview of American base history in Turkey following World War II. Through interviews with surviving Turkish participants, Holmes highlighted the tensions the American bases caused between Americans and Turks and the related Turkish protest activities. Holmes concluded her film by examining the initial American plan to use bases inside Turkey to support the 2003 invasion of Iraq. She described how Turkey linked anti-war and anti-base sentiments to reject the American plan. Holmes’ film served as an insightful complement to Vine’s opening presentation by showcasing a concrete example of the tensions caused by American overseas military bases.

Early Saturday morning, participants gathered at Temple University’s Main Campus for a day of panels and discussions. The first panel of the day, “Paths of Power: From Disaster Relief to Drone Landscapes,” examined base environments and base missions. Andrew Friedman (Haverford College) presented first on the imperial nature of the American base system during World War II. He showed how the construction of the international base system followed colonial trading routes, included colonial labor, and prescribed colonial notions of race. Julia Irwin (University of South Florida) sounded a more positive note. Her presentation drew attention to the connections between American military bases and American disaster relief. She highlighted how U.S. military bases abroad are integral to America’s supremacy in providing humanitarian logistics. The last presentation in this panel by Mark L. Gillem (University of Oregon) focused on the landscapes of U.S. bases abroad and the role of drones in the base system. Gillem showed how drones are changing the pattern of base construction and landscape by moving bases from highly visible areas into remote areas away from protestors.

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Following a lunch break, conference attendees filled into a third panel on “Occupations: Germany and Japan.” Susan Carruthers (Rutgers University-Newark) presented her work on interactions between American service personnel and inhabitants of Okinawa from 1945 to 1955. She explored the idea of a “good occupation” by examining the cultural products created during the occupation. Jennifer M. Miller (Dartmouth College) then spoke next about her study of Egypt during World War II. She traced the role of bases in the transition from British hegemony in Egypt to American hegemony in that country. Lauren Hirshberg (Stanford University) delivered the final presentation of the panel on the role of American bases in the Marshall Islands during and after World War II. Hirshberg focused on the tensions between the American military on Kwajalein Island and the neglected inhabitants on Ebeeye Island.

The final panel of the day, “The U.S. Basing System and
the Long Twentieth Century,” focused on the creation of an international base system in the twentieth century. Andrew Yeo (Catholic University of America) and Stacie Pettyjohn (RAND Corporation) addressed the expansion of U.S. military bases from 1898 to 2015. Challenging the paradigm of “informal empire,” they demonstrated how realist-strategic motivations have shaped the American base system from the mid-twentieth century onwards. Daniel Immerwahr (Northwestern University) closed the panel with his work on the role of islands in the construction of U.S. military power in the post-World War II era. He traced the relative unimportance of remote islands before World War II to the strategic importance they acquired in the aftermath of World War II.

The papers and the lively discussions following each panel reflected the questions driving the field of base studies. Scholars explored the role of military bases abroad in U.S. foreign policy, military strategy, and humanitarian aid. The wide array of examples ranged from the core nations of American occupation such as Germany and Japan to the Marshall Islands, Turkey, and Latin America on the periphery. All these examples underscore the prominence of military bases in influencing American foreign relations for good or ill. The symposium successfully highlighted the importance of base studies to both academics and mainstream audiences and emphasized the need for continued attention to this field.

Further Reading and Viewing:


CENFAD’s 2016 Spring Colloquia

Please save the date for the great speakers coming to CENFAD this spring!

**Bradley Simpson**

“Self-Determination, Human Rights and the International History of the Cold War.”
January 20, 2016

**Alessandro Giorgi**

“Vikings in Vietnam”: Norwegian Captains and CIA Clandestine Operations in North Vietnam.”
February 10, 2016

**Jennifer Mittelstadt**

February 23, 2016

**Tim Naftali**

“Thinking in JFK Time: Making Sense of Kennedy’s World View.”
April 14, 2016

**Book Reviews**


By Danielle K. Scherer (Ph.D. Student, Temple University)

In the 1980s, when Western powers were actively trying to advance democracy throughout the world, they spent virtually nothing on democracy promotion. Today, Western states spend billions annually in the name of advancing democracy, good governance, and human rights. Rather than funding direct challenges to non-democratic regimes, however, they focus on programs that teach civics, support civil society groups, train the media, and encourage the integration of women into politics. Sarah Bush asks, “What explains this ‘taming’ of democracy assistance?”

Bush responds to this question by challenging the prevailing explanations in the economic, political, and sociological literatures that argue that variation in democracy promotion can be examined by looking at the preferences of donor states and the characteristics of the states they target. Bush argues that we need to understand the complex position of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that inhabit the space between donor states and target states. She notes that much of the literature on democracy promotion fails to explore how aid works on the ground and fails to acknowledge the potential disconnect between state preferences and outcomes when donor states delegate democracy promotion to NGOs, which are charged with designing and implementing programs. In order to understand why democracy promotion has been tamed, Bush argues that we need a transnational approach to examine how NGOs navigate strategic interactions between both leaders of the countries that fund them and leaders of the countries where they work.

Perhaps the most impressive feature of Bush’s text is her triangulation of sources and methods to tell her story. In addition to utilizing a three-decade data set on democracy promotion for her quantitative analysis, she utilizes archival research, field research from Washington D.C., Jordan, and Tunisia, and more than 150 interviews to inform her narrative. Exploiting these sources, Bush demonstrates that NGOs are driven by self-interest to ensure their survival, which she argues is dependent upon two factors: access to target states and funding from donor states. Bush argues that these two needs encourage tamer democratization programs. In order to win access to target states, NGOs cannot directly challenge the regime or they would not be permitted to work within the state. As a result, NGOs are forced to pursue programs that do not directly confront dictators. Instead, they craft programs that target countries will tolerate if not embrace. Bush demonstrates that NGOs depend almost entirely upon donor states for their operating budgets. As a result, NGOs respond to donor preferences, thereby producing programs with clear, quantitative, measurable outcomes to justify their work.

Donor preferences are intensified within what Bush terms the democracy establishment where the number and professionalization of NGOs has increased exponentially over the past 30 years. Due to their increased competition for limited resources from donor states and their need to produce easily identifiable results, NGOs are incentivized to create programs that have highly quantifiable measures and that are less ambitious. NGOs have grown increasingly professionalized over time in order to interact with the institutions within donor states
that require these highly quantified results. This professionalization within NGOs is a direct result of the survival pressures that they experience. Bush notes that not only does this professionalization result in the perpetuation of easily measured programs, but it also coincides with a taming of the organizations themselves. This taming of the organizations has contributed to the taming of the projects they wish to enact, leading to NGOs pursuing less ambitious programs.

Bush provides a nuanced understanding of democracy promotion by disaggregating types of democracy promotion with a typology she creates in Chapter 3 and maintains throughout the text. She distinguishes twenty different categories of democracy assistance. What is more, she further refines the concept by separating out the measurable from the immeasurable categories and distinguishing those regimes compatible with democracy assistance from those which are not. She finds strong evidence that NGOs engage in measurable, regime-compatible programs focusing on local governance, business and enterprise promotion, and women’s representation, but pursue few projects in areas that are not measurable or regime-compatible. For example, NGOs refrain from establishing and promoting political parties, building trade unions, funding dissidents, and empowering youth. Bush notes that those programs that fail to meet the regime-compatible and measurable criteria are those that would in fact contribute the most to promote democracy in the short term. This leads Bush to the controversial finding that there is, “no evidence that tame projects that best generate funding and access are effective at democratizing countries.”1 Indeed, her data suggests that such projects as establishing gender quotas or monitoring elections that aim to promote democracy in the long term may in the short-term inadvertently reinforce the target state regime’s strategies of authoritarian survival.

Bush’s quantitative and archival findings fit with the narratives provided by the practitioners she interviewed. The consensus among the latter is that some of the most crucial outcomes of democracy promotion are not measurable and are not being actively pursued by the current democracy establishment. Bush challenges us to question the efficacy of the massive spending made in the name of democracy promotion, suggesting that to promote real democratic change, we need institutional changes in the funding process to reward programs that more directly challenge authoritarian rulers.


By Brian McNamara (Ph.D. Student, Temple University)

Over the past two decades, the continent of Africa has gained a measure of prominence in the study of the Cold War and American foreign relations. Historians such as Thomas Borstelmann, Brenda Gayle Plummer, and Penny Von Eschen have argued that while the United States may never have given Africa its undivided attention, that continent certainly merited more than a cursory glance. Perhaps no other historian, however, has done more to situate Africa’s importance during the Cold War, not just to the United States, but also globally, than Piero Gleijeses. Gleijeses’ 2002 book, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, showed that Africa was not only a site of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, but that it was also a place where Cuba was able to exert its international muscle. Gleijeses’ most recent book, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991, continues to develop these themes.

Gleijeses sets out to correct the idea that “American skill and persistence” was the key factor in the 1988 negotiations that ended the South African and Cuban presence in Angola. 1 In fact, many of Gleijeses’ arguments about the United States refute the idea that its politicians showed either much skill or persistence when it came to Africa. Instead, he argues, it is Cuba that must be understood as “the engine” of change in Southern Africa. 2 The primary factor holding back the United States from achieving meaningful policy change, particularly under the Reagan administration was, according to Gleijeses, “empathy for South African whites.”3 By contrast, Cuba, and particularly its leader, Fidel Castro, were motivated to intervene by its desire to join in “the struggle against racial oppression.”4 Proceeding in a more-or-less chronological manner, Gleijeses explains how the tension between American support for the South African apartheid regime and Cuban support for black self-determination led to the perpetuation of geopolitical tensions both in Southern Africa and in the belligerent states of the Cold War more generally.

Gleijeses exhibits a facility for breathing life into the dusty policy documents found in the archives. His work truly shines when he sheds light on the ways Cubans supported African nation-building projects beyond the provision of military advisors. In particular, his discussion of the thousands of Cuban aid workers, who provided needed medical, technical, and administrative support to Angola as it developed as a nation after its independence adds needed complexity to the image of Cuba as simply a Soviet proxy in the region.5 Gleijeses’ access to individuals who participated in these missions helps to humanize his tale of global geopolitics. Moreover, as Gleijeses indicates throughout this book, Cuba often took action independent of the USSR, proving that it could chart an independent course in foreign policy. 6 Indeed, one of the fundamental tensions that animated the tripartite relationship between Cuba, Angola, and the USSR was the assignment of troops, particularly in Cuba’s desire to fight the interlopers from South Africa, leaving Angola in charge of handling domestic opposition to the MPLA regime. 7 The USSR vehemently opposed this strategy, but such opposition did not always translate into tangible action on the part of Cuba, as Gleijeses’ detailed recounting shows us.

Gleijeses’ work rests on deep and wide-ranging archival research. Displaying a facility with multiple languages, Gleijeses has plumbed the archival depths of no fewer than twelve countries in support of his argument. Most impressively, Gleijeses is the only western scholar who has been allowed to read the 1986-1989 GHQ files. This access enables him to enlighten readers to a site of foreign policy creation which has, in many ways, remained opaque. Gleijeses’ international research also allows him to move his narrative beyond the paradigm of the Cold War. While the Cold War suffuses the actions of all of the major players, Visions of Freedom also foregrounds shifting racial attitudes, and the decolonization process in ways that narrower works might not. This is evident in the amity that Fidel Castro felt toward Angolans, in a way that went beyond their shared Communist ideology.

Gleijeses’ interpretation of archival documents can, at times, produce difficulties in his work. There are many instances throughout the book in which he seems to accept the content of archival documents more or less at face value, often resorting to long block quotations to convey the course of events. 8 It is imperative, particularly with the Cuban documents, which he had been privileged to see, that Gleijeses interrogate his archival sources more thoroughly. To his credit, however, it is evident that
Gleijeses pressed his interview subjects more firmly and their testimony comprises an incredibly valuable source of information. Thus, while this reviewer was occasionally frustrated with Gleijeses’ less-than-probing approach, the richness and importance of his archival work generally offsets the book’s weaknesses.

Over all, Visions of Freedom is a compelling and well-argued book. It serves as a valuable corrective to the idea prevalent during the Cold War, which suggested that Cuba was simply a Soviet proxy, thus diminishing its importance and independence in the international arena. Moreover, the book reminds readers that nations whose interests are antagonistic to those of the United States can act from complex motivations and possess identities beyond their status as America’s foes. Indeed, Gleijeses’ analysis in the macro sense sometimes falls prey to this trap, leading him to frequently offer broad declaratory statements about of the “failure” of American policy toward South Africa. In contrast he ascribes more altruistic motivations to Cuban intervention. When Gleijeses gets down to the nuts and bolts of Cuban policy, however, his analysis is stellar precisely because it highlights that Cuba’s actions should not be understood in terms of black and white, but rather in terms of grey. This subtlety, and the monumental archival material that Gleijeses brings to bear on the discussion, constitutes Visions of Freedom’s lasting contributions to the historiography.

2 Ibid., 15.
3 Ibid., 178.
4 Ibid., 15.
5 For example, see Ibid., 78-82.
6 For example, see Gleijeses’ discussion of the Cuban decision to augment its troop numbers to lead an offensive on the Angolan city of Cuito Cuanavale in November 1987: Ibid., 409-414.
7 Ibid., 220-225.
8 Ibid., 15-16.
9 For example, see Ibid., 110.


By Manna Duah (Ph.D. Candidate, Temple University)

The Juggler is a compilation of Warren Kimball’s essays on American foreign policy during the Second World War. Kimball’s previous work on Franklin Delano Roosevelt is the basis for his claims about the underlining assumptions of that President’s personal foreign policy. Kimball argues that we should visualize foreign policy as operating at three levels – tactics, strategy, and assumptions. Assumptions are hard to identify, as policymakers, particularly Franklin Roosevelt, rarely discuss them.¹ The context and nuance of policy is important. The assumptions under which leaders operate are tied not only to how they see themselves, but also how they see the world.

The Juggler does not necessarily reveal new information about the Roosevelt presidency or American foreign policy during the Second World War. Kimball’s story, however, complements the narrative by acknowledging the descriptions of Roosevelt as selfish, immature, and incapable of giving his subordinates directives about goals. The President was, however, a juggler rather than a bungler because of his consistent personal assumptions which shaped the New Deal and FDR’s attempts to extend American policy abroad. Kimball argues that beyond the personalities of political actors, their deep-seated assumptions matter.²

Kimball’s contribution extends beyond the Second World War into challenging the narrative on the Cold War. The Cold War narrative has been a consequence of Western suspicions over Soviet interest and intentions. These suspicions shaped the United States’ reluctant alliance with the Soviets during the Second World War, and the ensuing peace allowed both parties to retreat to their ideological standpoints.

Kimball shows that Roosevelt was far from a cold warrior. He was more concerned with British imperialism, which he saw as the bigger threat to the new international system. The vague language of the Atlantic Charter’s call for self-determination applied to both the British and French governments. To Roosevelt, neither Britain nor France was a true democracy. Rather, Roosevelt’s relationship with Britain, and his assumption that the USSR would become a more powerful postwar partner to the United States, shaped his relationship with the Soviets during the Second World War. Continued peace and stability required at least a working relationship with the USSR. Roosevelt saw America’s relationship with Britain as a way to save Britain from herself, and prevent a repetition of Britain and America’s pre-depression economic policies.³⁴

Kimball’s substantive arguments regarding Roosevelt’s core assumptions permeate his examination of the US-Soviet relationship. There were tensions over the treatment of diplomatic officials in Washington and Moscow, and each nation distrusted the intentions of its ally.⁵ After Germany declared war on the USSR, Roosevelt agreed to offer aid to the Soviets if they stayed in the war.⁶ Concerns about the postwar world order affected Roosevelt’s thinking. He believed a victorious USSR would emerge from the war with power comparable to the USA’s. Based on hope and intuition, he believed the USSR would interpret aid as a sign of good things to come. US policy became giving as much aid to Russia as possible without compromising national security.⁷ He tried to hide his attempts to meet with Stalin during his Tehran trip in November 1943 from Churchill, as the British could object to an alliance with the USSR.⁸

Roosevelt was dedicated to great power cooperation. During tensions over British intervention in Greece, he suggested increased economic cooperation in Greece with the Soviets.⁹ He saw no sense in fighting the Second World War in a way that set the stage for a third.¹⁰ Because of his assumptions about the postwar order, Roosevelt supported peaceful coexistence and cooperation, and hoped whatever the imperfections of the Yalta peace conference, its agreements could be shaped over the years to guide a peace that would prevent the tensions other treaties had failed to stop.¹¹

Kimball’s language regarding Stalin may at times be inflammatory and not particularly academic, but his narrative is a welcome intervention, even if it repeats familiar arguments. Kimball’s work convincingly defends Roosevelt’s actions during the Second World War as consistent, because they stemmed from his core assumption about the nature of the postwar world: the USSR would be a great power. He challenges assumptions about the alleged Anglophobic bent in American policies, the Cold War’s roots in the Second World War, and places principles firmly within the realm of legitimate diplomatic history enquiry. Future research that examines the assumptions behind the USSR’s responses to Roosevelt’s overtures would be a great contribution to Cold War literature.

2 Ibid., 5
3 Ibid., 59, 60, 61, 65, 67.
4 Ibid., 27.
Marc Matera’s *Black London: The Imperial Metropolis and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century* delves deeply into the lives of individuals who helped to turn London simultaneously into the heart of the British Empire and the movement against it. He argues that London served as a place where members of the global black diaspora could participate in intellectual and cultural exchange. Through these interactions a sense of connectedness emerged between peoples of West Indian and African descent and to a lesser extent African Americans as well. The identities developed in interwar London served as foundations for the decolonization movements that occurred after World War II.

Matera offers a compelling blend of cultural, political, social, and intellectual history showcasing not only the well-known diasporic figures such as Jomo Kenyatta, George Padmore, and Marcus Garvey, but also the lesser known jazz musicians, pimps, and graduate students who interacted with each other and the British public in London’s public and private spaces. These spaces show how prevalent ‘black’ areas were in London, from the student hostels in Camden and Islington, to the intellectual zones in Bloomsbury’s squares or Hyde Park corner, and to the seedy Soho underworld of dancing, gambling, and prostitution. Matera is at his best when he gives micro-level breakdowns of specific neighborhoods or blocks and the cosmopolitan makeup of the ‘imperial metropolis.’

Matera makes a conscious choice to ensure that African voices are well represented in his book. This intervention challenges the historiographical narrative of Black London as a primarily West Indian space. It is especially important now that Black Londoners of African descent outnumber Black Londoners with West Indian roots.

Matera covers the period between 1918 and 1948 thematically, with chapters addressing subjects as varied as Black Feminist Internationalism, interracial sex, and the development of colonial studies. Consequently, Matera’s source bases are quite varied. He cites at least sixty different newspapers and periodicals and materials from archives in London, Oxford, New York, New Haven, and Los Angeles. Individuals from across the Atlantic world produced these materials. Each chapter makes a solid argument that fits into the larger goals of the text and does so well.

The strongest chapters, and those of most interest to the readers of this newsletter, are the first two dealing with the formation of various intellectual communities in London. These chapters show how such communities became involved in anti-imperial activities in the lead up to World War II. Matera demonstrates that privileged individuals from various imperial outposts met in state and privately run student housing and shared their experiences of empire and developed a collective identity. These newly formed groups interacted with each other and with global Marxist movements in London’s public sphere. Black authors published in Marxist periodicals and some even joined the Communist Party. Matera shows that through the formation of new political coalitions London became a city at the heart of empire where anti-colonial rhetoric and ideas could flourish.

If this book warrants a small complaint, it would be for its lack of maps. A single map appears before the introduction, but readers would be better served if more street-level views of London were integrated into the text as photographs and visual sources are. Maps would help show how London evolved throughout the period Matera covers, especially if maps were paired with those showing the same spaces at different points in time.


By Britnee Smith (M.A. Student, Temple University)

Sargent’s important new book, *A Superpower Transformed*, focuses on the 1970s as a decade of pivotal transformation in American foreign policy. He aligns his work with those scholars who view the 1970s as a decade of disruption and breakdown of the postwar era. Sargent adds to this growing body of scholarship. As the word “transformed” in the subtitle signals, he argues that beginning even before the end of the Vietnam War, America’s status as the linchpin of a stable Cold War was overwhelmed by the forces of globalization.

Sargent, as assistant professor at the University of California, writes top-down history of the best kind. Focusing on Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and their principal advisors, he uses recently declassified material to explore their attempts to formulate a grand strategy for American foreign policy. By examining their differing strategies, Sargent highlights the uncertainty of their choices and the rise of complex international forces beyond individual control. Sargent argues that the decade of the 1970s “were years of Soviet-American détente, but they were also years when the Cold War ceased to define world politics (if indeed it ever had done) and new challenges proliferated.”41 Sargent’s purpose is to show how American leaders responded to the new challenges.

Following a chapter on the consolidation of the international postwar era in the 1940s and the destabilization of the order in the 1960s, Sargent divides *A Superpower Transformed* into two sections. The first assesses Richard Nixon’s presidency (1969-1974) and his attempt to stabilize the Cold War era on favorable terms for the United States. The second section continues the story by examining the presidencies of Gerald Ford (1974-1977) and Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) and their attempts to adapt American foreign policy to meet new challenges. The challenges that American leaders faced in the 1970s included the disintegration of the Bretton Woods monetary system, energy crises, the rise of human rights, geopolitical changes in the Third World and China, and tied to them all, the emergence and intensification of globalisation.

Laying his foundation by delving deeply into Nixon’s attempts to stabilize the Cold War international order, Sargent argues, “Radical as his diplomatic maneuvering would be, Nixon did not transcend the assumptions of the Cold War, which held that the superpowers and their competition were what mattered in world politics.”42 Nixon’s goal, and perhaps more famously that of Henry Kissinger, was to preserve the Pax Americana of the early Cold War. Consequently, Nixon worked within the Cold War order to cut spending, reassert American primacy, revitalise the national economy, and preserve equilibrium with the Soviet Union in military capabilities. Nixon and Kissinger relied on
diplomacy and progress towards détente as a means to achieve their ends. Sargent makes it clear that Nixon sought to cement rather than transcend the Cold War order. Consequently, notwithstanding the reputations both he and Kissinger sought to cultivate after they left office, Nixon’s strategy forfeited opportunities for such fundamental initiatives as transnational humanitarianism, financial globalization, and energy interdependence.

Sargent concludes his first section with the Oil Crisis of 1973-1974, emphasizing how that transnational episode showcased the limits of Nixon’s geopolitical strategy. The oil crisis also, he argues, caused Kissinger to rethink some of the foundations of his Cold War strategy. Sargent’s portrayal of Kissinger provides a segue to the book’s second section, in which he identifies the Ford administration as a creative period between Nixon’s conservative Cold War strategy and Carter’s attempt to transcend the Cold War framework. Both Ford and Kissinger maintained Nixon’s goal of preserving the international postwar order through détente. Nevertheless, Sargent detects a consequential if not dramatic change. He notes, “Nixon had sought a tryst with adversaries; determined to remake the Pax Americana in a more multilateral guise, Ford and Kissinger worked to cultivate cooperative relationships with core allies on a variety of issues, including the management of common economic dilemmas.”

Ford and Kissinger thus began to move away from the comfort of the Cold War framework and acknowledge the evolution of an interdependent, indeed globalized, world order. It was left to Jimmy Carter to transcend the Cold War framework entirely. Carter’s strategy, while poorly articulated, centered on world order politics with human rights as a primary factor. “World order politics,” Sargent explains, “proceeded from the assumptions that technological modernization was contracting space and time; that transnational relations were rendering nation-states interdependent, if not obsolete; and that mass literacy and mass media were globalizing human aspirations.”

Sargent argues Carter’s strategy broke with his predecessors’ strategies and created a post-Cold War foreign policy. Sargent also shows, however, how events after 1978 destroyed Carter’s strategy. International factors such as a second oil crisis, rising tensions generated by the Soviets in response to the human rights campaign, the Iranian Revolution and Hostage Crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced Carter to re-adopt aspects of the conservative Cold War strategy.

Sargent demonstrates how international forces beyond Nixon’s control forced him to confront new challenges that his strategy could not accommodate. By the end of the decade, the opposite would occur. International forces, some of the very same international forces, would compel Carter to adapt older Cold War strategies to his post-Cold War foreign policy. Ultimately, Sargent contends that the challenges faced during the 1970s allowed the United States to adapt its superpower role to an era of globalization. In his conclusion, Sargent notes the Soviet Union by contrast was not able to meet the challenges of globalization.

Sargent’s work offers a sympathetic yet convincing portrayal of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski as they attempted to craft grand strategies during a period of change. By focusing on elite policymakers and their foreign policy strategies, Sargent does not engage the various cultural, political, and social changes that occurred in the United States. Sargent’s purpose is to enhance our understanding of American foreign policy during the 1970s by situating that decade as the beginning of the contemporary world. Sargent’s persuasive argument makes A Superpower Transformed an important new work.
at the University of Florida at Tallahassee on November 17-19, marking the hundred-year-anniversary of the onset of the U.S. occupation of Haiti. He continues to work on his next book, provisionally titled, *The Containment of un-American History: The Ironic Fate of ‘Consensus’ Historical Scholarship in the Cold War U.S.*

Eileen Ryan, assistant professor of history, has begun researching a new topic on Italian colonial settlers as refugees at the end of the Second World War. This work is part of her larger project on decolonization and Italian national identity. She is examining questions including the role of colonial soldiers on Italian soil, and how decolonization fit with the idea of purging a fascist past in the Italian republic.

Gregory J. W. Urwin, professor of history, continues to serve the Society for Military History (SMH) as a member of its Long-Range Planning Committee, an ex officio member of its Board of Trustees, and its delegate to the American Council of Learned Societies. After seeing his son married last June, he conducted research on his book about the 1781 British invasions of Virginia. Urwin punctuated his summer by delivering invited lectures at the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania; Civil War Museum of Kenosha, Wisconsin; Ann Arbor Civil War Round Table; and North Jersey Civil War Round Table. He is currently preparing a paper on British Army foraging policy in the South in 1780 and 1781 for the SMH Annual Meeting in April 2016. He hopes to publish an expanded and revised version of that work in the *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*. Urwin is also writing a short article for the on-line *Journal of the American Revolution*.

**Graduate Students**

Alexandre Caillot, Ph.D. student, is in his first year at Temple. He has had four book reviews published on H-War (part of H-Net: Humanities and Social Sciences Online) over the last several months.

Jesse Curtis, Ph.D. student, is enjoying the privilege of serving as the Thomas J. Davis fellow at the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy. Assisting with CENFAD’s fall lecture series and editing *Strategic Visions* have been challenging and rewarding experiences. Last spring Jesse won the award for best paper in modern U.S. history at the James A. Barnes Graduate Conference at Temple University. In addition to finishing coursework and preparing for comprehensive exams next semester, Jesse has an article undergoing revisions for publication.

Carly Goodman, Ph.D. candidate, spent most of June in DC, Berlin, and Paris as a Humanity in Action Diplomacy and Diversity Fellow. In June at SHAFR’s annual conference, she was awarded the Dissertation Completion Fellowship. This fall, she presented a paper at the Immigrant America conference in Minneapolis, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 1965 Immigration Act. Then she spent a month conducting research, including doing oral history interviews in English and French, in several cities across Cameroon in Central Africa. This research was supported by grants from The History Project & The Institute for New Economic Thinking and Temple’s Global Studies Program.

Silke Zoller, Ph.D. candidate, was delighted to be a co-recipient of CENFAD’s Marvin Wachman Fellowship in Force and Diplomacy. She is using the fellowship to visit numerous smaller archives throughout the United States, researching the various actors who will be appearing in her dissertation, which is tentatively titled “Internationalizing Counterterrorism: Combating the Threat of Terrorism in the United States and Western Europe, 1968-1980.” She also just won a Global Studies Graduate Student Research Grant from Temple University’s College of Liberal Arts, with which she will visit archives in Germany next year. In May, she presented a paper about “States and Non-State Actors in Counterterrorism” at the conference “States and Terrorism: An Ambivalent Relationship,” hosted by the Graduate Institute Geneva in Geneva, Switzerland.

**Friends & Alumni**

Drew McKeivitt (Ph.D., 2009) is in his fourth year as an assistant professor of history at Louisiana Tech University, where he teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in postwar U.S. history and the history of U.S. foreign relations. Currently, he is completing a book manuscript under contract with the University of North Carolina Press. The book began as his dissertation on the consumption of Japanese goods in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. He also recently authored a chapter on popular culture in Beth Bailey and Richard Immerman’s edited collection on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, published this fall by New York University Press. In addition to teaching at Louisiana Tech, Drew helps to run an annual summer camp, sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security, that introduces high school students to a multidisciplinary approach to cyber security issues.

Jason W. Smith (Ph.D. 2012) is presently the Class of 1957 Post-Doctoral Fellow in Naval History at the United States Naval Academy. He recently received an advance contract from the University of North Carolina Press for his book, *Controlling the Great Common: The U.S. Navy, the Marine Environment, and the Cartography of Empire in the Nineteenth Century*. He is also under contract to write the chapter, “War and Environment” in *The Routledge History of Global War and Society* edited by Temple alumni David Ulbrich and Matthew Muehlbauer. In the spring, he will present a paper at the meeting of the Society for Military History alongside two more Temple alumni, Michael Dolski and Eric Klinek.

David J. Ulbrich (Ph.D., 2007) has been teaching at Rogers State University since 2013. In addition, he continues to serve as a senior instructor, course developer, and capstone advisor in Norwich University’s online M.A. in Military History program. Ulbrich will be on research leave in the spring 2016 semester to write the official history of the U.S. Army Engineer School. This book will trace the evolution of the engineer education and training from 1802 until the present. In addition, Ulbrich’s article titled “The U.S. Marine Corps, Amphibious Doctrine, and Preparations for War with Japan” was published in the peer-reviewed *Marine Corps University Journal*. He reviewed books for *Michigan War Studies Review* and the inaugural issue of Marine Corps History. Ulbrich also lectured at Ball State University, University of Dayton, SUNY Maritime College, the Army War College, and the International Congress of Historical Studies (Jinan, China) during the fall 2015 semester.

The textbook, *Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century*, co-authored by Ulbrich and Temple alumnus Matthew Muehlbauer, has been selected as required reading for all cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Their text was also reviewed by Joseph Henrotin in *Défense et Sécurité Internationale* (Belgium), Jeremy Black in *War in History* (Scotland), and Richard Stewart in *International Bibliography in Military History* (The Netherlands). Muehlbauer and Ulbrich are currently collecting chapter contributions for their co-edited anthology *The Routledge Global History of War and Society*. Finally, they lectured on “Ways of War” at the New York Military Affairs Symposium in October; and they are...
scheduled to make a similar joint presentation at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center in February 2016.

Paul Walsh (M.A., 1994) published an article, "The Hand on the Rudder: Murtaugh 'The Great' and Irish Naval Power, 1086-1115" in the latest issue of Medieval Warfare magazine. The article uses the career of Muirchertach Ui Briain (1050-1119), who sought to establish unchallenged control over Ireland, as a means of exploring the nature of the naval forces available to Irish rulers in the 12th and 13th centuries. They employed fleets of warships both in Ireland and across the Irish Sea. Regarding the latter, the loaning of naval forces to royals and nobles in neighboring Britain elevated aspiring kings of Ireland to the level of regional power brokers in the British Isles.